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SELECTIONS

FROM MY

RECENT NOTES

ON THE

INDIAN EMPI

By

DINSHAH ARDESHIR TALEYARKH/

LATE SECRETARY TO THE ASSOCIATION OF THE CHIEFS OF KATTYWAR, NO
CIPAL COMMISSIONER FOR HIS HIGHNESS THE GUICWARS TEEBI
AUTHOR OF TRAVELS IN SOUTHERN INDIA, THE BARODA REVOLUTIO
BRITISH POLIOY AND INDIAN FAMINES, REPRESENTATION ON KAT
AFFAIRS, THE FORCES OF THE NATIVE STATES, AFFAIRS IN AFGHAN
THE NATIVE PRINCES' OWN BOOK

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Vincit Omnia Veritas

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Vincit Omnia Veritas

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED AT
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1886

THIS WORK

IS

RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED,

WITH PERMISSION,

To

THE RIGHT HON'BLE

LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL, M.P.,

LATE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

AND NOW

CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER & LEADER OF THE HOUSE OF C

SC.

SC.

SC.

By

His most Dutiful Servant,

THE AUTHOR

THE RIGHT HON^{BLE}
LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL, M.P., C.I.E.,
&c., &c., &c.

May it please your Lordship,

I am much obliged to your Lordship for condescending to accept the Dedication of this my humble Work.

As your Lordship is aware, I have not ventured to solicit this indulgence at your Lordship's hands till I had reason to believe that, though not expected to admit all that I wrote and had the privilege of submitting, your Lordship had, nevertheless, thought that my proposals and elucidations on the questions of the day deserved the practical consideration of Statesmen.

Thus kindly encouraged, it has given me great honor and pleasure to propose the Dedication to one who recently pleased all India with a sustained and historical visit, and subsequently with the valuable services rendered to our country as its Administrative Head.

It would be presumptuous on my part if I attempted to make this note a flattering one to your Lordship all I would, therefore, say with due deference, that it is your Lordship's singular and constitutional freedom from party conventionalism, prejudices, and stiffness which has always inspired in me hopes of your Lordship being able, in some near future, to deal with the affairs of Great Britain, its Dependencies, and Colonies in a manner which, while really raising them individually from time to time in the estimation of the civilized world, would also strengthen and purify their ties with Her Most Gracious Majesty's benign and world-wide Empire.

I beg to remain,

Your Lordship's most Dutiful Servant,

DINSHAH ARDESHIR,

Baroda, 28th July, 1886.

INTRODUCTION.

THE present work is mostly composed of some of my recent contributions on the leading questions of the day referring to the interests of this country.

The original circulation of these papers having been limited, it is deemed desirable on several public grounds to collect them in the present form, which is likely to obtain the required circulation.

So many interests vital to my countrymen are now-a-days cropping up that I am, perhaps, not wrong in assuming that my quarter of a century's treatment of practical questions affecting the advancement and welfare of India may secure to me the privilege of speaking to them with some authority on the subject-matter of this work.

Those of my readers who are accustomed to the writings of the rising writers and the sentiments of the extreme patriots who are now being formed—I of course exclude from this category those who rest on a higher platform—may not generally be prepared for an endorsement of all that I have advocated.

I do not, however, doubt that I will carry with me the sympathetic approval of the most experienced and practical portion of my countrymen, as also of those who have to deal directly with Indian matters and warmly interest themselves in the well-being of this country.

The very fact that careful readers will find in the work much of what I have maintained as being actually borne out

either by subsequent events or the adoption of identical views, suggestions, or proposals, will, I hope, secure the indulgence of the younger generations who, too, now form the brightest hopes for the social and political regeneration of India.

I hope this work, in due proportion to its scope and merits, may be able to demonstrate one of its intrinsic objects, that the task of rendering real, sustained, and permanent service to the country is indefinitely more difficult than an indiscriminate advocacy of our rights as sons of the soil, or a similar condemnation of the apparent factors which are held as actuating the impoverishment of the country, the party aims directed towards an uncompromising contention for effecting every unqualified good or restraining all durable influences in regard to the welfare of India, and the patriotic activity which, while finding a plentiful play in a plain and seemingly smiling region of operations, is yet lying fallow, in a concrete sense, in those thick and impenetrable forests of the social, political, economic, and religious sciences, as applied to native India, in which now lie buried the rays and splendour of the Mazdiasni-Christian Light, which alone can free our country from the unethical and effeminate shackles of countless ages, for working out a vigorous civilization within itself, and inspiring amelioration and freedom in the East in general.

In regard to the get up of the work, I cannot help observing that it is defective in several respects, as I could only attend to it during the scanty leisure which my heavy official duties would afford. Though I have rendered the arrangement of the various papers and essays pretty consistent, I have not allowed the links which mark the progress and

development of thoughts, sentiments, actions, and events, for the period in which they have appeared, to be marred, so that the principles which have guided me, and may well guide those interested in the good of our country and in the stability and progress of Her Majesty's Rule, may be placed in full relief.

I shall now pass on to a consideration of some significant portion of a practical plan on which our patriots may base their future line of action, and which may also serve to show how any earnest and impartial efforts to be exercised in behalf of India are besetted with the difficulties to which I have above alluded : dreary and forbidding though these difficulties may be, they are still calculated to open up real prospects of a humane emancipation before us, as these difficulties are systematically and single-mindedly encountered.

The present period in the Indian history is very extraordinary. The fate of the vast majority of the people of India is but slightly better than a wretched one. They are not capable of much exertions, and even if they did exert much, they could not place themselves in a position above the most common wants of life. Devoid of capital, or of much intelligence and genius, the earnings of many millions are not enough to build them up to any degree of prosperity. The populations grow, and their wants grow too. The demands growing out of these indefinitely increase, but the supply does not equally become abundant. The crucial point of such an aggravation is reached when a famine or other calamities occur. The starvation and death of millions then take place. The British Government have, no doubt, done their best to mitigate these frightful human disasters to an extent and in a manner which no Native Government ever did.

The Native Press still teems with expressions of disaffection, and the patriots of the country systematically inveigh

against the present system of the British Government. The Native Journals and the Native Associations constantly maintain that the Government is not all what it should be to the people of India, and that the lower, the middle and the upper classes are all being more or less impoverished and demoralized. The reasons assigned are the refusal of the Government to reduce the civil and military expenditures, to substitute native agencies in various administrations, and to grant more extensive and more sincere self-government to the country. Another general reason assigned for the prevalent popular disaffection is the tendency of the Government to go to war for annexation and other purposes which inflict ruining expenditures on India and vitiate its capacity for internal development and progress.

The notes published in this work serve to show in what manner and how far have we been influenced by these early clamours in India, which so inadequately come upon the surface. These clamours I recognize as being early, because the mass of the people are not so far civilized as to raise them for themselves, and those who have so deservedly elected themselves as their representatives have neither sufficient leisure nor all commanding resources to invest their advocacy with that truth, weight and dignity, the fullest amount of which alone can tell on a powerful Government like the British. The contest in which the leaders of Native India are engaged is often based on personal grounds, and there is the most valid excuse for this being so. They are drawn by the Western spirit, while the influence of wealth and power in India is hardly allied with the germs of public spirit, nor shines very considerably on those graced with education and culture. Much, therefore, of the patriotism in the Indian cause lacks in genuine strength and irresistible fulness of sincerity and sympathies which can only meet those who, while influential in wealth, power, and high intellectual capacity, are also animated by an earnest desire to see large measures of amelioration planned and enforced, not in the interests of any small section of society, but in the interests of vast populations.

The grave shortcomings of the Indian leaders do not of course aid the efforts of the Government in righting itself with the people. If it is not able to consult their interests fully, and in all matters, the labours of the leaders, which are only occasionally opportune or pointed, or the uncompromising hostility displayed by some of the younger educated generations, furnish the rulers with sufficient excuse to maintain a conservative and frigid policy which, no doubt, has good deal to do with the continuance of our public miseries. Any real reforms in Indian affairs will considerably depend upon the correct and adequate ability displayed by native politicians, both of a patriotic and administrative character.

I shall here attempt to show how the Government may be induced to initiate a reformed and national policy for the general and specific good of India. In thus forecasting, I may assume that the Indian leaders will generally follow the line of action which I have denoted.

(a) Every province in India must constitute a large assembly of educated and practical persons, which should regularly assemble once or more a month, and hold public debates on all matters concerning the public finances and their disposal.

The object of these debates should be to point out the irregularities of expenditures, the sources of legitimate, and the hardships of illegitimate, revenues, and the best methods of disbursements which would conduce to the prosperity and happiness of the people. The debates and representations should be systematic and untiring, and conducted with so much of practical knowledge, skill, and moderate force, that the competency of such debators to become Legislators and Executive Members of the Government would become self-evident.

(b) These Presidential and Provincial Assemblies should, to a certain extent, be fed by secondary Assemblies which should be established in district municipal towns or the chief cities in the districts. The debating powers should be widely cultivated, and no question should be taken up without collecting the utmost possible information thereon. Each important centre should have a capable Journal to publish the

debates *in extenso* and assist the objects of the Assemblies from time to time. After either a measure of reform, or an important proceeding of the Assembly is well discussed, and its general propriety fully recognized, the Assemblies should not rest till the Government has been induced to accept the recommendations made.

(c) One of the primary objects of these Assemblies should be to return members for District and City Municipalities and for the Government Councils. Before, however, attempts are made in this direction, members of the Assemblies should fit themselves for the said administrative functions by exercising and displaying their abilities in the Assemblies, which would be the training Schools for Politicians, as well as effectual agencies to publish the transactions of the Government as they may affect the moral and material condition of the people.

(d) The merits of all new appointments and vacancies should be regularly discussed in these Assemblies with a view to reduce expenditures and increase the number of appointments held by the natives of the country. The eligibility of all natives who are fit by experience and character to fill up responsible district and city appointments should be constantly discussed, while the claims of really able natives to appointments of Executive and Legislative Members should be systematically and sedulously pointed out.

(e) The number of members for each Assembly should be higher according to the extent and importance of the tract of the country it may represent. A Presidential Assembly should consist of a far larger number of representatives than a Town Assembly, as the number of popular and other members should be higher in a Government Council than in a Town or District Municipal Board. Each Assembly should, therefore, contain not only members sufficient for its own business, but also for its Municipalities and the Government Council according to the proportional numbers needed in each of such institutions.

(f) Every Assembly must command the services of a large number of members, for very great portions of them

will be absorbed in the Council and the Municipalities. Though a practical voting action cannot have much freedom at the outset, every Government will be aided in commanding the services of a large number of representatives capable of discussing public questions in State meetings.

(g) The Viceregal Council will contain the largest number of popular and nominated members, as it must represent every province of the Indian Empire. The principal Assembly of a Presidency will be entitled to send its representatives to the Supreme Council from its own body and from the members with a Governor's Council. Any Government will further be at liberty to nominate certain number of members, either from the people at large or from the Assemblies.

(b) The Assembly at the seat of the Chief Government in India may be termed the Chief Indian Assembly, which must be composed of the largest number of representatives, and to which every Presidential Assembly will be entitled to return a certain number of its own representatives.

(i) The Chief Indian Assembly will also have its corresponding Assembly in London composed of such number as may be possible to send there. The Chief Indian Assembly will be entitled to depute some of their members to the India Council, these being much fewer than those appointed to the Viceroy's Council, the India Office nominating Government members from the Assembly just mentioned, or directly from the people.

(j) The public meetings of the Governors', the Viceroy's and the Secretary of State's Councils may be held every three months, the Budget quarter being considered the more important of the rest. The popular or the nominated members will be entitled to put questions to the Government, in reference to any of its actions, or those of its servants, and elicit the necessary information thereon. All records or minutes of the Government will be open to the inspection of any member, who will also be entitled to bring forward, sufficiently early, any legislative or administrative measure which may be deemed by him or the public essential in the public interests.

(*k*) The early constitution of a popular representation allied with any Government need not be held absolute. The majority of a Government will, therefore, be empowered on the basis of good faith to throw out any measure or censure passed by a larger majority till such time as a responsible popular representation is tentatively introduced. The Viceroy's or the Secretary of State's Council will be at liberty to take cognizance of any such proceedings, either voluntarily, or at the instance of any subordinate popular Assembly, and decide on the merits of such a case.

(*l*) No proceedings of any Council will be held secretly unless the great majority, or an authorized minority wish it to be so.

(*m*) Members of any of the People's Assemblies, or of the Government Councils, excepting officials, will be entitled to appear as candidates for the British Parliament.

(*n*) At the outset India should be represented in the British Parliament by as many of its representatives as may harmonize with the number of its chief British Administrators. Each group of Native States may also return their representatives, if they can afford to do so. Any Native Prince who has granted some measure of self-government to his subjects will be entitled to a seat in the Council in the same manner as any ordinary member is returned or nominated.

The scheme that I have here somewhat roughly laid down should aim at creating at least 5,000 capable spokesmen for India, to influence the institutions of self-government and the Executive Governments, both here and in England. The larger number the better, for the purely popular Assemblies may, indeed, need numerous members to bring on for open discussion every village, district, city, provincial or State question affecting the people, financially, politically, socially, morally, or commercially. These thorough and fearless discussions abroad and prior to the holding of the Council and National Meetings will greatly help governmental proceedings and lay out a clear road for the popular members to follow and to confirm.

The labors of our public men and public bodies are much wasted, because they do not follow some intelligible and

consistent line of action as above briefly laid down. The 5,000 leaders required to follow one grand plan—composed of a set of well-joined constituents—are, by no means, a large number for India, and yet we cannot do with any much less number. We cannot create any large number as if by magic. Even in respect of securing a minimum number, we have to follow some consistent plan with uniform energy and perseverance throughout India. The Princes and wealthy classes should assist the present few leaders with funds, so that by the means of Associations and other methods they may succeed in adding to the present ranks of patriotic debators and writers. Some of the principal persons should travel throughout the country and encourage their countrymen to identify themselves with public affairs and open debating assemblies to discuss and place them in suitable forms before the Government.

It must be admitted with regret that a prominent portion of our patriotic labors is based on mere sentiment. While we should work out such a practical political scheme as I have here explained, we should also engage ourselves in other practical directions as I have elsewhere pointed out. It must be taken as an undoubted fact that, unless considerable new wealth is created in India, there is no hope for a better and more extended self-government, and a more sympathetic and congenial Imperial policy. The Indian leaders have, therefore, another urgent task before them, which they cannot neglect a year further. Instead of frittering away their ability and resources in less practical matters, they have to exert in getting a broad Imperial policy created for the various popular instructions of the masses—such as I have already indicated. Let them apply themselves sedulously to pointing out to Government how they might spare 5 or 6 crores a year in the cause of the Arts, Industries and Professions of the country. A complete exploration of the now hidden, but vast and inexhaustible, resources of the country is also a subject to which they should strive to direct the most practical attention of the Government. But the following pages treat of these and other questions fully.

RUSSIA, INDIA AND AFGHANISTAN.

PART II.

The Armies of Native States	63 to 67
Military Reorganization of the Indian Empire	67 to 71
The <i>Times</i> on the Army at Baroda	71 to 75
How may we become Volunteers?	75 to 78
Sir Lepel Griffin on the Armies of Native States	79 to 83
The Empire's Present Interests	83 to 87

xii

The Question of Reserves and Retrenchments	87 to 93
The Liberals <i>in extremis</i> , and India's Opportunity	93 to 97
The Great Change is Coming!	97 to 101
Resuscitation of the Armies of Native States	101 to 102
The Native Press, and how the Army Question is viewed in High Quarters	103 to 106

PART III.

INDIAN VICEROYS AND GOVERNORS.

Government in the Hills and the Plains	107 to 110
Lord Ripon's Indian Career	110 to 113
Viceroy in Transit	113 to 117
Earl of Dufferin at Belfast	117 to 122
The Town Hall Meeting at Bombay	122 to 131
The New Viceroy in India	131 to 135
Lord Ripon's Parting Speech	135 to 141
The Outlook	141 to 143
'The Eulogistic Literature of the Tombstone'	143 to 147
Declaration of Policy by the Earl of Dufferin as Viceroy of India ...	147 to 153
Retirement of Sir James Fergusson	153 to 156
The <i>Times</i> on Lord Ripon at Leeds	156 to 160
The Banquet at St. James's Hall	160 to 175
Lord Reay in Bombay and his Deputationists	175 to 182
Lord Reay's First Address to his Council	183 to 186
Earl of Dufferin's First Tour : The Speech at Delhi	186 to 189
The Speech at Ajmere	189 to 194

PART IV.

POLITICAL ASPECTS.

The London <i>Times</i> on Scurrility and Sedition in India	195 to 199
Indian Public Opinion in England	200 to 203
Political Activity in Bombay	203 to 206
A Political Meeting at Bombay	206 to 211
Lord Randolph Churchill on his Tour in India	211 to 215
The Change in Government and Lord Randolph Churchill	215 to 219
The Railway Racial Agitation	219 to 221
India's Appeal to the British Electors	221 to 226
Our Difficulties at the next British Elections	227 to 230
Elections in England <i>versus</i> Indian Affairs	231 to 232

PART V.**THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION.**

Administrative and Political Reforms in India	213 to 237
The India Council and its Vacancies	238 to 244
The Secretary of State on the Indian Finances... ..	244 to 258
Lord Ripon's Defence	258 to 265
Lord Dufferin's Bold Policy	266 to 268
Revival of the Income Tax	268 to 273
How the "Famine Insurance Monster" is dealt with	273 to 278
Statesmanship of Direct Taxation	278 to 283

PART VI.**NATIVE STATES.**

Kings and Queens in Native States	284 to 290
The Good Features of a Native Chief and his Administration... ..	291 to 294
Affairs at Hyderabad	294 to 297
A Leaf from the Past History of Indore	297 to 299
The Poet's Chapter at Baroda	299 to 302
The Speeches near Powaghad	302 to 303
The Projected Water works at Baroda... ..	303 to 310
India's Expedition against King Theebaw	310 to 312
Invasion of Upper Burmah	312 to 314
British Action <i>in re</i> the Buddhists and their King	315 to 319
The Crimes and Deportation of Theebaw How the Burmese Kingdom should be Restored... ..	320 to 323
The Secretary of State on Burmah	323 to 328
Annexation of Upper Burmah	328 to 333
The Viceroy's Speech at Mandalay	333 to 335
Earl Dufferin's Conquest of Upper Burmah	335 to 339
Mr Gladstone and the British Parliament on the Burmese War	339 to 346
The Restoration of the Gwalior Fortress to Scindua	347 to 348

PART VII.**NOTABLE DEATHS**

The late Sir Bartle Frere	349 to 354
Death of Kristodas Pal	354 to 356
Premature Deaths among Native Leaders	356 to 359
The late Model Patriot	359 to 363

A National Loss	364 to 365
The late Right Hon'ble Henry Fawcett, M.P.	365 to 366
India's Tribute to the late Mr. Fawcett... ..	367 to 372

PART VIII.

ABOUT WOMANKIND IN INDIA

Lady Dufferin's National Fund in India... ..	373 to 376
Progress of the National Movement	376 to 380
The Countess of Dufferin's Stewardship of the Indian Women	380 to 387
Parsi Women... ..	387 to 390
Higher Education for Native Ladies	390 to 395
Death of Her Highness Chinnabai of Baroda	395 to 397
The Royal Marriage in Gujarat	397 to 401
The Jubilee Year of our Queen	401 to 406

APPENDICES—

A	1 to 29
B	31 to 39
C	41 to 45

SELECTIONS FROM MY RECENT NOTES ON THE INDIAN EMPIRE.

PART I.

RUSSIA, INDIA AND AFGHANISTAN.

ON the advent of Lord Ripon in India, the present writer took special care in representing the state of affairs on the North-West frontiers of this Empire, presuming that, as the honest opinion of one of the thinkers in the country, it may count upon a passing reflection. The collapse of the political party in England about that time was, perhaps, too fresh to permit the new Viceroy to adopt a policy which the Conservatives had pushed on, but which the Liberals had, in a certain measure, denounced. Our own exposition of a policy in respect of the advance of Russia on the Persian and Afghanistan frontiers attempted to steer clear of the prejudices and passions which had rent England asunder in respect of its attitude towards Russia in Central Asia, knowing full well that the party in power, when the time came, was no likely to sacrifice Indian interests, or the British prestige.

In consequence of the recent subjugation of Merv by Russia, the old question of its advance towards India has again been agitated in the British Parliament. The Russian usurpation of Merv is likely, after some time, to lead to important frontier disputes between that country and Afghanistan. The Asiatic frontiers of Russia are now more closely conterminous with those of Afghanistan, with Sarakhs on the one extremity, and Kashgar on the other. Further, Russia has now approached the north-eastern frontier of Persia. England has not thought fit to check the Russian advance upon Merv. When Merv was to be annexed Russia declared its frontier line, east of the Sumber, would run north to the

Attock, in the boundaries of Deregez, Mahomedabad, Kilat and Sarakhs. Having got over the objective point of Merv, the Russians are naturally inclined to set up a delimitation between itself on the one hand, and the Persians, Afghans and Turcomans on the other. It is apprehended that the Attock will also, in course of time, be swallowed by Russia, its movement from Askabad, eastwards, being unfavorable to the defence of India. It is also apprehended that Russia, on the part of Bokhara, may lay claim on Wakhan, Shignan, and Rosban, which are the disputed districts of Afghanistan, on which, however, Russia presumes to advance certain old rights.

It is fortunate at this stage of affairs that the Liberal statesmen in England are not inclined to look upon the Russian advance as requiring no action from the lord paramount of India. They have informed the Parliament that they are negotiating with Russia with reference to a permanent understanding necessary to establish between the two countries as to how far the advance of Russia can be consummated southward towards India. It is admitted on all sides that, though it was necessary for Russia to push through the Central Asian deserts on its mission of civilization, dexterous efforts have been employed to advance towards India in directions which should now be controlled by England. Suspicions are now aroused that it aims at acquiring undue strength, calculated to affect the balance of power of several European, Asiatic and Indo-British Kingdoms. That the Liberal Ministry should itself begin to entertain some such suspicion, in howsoever a remote manner, is a fact on which we congratulate the Indian princes and people alike. We are specially gratified at the dawning of this national feeling in England, for when both the Conservatives and the Liberals are generally agreed upon a similar line of action, India's dearest interests are sure to be indicated.

The time is now come when violent conflicting opinions, which have prevailed for many years on the subject, can be given a permanent repose, and when the feverish anxieties as to the insecurity of the Indian dominions can be set at rest for a portion, if not for a whole, of a century. With due deference to the high ability of the authorities in London, we would submit that something more should be done than the direct negotiations now conducted between the Metropolis of Her Majesty and that of the Czar. Some amount of direct responsibility should be thrown over the Governors-General of India in Council, who are more

intimately acquainted with the public feelings and conditions in the several States in Central Asia, now partly domineered over by Russia. It is the high Indian authorities who can exactly feel the effects created by the movements of Russia on those tribes and chiefs, whose allegiance it is essential for British India to secure. It is the Indian Viceroy and his counsellors who can ascertain at first hand what would be the measures which would serve to keep Russia within its legitimate bounds and preserve peace and prosperity in those outlying States on our frontier, which Russia gradually seeks to weaken in its own aggressive interests. It is advisable that a Commission should be appointed in India with a view to proceed on the frontiers to decide upon the boundaries of all the large and small powers, which, thenceforth, none of them could venture to violate. The Commission may consist of two or three statesmen of marked ability from India, such as the Hon'ble Mr. T. C. Hope and others, and the representatives of the Russian Emperor. Unless an able Commission proceeds to the spot and deliberates on the plan to be adopted after exhaustive enquiries into the character, capacity and needs of each of the more prominent tribes and kingdoms, no substantial solution of the difficulty will be possible. A Commission of this sort may be directed to entertain a masterly conception of the interests of each of the peoples and the States, and to concede every possible benefit to every party involved in the settlement. All of them will thus be influenced by currents of intimate knowledge and sympathies paving the way for that adjustment of dissensions and quarrels which mutual friendliness, discussion and forbearance can alone bring about. What is the use of Russia always let alone with all sorts of inferior and impoverished people whom it could always overawe? Or why should those people and the various States, such as above described, not have the advantage of impartial guidance, or a control moderated with measures of expediency and justice emanating from a Government like that of the British? The whole evil at present consists in letting an absolute power to trample upon weak nationalities without confining the former within the limits of well-defined responsibilities. As we have often stated, both the Russian and British Governments have a civilized calling to follow in Asia; what should now be firmly done is to define the respective boundaries of both—within which each one should exercise its benevolent sway. This done under solemn treaties, we shall no more hear of Russian treacheries, or of the alleged imbecility of English statesmen. If

Lord Ripon succeeds in persuading the English Cabinet to adopt some such measure as we have here put down, and be able to carry it through, he will have considerably added to the deep obligations he has already conferred on the country.—*4th May 1884.*

We noticed in our last paper the agitation caused in the British Parliament in consequence of the Russian conquest of Merv, which places Herat virtually at the feet of that ambitious Power. Having conquered Turkestan and all the Khanates of Central Asia, in spite of England's unwillingness, it has struck on the north-west frontier of Afghanistan, its northern border being previously secured. It must be admitted that Russia could not have satisfied itself with its march through the wilds of Central Asia, without pushing on the confines of wealthy empires, thus rendering its influence felt. Hitherto it had struggled to conquer insignificant little States, though possessed of warlike material. Having secured these States, it now lies, or will at no very distant date lie, side by side with the leading powers in Lower Asia, and especially with the Paramount Power ruling our own country. That Russia has ever considered England an inconvenient thorn by its side in both Asiatic and European countries, and that, therefore, it has been fast descending upon the northern and north-west confines of India, can admit of no doubt. Unless England feels strong and supplants it in the neighbourhood, where it makes its stealthy marches, both Afghanistan and Persia must come below its thumb. Russia has hitherto had a good deal to fear from England. Russia has known this to its cost on several occasions, such as what it had to suffer at Crimea and the check which it received more recently in Turkey. It seems to have moved its chessboard in another direction altogether, having failed elsewhere for the last quarter of a century. But we must view its movements towards this part of the world from another stand-point. But for Russia the Central Asian kingdoms would have been rendered a perfect curse, and both Persia and Afghanistan would have only served to render that fair portion of the earth a greater desolation than ever. Russia is putting down plunder and bloodshed, checking abnormal slaveries, and is introducing order and civilization in the barbarous tracts that it has subdued. Its proximity to Herat and Cabul is a sort of indirect co-operation with England in spreading civilization in unfortunate Asia. What we, the princes and people of India,

have to look to is,—these near possessions of mighty powers do not form, in course of time, a mine of gunpowder underneath us, doing the teeming populations of India incalculable mischief. We shall be content to have the Russian bear as near us as may be desirable, but do not wish to see the Bear and the Lion converting the fair regions of the earth into a battle-field. We shall be glad to remain at peace with Russia, and even encourage its merchandize, but we should certainly resent its interference with our relations with the British power. Let it approach us as a kindly neighbour, but its evil eye on our peace and prosperity and our smooth-going civilization we shall damn with all our might and resolve. Russia ! If you feel that England does not act magnanimously with you in Turkey and elsewhere, you may have your say there, and not here. We have already paid dear for our peace and for our consolidation as an empire, and our wealth and resources have already been thinned, so that we are now striving hard for their replenishment. We cannot, therefore, allow you to exercise your malicious grudge against England on the confines of India. We have suffered a good deal from the raids hurled on us from Central Asia. We shall now take care that no more of these occur in future. Russia ! you dare not bring the beasts of the Khanates to pollute our sacred Indian soil. They will be infinitely more dreadful than our poverty, and infinitely more repulsive than our worst princes. Every one whom you might bring will be a ferocious brigand, and much more mischievous than a hungry, bloodthirsty beast. Rest quiet where you have advanced, for we know well your motives and your ability, and the savage propensities of your Generals.

We trust every native journal throughout the country, as every Anglo-Indian too, will take up this cry, and send the feeling deep into the mind of every native feudatory and every heart beating for England's supremacy.

We respectfully demand of England that she should keep her accounts with Russia square. England would do well by satisfying the aspirations of Russia. It won't do to always inflict chastisements on it. Great Britain should see to the great progress made by Russia now-a-days in the direction of India, and deal with it accordingly. England had not much to lose in past times ; now she has, from the fact of the bear having stealthily come and sat at her door.

The policy of both countries may, however, all of a sudden produce a clash in spite of the conciliatory tendencies of both. Will not England,

therefore, be ready for a dark day ? Are her resources in the East and the West sufficient to meet the Russian Bear in both quarters of the globe ? On this subject we have reflected much and written a good deal. We have shown the weak points of the forces of the Indian Empire, and fully demonstrated how insufficient they are, and how culpably do we neglect to utilize the fine material at hand. Elsewhere we have demonstrated this exhaustively. We can repeat but little of that here. The forces of the Native States should not be neglected. Already those of the leading Native States of this Presidency are being reorganized in the way they ought to be. It is a sign of better times. But whatever has to be done should be done quickly and with full heart. Every possible improvement should be introduced in the rank and file of the forces of the Native States of India. You may not be able at present to impart to them a first-rate efficiency, but make them fairly warlike. It is a culpable thoughtlessness if they are left alone wherever they could be subject to discipline and work. Any time we may want a lakh or more of the imperial army to defend our frontiers alone, while a good deal of resources may be needed in Europe simultaneously. Yet, again, considerable numbers would be required to keep internal order. If, therefore, we had a lakh and a half of native army from the States, each of the many important points in India could be garrisoned, partly by the British and partly by the force of a Native State, while the most capable army could be sent on to fight the enemy. To let some of the more deserving Native Chiefs share in the glory of the defence, their armies could even be sent to the frontiers, or elsewhere, to actively co-operate with the British columns. At present almost the whole fighting resources of the Native States are demoralized and wasted away in sheer idleness. What a mistaken political foresight ! While there is yet time let the Foreign Office in India, we humbly submit, take up the whole question seriously. Some amount of confidence should be reposed in the loyalty of Native States. When some part of the native forces has been drilled and disciplined, it would rest with the British Government how to make use of it. It could be used in such a way that wherever it is put forward, it could be an instrument of good, and not of evil, in the interests of the Empire. Till full confidence could be reposed in them—and we dare say it could be in course of time—no part of the force need be granted any independent sphere, except in joint responsibility with the regiments especially trusted by the British. But we are almost sure that

any State who could produce a working regiment will also prove worthy of the highest trust which the Paramount Power could show it. No additional expenditure should be thrown over any State ; but such States as can produce an army may utilize their present resources to a practicable extent. Again, no State should, in the case of a foreign aggression, bear more than its resources and its capability as a member of the Empire will admit of. Any delay on the part of the country in general to take definite action of the sort here mentioned would be deplorable. Russia has been always active in pursuance of the end it has so steadily kept in view. Can the Paramount Power of India and its important feudatories afford any longer to neglect the resources at their disposal ? It is true that the naval power of the British can undo Russia in Europe in a swift and telling manner, but will such a retaliation compensate for the sufferings of this country, should Russia try to upset it from the Peshawar or Herat side ? Let every house in native India be put in order before Russia endeavoured to tamper with it. The native kingdoms will in time be able to co-operate with the Empire at large in their own way. If this be pronounced a little more ambitious for them than desirable, every Native State, which has some fighting infantry and cavalry to boast of, can at least look after its own principality, and thus save the country at large from multiplied exertions and anxieties. Good princes of India, and ye thrice-blessed Government of the Queen ! Arise, and be on the alert, while the time is so favorable to work.—
11th May 1884.

THE Simla correspondent of the *Times of India* announces by telegraph that an Anglo-Russian Commission will proceed early next autumn to demarcate the northern part of Afghanistan. We shall not for the present deal with the question of the limit proposed as given by the same writer. Probably the information given is not full, for the frontier on the Persian side is also to be taken into account. On the same authority it is stated that difficulties in the way of practically proposing this Commission have already been removed as between the English and the Russian Governments, though it is not certain "what officers will represent India."

This intelligence causes us very great satisfaction, as it must to all those having the permanent peace of the country at heart. It will be remembered that I had, in these columns, strongly pointed out the

necessity of deputing such a Commission. The announcement, if true, proves at least the desirability of the suggestion made. It is noteworthy that it is no longer considered that a deputation direct from the British Cabinet alone could carry out the object with efficacy. We shall watch with interest how the constitution of this deputation, which India will also have the honor to represent, is finally decided upon. There can hardly be a doubt that distinguished officials who have an immediate and acute knowledge of Central Asia as well as India will sit on this Commission. As we humbly believe, the Indian part of the Commission will hardly be complete unless a large minded, extremely shrewd, sagacious and diplomatic administrator like the present Public Works Minister of the Viceroy is deputed as President of the Indian deputation. We make this suggestion with unreserved independence, for we are entirely ignorant of what the views of the Hon'ble Mr. Hope are on this subject. His invaluable knowledge of the country is rendered more significant by his recent experience of the imperial P. W. Department. His knowledge of Oriental character, his sincere love for the country, and his keen and sagacious instincts may render a permanent service to India in the present cause. He will be a formidable, though quiet, match to any Russian diplomatist brought in the field. It is certain that he will never be taken in by any consummate wiles of either a Russ, an Afghan, or a Turcoman.

The escort may be composed of able natives of local knowledge and imperial integrity. One of these at least should be a genuine Persian claiming imperial confidence. We sincerely hope that Lord Ripon's distinguished Indian career may be signalized by that happy break in the diplomatic policy of British India which may admit into imperial confidence some of India's best sons—patriots of the country as well as profound loyalists in the Queen's Empire. The reasons for extending this imperial confidence to the ever loyal Parsis of India are at once most rational as they are most cogent. It may well be the lot of the Gladstonian Government to do justice to the aspirations of a reforming nation which once commanded a large Empire in Central Asia. A mighty nation despoiled of one of the most famous empires of the world might, on the basis of far-seeing and chivalrous public policy, be associated with modern diplomatists, to whom a Persian colleague, though of an entirely subordinate character, would certainly prove a fully reliable acquisition and a credit. His re-admission into the ancient provinces, where his nation ruled for

thousands of years, can essentially and legitimately bear the character of a most conciliatory medium, and an appreciative friend of the anarchical and semi-barbaric countries. While his deputation to the scene of his ancient country must inexpressibly rejoice the Parsi nation, young and old, would also sow the seed of an immense future utility to the British Government, pave the way to their beneficial and tentative introduction into the service of the Central Asian States on the same principle as is in vogue in Native States, and relieve a little the pressure on superior Indian services. The fresh element indicated for Foreign and British diplomatic service may always be kept under Indian control, as it will surely be of great service to the Paramount Power itself. Altogether, the cause we most respectfully advocate is worthy of the practical, generous and liberal statesmen who now rule over us, and must leave a decided landmark in the history of their achievements to be followed on a broadening and ever broadening basis of universal approbation and esteem.—15th June 1884.

One feature of Skobelloff's plan of invading India was, to quote his words, "to organize masses of Asiatic cavalry and hurl them on India as our vanguard, under the banner of blood and rapine, thus bringing back the time of Tamerlane."

It is deplorable that Mr. Seymour Keay's indictment against the British Government should attract proportionally far more serious attention than the above utterance of a Russian Devil, which has been lately uncarthed from a confidential despatch of Skobelloff to his illustrious masters at St. Petersburg. We denounce Skobelloff as the veriest Devil, for we must charitably suppose that the Russian diplomatists and nation could not be at heart so wicked towards a sister country as this one of their misguided councillors. The expression of this violent design has been followed by a remarkable descent of Russia upon the frontiers of Afghanistan and Persia. What we, native writers, have now to bear in mind is, any moment relations between England and Russia are disturbed in Europe, a serious commotion may be expected by half a lakh of Russ with the wild looters of Central Asia fronting us at the North-West, or other equally accessible corner of Upper India, when Mr. Seymour Keay's teaching that our Government has got possession of India by fraud and force would surely evaporate. And we should further expect to be hampered in our discussions about the

age of the Civil Service candidates, or the propriety of saddling India with the Church expenses of the British soldiers employed in defending India.

The earnest, sound and honest patriots of the country would be so glad of an agitation of the latter questions if we were found twenty or thirty times more earnest in discovering what the terrible words of the Devilish Russ, above quoted, actually mean. We repeat we deplore—most sadly deplore—that this utterance of the Russ has not been one hundred times more scrutinized than the rusty allegation of Mr. Keay has been throughout the country. A very well intentioned and clever gentleman—but he has been leading us into a totally false and mischievous track. When the Russians have fairly approached the Gate of India with a bloody imaginary banner on their front above depicted, we to propagate the teaching of Mr. Keay, that the British is a band of horrid spoliators, is upsetting our scale of reason altogether. We certainly like to be told where the natives can strengthen their position in due relation to the integrity of the Empire, but we must consider the question of its foundations as far superior to any that now agitate India till at least that question of overwhelming importance is satisfactorily disposed of both in England and India.

We must earnestly request every native contemporary, as also the Anglo-Indian, not to lose sight of the question of Russian advance towards Herat till the world is sure that the disgraceful threat against India has been freed of its base sting. If Russia is not allowed to do what it thinks proper in Europe and Asiatic Turkey, it must immediately employ measures to threaten the honor and peace of a foreign, innocent and quiet Oriental Empire ! It must hurl on us the murderous and greedy hordes of Central Asia, and thus recover the expenses of her ruinous conquests in the wilds of Asia above us !

It behoves every Native State and every important native community to resent this rapacious design. We need not fly into a fit, but must seriously think of strengthening the position of each province in India, so that, individually, it may become stronger, and, collectively, our Empire may be sustained without a chance occurring of its being violated by a foreign foe.

When the question of occupying Candahar was mooted, we pointed out the grounds on which its friendly occupation was urgently called for. The Russian occupation of Merv and Sarakhs, and its further advance towards Herat in prospect, must now force the British Government to possess itself of the passes leading into Afghanistan. Our proposal four years ago was to

catch time by the forelock. We proposed to postpone the evacuation of the country of the Afghans, occupy a portion of it permanently, and so organize the Government that the finances may be improved, and a force organized for the defence of the country against Russian aggressions. Russia wanted to achieve some object in Turkey. England could not tolerate it, and sent a fleet to the Dardanelles. Russia, in its turn, fired a match in Cabul, plunged India into a costly war, and brought on the death of poor Shere Ali by abandoning him at the last moment. Henceforth is it to be admitted that India should be made a sport of the warlike parties as well, as she is of the English political parties ?

However unpleasant the contingency—we have to face it ; we have to admit clearly that the force we have in India are only meant for preserving the peace *in* the country. When first organized, the contingency of a disturbance in Europe giving rise to the movement of hundreds of thousands of hostile troops in the vicinity of India was hardly conceived. A large part of the British strength, both in England and India, may be withdrawn for the battle-field in Europe. The point to be considered then is—what strength would remain available for the frontiers and internal purposes. That strength must be inadequate, while the present course of mistrusting Native States, as regards their military organization, would be a grievous source of weakness.

The best authorities have been talking about the difficulties in fixing the frontiers to remain on the defensive. Such frontiers, in our opinion, should comprise the whole of Afghanistan. Is there any doubt left of the great danger of remaining in the rear of any of the Afghan tribes or any part of the country ? The abandoned country and the tribes, unless they are placed under our authority, must be won over and used by Russia. Cabul, Candahar and Herat should therefore be quickly placed under the civilizing influences of India. The resources of these provinces should belong to England and not to Russia. It would be woeful to have any more wars raging within the confines of India. For protecting weak India, and saving the honor of England as the leading nation of the civilized world, Russia should be disposed of out and out.

Though we have fully demonstrated our views on the necessity of judiciously reforming the forces of the Native States, and taking Afghanistan under our direct and honest control, we are prepared to modify our convictions, if these have not been quite right.

It would be a prudent policy not to go so far near Russia that a war between the two Powers may be easily provoked. Any inaction or delay by the British Government, as far as it may be due to this reason, can be well comprehended. But very strong reasons will be required to believe that it was a perfectly wise measure to have abandoned Afghanistan just when we could have easily taken it under our provisional, or limited control. Possibly a friendly understanding with Russia on graver points might have rendered the evacuation of Candahar in 1880 desirable, full reasons for which being at present unknown. It cannot be denied that England cannot exercise a disproportionately large influence against Russia in Europe and other parts of the world, without compromising the universal effects of civilization on the world in general. If a vulnerable point existed beyond the confines of Afghanistan, England would be less tempted to offer any obstruction to the progress of Russia, which may be considered of a somewhat wanton character. On the other hand, we have to bear in mind that, occasionally, with the best of desires on both sides to avoid a conflict, the mutual relations of both Powers may reach a straining point when peace would be impossible. In practical diplomacy, and in matters of sovereign prestige, no abstract rules of right or wrong can always and invariably subdue human passions and prejudices. We cannot therefore know for certain when a mine may be fired. In this event, as England would be at liberty to destroy the dominions of Russia at any accessible point, so will Russia seek the weakest point of the British Empire. Will the past anarchical sufferings of India and its present poor condition be able to appeal to the instincts of a foe bent upon a complete devastation? Of course not. A calamity, which cannot be expressed in words, may befall every member of the Empire, whatever may be the eventual result. The strongest and most humane Government cannot repair for half a century the ravages once caused by war to a peaceful country. The tribes and rulers on our frontiers are naturally fierce and warlike. It would be dangerous to leave them in a shaky and halting condition. Let them be so secured that they may prove thoroughly loyal to India. We have strenuously advocated a gradual intercourse between the Afghans and Indians. While the less civilized Russians have amalgamated with the barbaric hordes of Central Asia, we keenly feel our isolation from the Afghans, who can so well protect us in the worst possible position. In the interests of India, Afghanistan should no doubt be rendered friendly

and independent. It is doubtful, however, that it can remain strong and self-protective without the British Government undertaking to directly assist the Amir in all his vital affairs. The combination of Afghans with the British will on all sides be considered more beneficial and welcome to the former than their subjugation by the Russians. The other equally potent advantage is the capacity of this country to provide an almost indefinite scope for the trading resources of Afghanistan which now lie dormant. The present isolation of Afghanistan is seriously prejudicial to the interests of both countries. It is a pity the British Government have not yet perceived the manifold advantages of permitting a political and judicious mixture of certain loyal sects of India with those of the neighbouring country. The real key to secure immunity from the apprehensions now persistently raised by Russia lies in granting that brute and moral force to Afghanistan which the British, in co-operation with India, could grant without causing the depressing evils a greedy and semi-scrupulous power would cause to a weaker neighbour. Afghanistan should be so constituted gradually, that it may become as willing to resist foreign aggressions as Baroda or Mysore, or any other loyal Native State in India. For, then, Afghanistan will instinctively feel that it would have everything to lose and nothing to gain by the extinction of the British Government.

There is another factor in the frontier affairs which we *cannot* ignore, though it has a direct reference to affairs in *Europe*. We have to open our eyes to the fact that England cannot possibly take any step relating to the Persian and Afghan frontiers which can affect her relations in Europe through the instrumentality of Russia, or that on any complications arising in Europe with Russia and other powers, any step taken in the East should not be calculated to estrange England from the prevailing harmony. The Commission which we some time ago suggested for the demarcation of the various frontiers should also have the ablest of the plenipotentiaries of England, with a view that he may set forth every possible contingency in Europe and Asia which may bear upon the newly-to-be-adjusted relations of India with Russia. Any Commission to be composed should be complete in all its parts. That completion can be attained by the nominations from India which we have already suggested, and by the adoption of the further recommendation we beg leave to make, that as Russia will be represented by its imperial representative, so should England depute one of its Crown Agents (*Elchi*), who may have thoroughly mastered the

diplomatic intricacies of Europe and Asia and their extremely complicated foreign and international relations. We shall pursue in the next paper the statement of definite measures we are desirous of respectfully proposing to the distinguished head now ruling over India.—*22nd June 1884.*

We had laid some stress on the theory advanced by us some time ago that in any Commission appointed to fix the boundaries of the Russo-Persian-Afghan territories, on the borders of Afghanistan and Herat, as affecting India, "England should depute one of its Crown Agents (*Elchi*), who may have thoroughly mastered the diplomatic intricacies of Europe and Asia and their extremely complicated foreign and international relations." Subsequent events have shown that both this and our other theory, that it was necessary that experienced officers should be deputed to settle the boundaries once for all by proceeding on the spot with the representatives of the other Powers, have proved to be correct. A full Commission has been appointed of a number of varied officers who have had much dealings with affairs on our North-Western frontiers, and the Afghan, Turkestan, Turcoman and Persian States beyond them. It appears that the only officers who have been appointed have seen services in the foreign, political and military departments, and the unfulfilled part of the suggestions thrown out by us from time to time was due to where we thought there were special reasons for making the principle more elastic than the conventional rules of Government allowed.

The appointment of Sir Peter Lumsden is from London. As one of the recent members of the India Council, with his actual experience of our frontier and Afghan affairs, he must have thoroughly made himself conversant with the traditions, policies and susceptibilities of Her Majesty's Government at home as affecting its vital relations with those of other Powers in Europe and Asia. He is shortly expected in India with his distinguished Mahomedan Secretary, who has seen much political service at Cabul as Native Agent of the Viceroy at that Court. Sir Lumsden is further well equipped with a staff of experienced Indian officials. There is very little to criticise in the constitution of the Commission, it already being settled. That the head of the Commission should combine Indian knowledge with his direct acquaintance with the feelings of the British Cabinet and the India Office, is a great advantage impartially secured by the Viceroy.

The fixing of the authoritative *bud* by the representatives of England, Russia, Afghanistan, and Persia, is, in itself, a difficult and complex task to accomplish. It is forgotten by the general public that the question of the *bud* is one which would tend to revolutionize, in a certain degree, numerous relations of States and tribes, which, however naturally involved, do now stand on some generally understood basis, though apt to be occasionally violated. Whatever settlement that is made, it will of course have to be operative. Each Power will see to its effect as concerning itself. Persia may show a more encroaching spirit towards Afghanistan and other lesser tribes. The Amir has some serious contentions with Persia and certain tribes, which hitherto have been unruly. The interest of Russia is to descend towards Herat and Cabul as much as possible. We have not sufficient information at hand as to the precise points and directions aimed at by these Powers.

At any rate, one important measure will have been achieved if the Commission succeeds. Public agitation and disturbance of feelings may be stopped when the Russian advance is finally demarcated under expressly laid down terms. Whether an agreement is arrived at with Russia or not, if she is incited to take the offensive on the Cabul or Herat side, she will do so under any condition. But she cannot outstep the limits, if once fixed, in any ordinary state of affairs. When she does so under any of her usual pretexts, at least one thing will be clear to all concerned parties,—that she is committing a breach of faith. What she has been doing for years in the way of advancing her frontiers without any necessity for placing herself on the offensive, she would not be able to do as soon as the various frontier lines have been settled. If any tribe or State gave her trouble, she will not have the choice of putting her step forward and annexing that recalcitrant tract to her domains. Her only recourse would be to resort to diplomatic remonstrances and appeals to friendly Powers, and no dreaded measures of military subjugation and wholesale absorption. It is to be hoped that the Commission will devise a permanent plan of arbitration to dispose of all disputes or conflicts which may arise between the tribes themselves, or between any tribe and State, or between one State and another. Such a Commission as Sir Lumsden's—which we trust will effectually close its labors before the Viceroyalty of Lord Ripon ends—ought to be able to impose a sense of responsibility, in reference to territorial, political and international conduct, on each of the States and

tribes which, in future, are to fall under the suzerainty of Russia or England, as may be decided by the Commission. It would, no doubt, be difficult in persuading all the tribes to accept the sovereignty of any of the Eastern Powers—at least those of the tribes who have led a wild and unrestrained life. But that every one of these must accept the guidance of the larger Powers is, we believe, a certainty.—10th August 1884.

We wrote in a tone of emphatic warning upwards of a decade ago that the military strength of India was so inadequate that the mere anxiety not to incur additional expenditure would involve the Empire in serious consequences. Dreading also the risk of increased taxation, and desiring a higher political position for Native States, we pointed out for utilization their unused resources found in the present rabble of about 450,000 men maintained by them. After many years of fruitless (or if it is fruitful we cannot just now confidently say) writing, we now come across certain very emphatic statements made in the columns of the *St. James's Gazette* by an administrator holding one of the most responsible positions in the Indian Government. The revelation he makes is very alarming. Whether the public should accept it or not, they may at least be informed of it. He writes thus on the inefficiency of our Army :—

In 1858, after the Mutiny had been fairly got under, we maintained 108,000 British troops in India; to-day there are but 52,000. Our native army, too, is nearly 50 per cent. below its numbers in 1858. The regiments of the Madras and Bombay armies as a whole, and many of the Bengal regiments also, are wanting in those qualities which modern armies should possess. The men are recruited from unwalike races; British officers are too few in number and far too old; native officers are uneducated and feeble. In the Sikh, Goorkha, and Punjab frontier regiments, undeniably the best in the army, the average length of service of company commanders is twenty-nine and of subalterns twenty-four years. The difficulty in obtaining an adequate supply of recruits for our native army and the difficulty of retaining the services of our short-service men are in themselves adequate proof of the unpopularity of soldiering as a profession, whether in India or England.

The strategic position of Russia in relation to India is thus described :—

Herat is the acknowledged key of India. Even so staunch a Liberal as Mr. Grant Duff has said that we must fight rather than allow Russia to gain possession of it. Russian outposts at this present moment are but 275 miles from Herat; ours are over 500¹. In the north, Russian troops are at Samte and Kilif, whence they can reach Balkh and Chitral far sooner than we can. With Russian troops at Balkh an advance to Cabul is imperative; with Russian troops at Chitral an advance to Cabul is an impossibility.

What can be sent up to the front at a moment's notice, on which we have so often spoken, is stated below :—

It has often been said that England's extremity will be Russia's opportunity. It would ~~prove~~ no fairer opportunity for enterprise than now presents itself. Many of our best troops will soon be engaged beyond hope of recall in the Soudan and the Transvaal ; one army corps is locked up in Ireland ; Lord Cardwell's Army of Reserve, which in 1878 was to number 80,000, has no existence. Our authorities would be puzzled to send 10,000 trained and capable men to India at a month's notice, whatever the emergency ; and Russia, as you have shown us, can move 200,000 upon our Indian frontier (some of them from points of vantage already gained) in four-and-twenty hours. To-morrow we may hear that the ball has been set rolling. I fear that even "personal friendship" will not avail us anything in this case. Bold decided action, and an army and navy commensurate with our wealth and our needs, will alone enable us to face the enemies at our gates.

The fleet of the China Station and that comprising the East India Squadron is pronounced to be merely a "phantom" fleet, there being, it is said, not a single torpedo boat, nor a single armour-piercing gun in our harbours. "The combined Russian and French fleets "include seven ironclads of the second class, carrying breach-loading "guns varying from 25 to 43 tons, and armour from 10 to 14 "inches in thickness. Not only our fleets but our harbours are at the "mercy of these our hereditary foes." The arterial communications in India are described as incomplete, while any leading to the trans-Indus provinces do not exist, so that Russia can penetrate the Suliman range by the Cabul, Gomul and Bolan Passes without any obstruction.

We do not fall in quite with the alarmist tone adopted. The English Ministers who preside over the serious concerns of the world should know better than *Trans-Indicus-Olim* whom we have quoted. We have simply to look into the weaknesses attached to the instability of political parties at home. The point of collision between England, Russia and other nations cannot possibly be overlooked. For a general rupture day, every part of the empire should feel strong enough. It won't do if Russia is attacked in one quarter that it should then turn upon India and involve it in murderous anarchy. As our forces are insufficient we may have to face this contingency some day. We had to write pamphlet after pamphlet to show that unless the Native States were made strong and contented, that unless we effected a friendly occupation of Afghanistan, when we were there, and when we could have done the thing so easily, and organized the whole country in a military, financial and

material sense, India would not be safe against the dangerous approach of Russia. The Delimitation Commission must end in Russia establishing herself close to the confines of Afghanistan. Thus her accession of physical and brute forces will reach the maximum, while the Indian Government, when Afghanistan fell into their grasp, did hardly anything to husband their resources beyond the frontiers of India.

Have we, then, asked in vain the deputations that will wait on Earl Dufferin on his arrival in India to impress on the mind of His Excellency the extreme necessity of directing the most serious attention to the military reorganization of India, in which the reform of the armies of Native States by their own chiefs should play a prominent part? The work is of such vast magnitude, besetted with such unusual difficulties, that not a moment should be lost in the people and Native States of India interesting themselves in bringing the question to the front to procure its satisfactory solution. The more Russia advances the greater will be the difficulties in dealing with the question in a quiet and effective manner. This is *the* question on which the attention of the whole country should be most seriously engaged. India should be prepared for the worst, no matter if the worst came to-morrow, or some time hence, or never. We should not mind so much as Russia becoming our close neighbour as that we should be able to thrust it back whenever it chose to take the offensive against us.—23rd November 1884.

Of all the political questions now affecting the condition of India, that of the reported design of Russia on India is most important, deserving of the utmost consideration of all in India. The patriots of the country are parading their various grievances, in which they are not altogether wrong. If, however, they did so after fully satisfying us that they have understood the Russo-Perso-Afghan question, and that they do not think it need cause any anxiety to India, we should not blame them. But we do blame them for their want of foresight and for their tendency to waste their precious time in wholly devoting themselves to minor internal affairs, while we are not sure as to the forces now working in our foreign relations, which may or may not disturb the whole country eventually. The question of the Empire's safety does not rest in the hands of one political party in England, nor is influenced by any solitary or local considerations. To

Russia, or the Indian
Danger.

be sure of the permanent peace of India, we must not only be sure of the adequacy of our own Imperial and feudatories' forces, but of the good faith of our several Eastern neighbours and of the powerful States in Europe and Asia, who have so much to do with our parent country and its dependencies. We should like to have the name of *one* native of India directly or indirectly engaged in dealing with Indian problems, who may have influenced the public mind in a practical manner in reference to this question of the most serious import.

What our public men have to do is to persuade the Government in England to explain how India need not be anxious as to the sufficiency of the British and Native military strength to cope with any amount of force which Russia may possibly amass on the Herat, Cabul, or any other sides of India. We have some of the highest Indian authorities declaring in the strongest terms that if Russia chose to descend upon the plains of India, British India cannot count upon even half of the military force requisite to repel it. It is a sad commentary on the doings of native patriots of India that Englishmen should seem to perceive dangers of the highest magnitude to this country, while the former have as yet failed to gain any practical idea about them.

It is possible that no immediate danger may be apprehended; that the only serious thing which may be apprehended is the natural desire of Russia, while the respective frontiers have to be marked out, to extend its own jurisdiction as much as possible towards Afghanistan and India. If this be the minimum of our apprehensions, we are bound to see that Russia is not permitted to occupy any strategic points on the side of Persia and Afghanistan which may in future weaken our hold on those countries and the tribes subject to their influence. While there is a lasting potent force in Russia perfectly consistent, so far as pushing on and on its frontiers towards India is concerned, we cannot count upon the same motive force owing to the changing tactics of political parties in England. It therefore betrays our incompetency in that we have shown no inclination to keep public attention centred in this question in the midst of changes which are being so surely wrought in the Central Asian politics by a first class power able to commit widespread mischiefs. It is very probable that in the midst of party strifes in England, India may lose certain advantages which its strongest and direct advocacy alone can secure. No one seem to care to know the motive of Russia in delaying

to meet the Commission of Sir Peter Lumsden. We must try to ascertain if Russia wishes to absent itself in this demarcation business, thereby indirectly intimating us that it will not be bound with any decision the Indian Government may now arrive at. Or is it waiting for some party rupture in England before taking a step of some great importance? Or is her abstention from joining the Commission due to her unwillingness to adopt the boundaries which are likely to be dictated by our Government? There may be some foundation for different suppositions of this sort. In any case we are called upon to ascertain the exact position of affairs. As in matters pertaining to an important diplomacy, so in respect of any probably serious contingency, we find public opinion in India so far weak that to-morrow serious complications might arise without our being able to know how to meet them. It is not in a day that India can throw out an organized army sufficient to destroy any anarchical force which may be brought to bear upon it. No duty can, therefore, be more imperative than to press the British Government to recognize the strength of its Indian allies, to seek to renovate and regulate it, and to feel certain that on a day of trouble India can not only rout every possible adversary, but it can undo it even before it inflicted any direct calamities on India—and even if England should not have been able to despatch a Reserve. As we have maintained over and over again—though our cry has hitherto been a cry in the wilderness, especially as affecting our native patriots and publicists—the question of the military reorganization of the Indian Empire to be effected in full light and publicity, resorted to when safe to do so, is the one question before which every other Indian question must give way till satisfactorily settled once for all. Whether the public men in India are competent to deal with it or not, we beseech the Earl of Dufferin to exert his influence, ability, and high and tried personal powers to the utmost in achieving this result of supreme importance during his term of Viceroyalty. Whatever else His Lordship may be able to do, his success in this direction will for all times to come remain unrivalled in the permanent security afforded to the Empire. The work of conserving our strength, and to work it up to its maximum point, is a most arduous one, to be skilfully, silently and consummately done—one which has certainly not any transient popularity to win. And it is such work that is likely, we think, to suit the consummate temperament of our present Viceroy. We earnestly desire His Lordship may have a personal and earnest conference with the Native

Princes, the Residents at their Courts, and the distinguished European and Native dignitaries immediately responsible for the conduct and adequate strength of our active Armies in India. We beg that his attention may be drawn to the exhaustive State papers submitted to the Government of India by that astute and humane-hearted politician and statesman, Sir Richard Meade, late Resident of Hyderabad, as emanating from one known for his deep-felt and long-continued interest in all that concerns the safety and good name of the British Empire, and the increasing dignity and prosperity of its native feudatories.—*8th February 1885.*

WHAT we have urged so frequently and so strongly that British India
 Duty of the Princes should not lose one moment in uniting with Native
 and the People. India in creating a larger and stronger force for the
 defence of the country must now clearly appear to have been dictated by
 the strongest reason that can be imagined for such an advocacy. We have
 further urged that the Native Princes and people of India should themselves
 combine to represent to the Paramount Power the inability of the country
 to defend itself during a very serious crisis. For it is deplorable to think
 that if Great Britain failed any time to satisfy the Russian designs on
 Turkey, that Power should be allowed the opportunity of molesting the
 Indian Empire which has done no harm to Russia.

It is no secret now that Russia keenly desires to extend her frontiers
 close up to Herat, and even to push them into Afghanistan. The object
 is clearly to overawe all the rulers and tribes who interpose between the
 regular Indian frontiers and those of Russia beyond the Hindu Kush.
 The further and more important object is the criminal intimidation of
 India to be adopted whenever Russia desired to retaliate on England for
 any real or fancied wrong she may do to the former, not in respect of
 anything connected with India, but if England failed any time to satisfy
 the Russian cravings for Turkey.

It will be a bad time for India when Russia can subject it to any
 intimidation, which we consider nothing short of being criminal. She
 must be criminal, for she has now clearly intimated to England that
 if you don't let us have our own way on the Bosphorus, we shall attempt
 to injure India. We submit to the Government of India that this is a
 new phase of unprovoked enmity displayed towards India directly, though
 she has given no cause of offence to Russia. That country will, of course,

not venture to mention the international law under which it may possibly be justified to threaten an innocent country, while the cause of its disagreement lies with another.

How shall we deserve political freedom and unity if we have not even felt that an enemy is at our door, who can at any moment cause unrest and confusion in the country? Have the leaders of the country gone to the Government of India and told them that they are ready to support them in their measure of fortifying the Indian frontiers with a force sufficient enough to deter Russia from crossing the line, which Sir Peter Lumsden's mission has now practically laid down? Have our leaders impressed on the princes of India the desirability of their assuring the Suzerain Power at once that should they be allowed to organize their forces, they could be utilized by the British in the way they might wish for the permanent security of the Empire? Both the princes and the people should understand that the sovereign power can itself propose to utilize the feudatories' armies. Before, however, the Sovereign makes a move of this sort, it is better that we should make the proposal ourselves in a manner which would befit our dignity and enhance our safety. We deplore the apathy of the Indian leaders on this subject. When the whole country should be agitated to secure the reorganization of the military resources of India, we do not find a single journal, Anglo-Indian or Native, taking up the question with that earnestness which Mr. Robert Knight employs in persuading Lord Dufferin to reject the Bengal Tenancy Bill altogether. And yet that Bill is nothing in gravity compared to the unspeakable apathy which exists in India in reference to its literal safety. There is no use in creating an uproar in the matter, but how many years more should we speak in the wilderness in reference to the dangerous inadequacy and deplorable disunity of the military strength of India? That strength should be sufficient and united enough to rout any possible number of foes who may dare to cross the neutral zone beyond our frontiers. On a dire emergency we should not have to wait for succour from the mother-country.

We ask the leaders to bestir themselves in reference to this serious problem, than which no other Indian problem is more grave at the present moment. We predict that Russia is now waiting for an opportunity to advance towards our frontiers, which she will do as soon as it finds England hotly engaged in Egypt to avenge the most treacherous, the most

cruel murder of Gordon, one of the real Saviours of the World,—of the civilized and uncivilized races alike. While our tears will yet be fresh for his undeserved fate, criminal Russia will take a step as bad and as traitorous as that of the Mahdi, whose blood is now wanted for the permanent emancipation of a barbarous country and of his own ill-treated countrymen. To save the resources of the country from a greater future ruin, the present is the occasion to baffle the Russian design to tamper with Afghanistan and Persia to the detriment of India. The Russian limits have to be authoritatively laid down at the present moment with sufficient force to back up our decree. We exhort the British Government to make real and loyal warriors of the more trusted of the Native Princes and Noblemen and Commoners of martial spirit, and slap Russia severely for her constant criminal impudence to threaten the safety and happiness of a country which has done her no harm, directly or indirectly. We address our dear countrymen to move their energies and show themselves worthy of all the talk they have been indulging in for years in the interests of their country.

Will a million volumes full of talk in behalf of their capacity to govern India be of any earthly use, or compensate for the public mischief that may be caused by a few lakhs of Russian and Mahomedan hordes effecting an entrance into the North-West, or an hostile fleet destroying a few ports of India for the mere pleasure of humiliating the British in their foreign possessions? Surely not a day should be lost in taking the needful action. Take the action calmly and collectively, but take it without further delay or hesitation. Are we ready to forcibly intercept Russia from bullying Afghanistan, Persia, and other tribes, while England's troubles may increase abroad? Is it not the duty of every prince and every native community to think of the gravely responsible position we are now placed in by the suspicious and continuously humbugging and fraudulent attitude of Russia on our frontiers?—*22nd February 1885.*

THE Anglo-Russian politics being fast removed from the pure region of speculation, the time has come when it can be said with some certainty which of the two great dogmatic parties has proved to be generally right. All those who have persistently maintained that the Northern Bear has been stealthily and dishonestly making forward move-

The Rawal Pindi Conference and the chances of War or no War.

ments from the Oxus and the Caspian, with the ultimate object of menacing India, have always been pooh-poohed by their opponents, eager in asserting the good faith of Russians in extending their conquests in Central Asia—who have had, they say, no sinister object in view. The one party strongly urged England to check Russia long before she occupied Merv. The other party have always laughed at the alarm raised at every forward movement by Russia till they have practically approached the road leading to Herat. We were the only native writer in India who published in time a full exposition of the movements and designs of Russia in Central Asia; advocated the impolicy of dreading the Bear joining hands with the Lion on the northern borders of Afghanistan, and yet most emphatically warned the British Government to strengthen themselves, both internally and externally, against the coming struggle, and to devise special measures of conciliating Mahomedan fanaticism, the source of which we traced from the centre of India to the Islam countries, which Russia had then conquered as lying far beyond the northern regions of Afghanistan. Besides publishing a correct diagnosis of the transforming and agitating Central Asian affairs, we have for years together most earnestly pointed out the necessity of strengthening and confiding in Native States, and bringing them up as no nominal, but practical auxiliaries of the Suzerain Power. So far have we felt the direness of this necessity, that even when there appeared not the least chance of a conflict on the Afghan borders we maintained that not a day be lost in taking up the reorganization of the armies of the Native States. And yet we have never allowed ourselves to be enlisted either on the side of the one party or the other. Many successive events have given us no reason to change our convictions, which have only grown stronger day by day.

We are not of the opinion that the British Commission, in the neighbourhood of Herat, has been a useless or dangerous affair. Far from it, so, all India ought to take it as the most significant sentinel doing us an invaluable, but a quite unperceived, service as against the painfully uncertain and unknown affairs between the Caspian and the Murghab. As far as we may see, Sir Peter Lumsden is at present placed in the most responsible position at the same time that he occupies a position securing peace for India and Afghanistan. He must now be able to let us know precisely the limits of various sovereignties in the neighbourhood of Sarakhs and Herat. He can let us know how far the region of Afghanistan has

practically extended ; whether the Russians have violated the express Afghan limits of jurisdiction ; whether there were any tracts over which any sovereignty was *dormant* which either the Russians, on the part of the Turcomans and others, have confiscated, or the Cabul Amir has recently got possession of ; whether any of the two Powers has seized upon any territory expressly belonging to the opposite party ; or whether the whole dispute is only in reference to regions over which no sovereignty ever existed, and which both Russia and Afghanistan are in a hurry to seize to as great an extent as possible before the delimitation is defined. The suspicion at present is that Russia has made unlawful encroachments upon the Afghan frontiers. Before this suspicion can be removed, it is for Russia to give a clear proof that her recent seizures have legitimately belonged to the tribes she has conquered. Unless the Amir plays some double game with India, we cannot believe that he has ventured to garrison certain outposts though not belonging to him. In a very backward Asiatic kingdom it is possible for remote and outlying districts to remain neglected till they are placed in some danger. That they were not before garrisoned can be no excuse for a Russian aggression. Whatever be the ethnological affinities of the Turcomans with the people claimed by the Amir as his subjects, that circumstance can by no means warrant Russia to appropriate any integral portion of the Afghan kingdom. The right of sovereignty over remote parts of an eastern kingdom may long remain dormant till vivified by foreign intrigue and usurpation. The British Government have to meet one reasonable argument by the Russians, that disturbances within the Afghan limits, or beyond them in reference to her own subjects, must influence her to secure the quarters necessary for the preservation of peace in her own countries. This argument cannot of course be fully disposed of till the frontier line is settled and our Government is able to adopt effectual measures in preventing the Amir's subjects or other powers from creating any conflict on the Russian borders. The task of ensuring such a peace, or suppressing all disturbances, will not eventually be found difficult by our Government soon after the settlement and a regular administration has been established at Herat. The only difficulty of any magnitude is the present one, and that alone has to be skilfully overcome without forcing on this country one of the most singular, and at the same time barbarous, wars that was ever undertaken. While India and England should certainly put forward the strongest and the

largest forces of the Army and the Navy, we are much annoyed at the present outlook that a national war should be seriously thought of in both the opposed countries. We do not mean that there is no likelihood of anything occurring in the immediate future that would constitute a *casus belli*. The stratagems of the Russians and their rapacious designs, in that they have annexed a series of very important regions crossing the Oxus, which they had expressly before declared were beyond the range of their conquests, have been too apparent. We have of course no reason to condemn Russia for her conquests, for they may be legitimate in the case of semi-barbarous and fanatic hordes she has been subjugating from time to time. But her designs are impure and liable to chastisement when they in the least degree would intimidate either Afghanistan or India.

She has no doubt committed herself so far that Great Britain has been compelled to make grand preparations for war. In spite of these preparations the sincere advice of this country should be to avoid war at the present juncture. We are not aware of the strength of feeling of Abdur Rahaman in respect of the encroachments made by Russia. If these encroachments are really intolerable, the world may as well know all at once how they are intolerable, or perfidious. If the usurpation of Russia is of little consequence, efforts should be made to gradually bring about her retirement from the objected ground. If she does not seriously intend war, she is likely to accept a compromise under which both the Amir and the Czar ought to yield something which would smoothen the way towards a compromise. If the Czar is bent on war the frontier line dictated by Russia must be such as neither Afghanistan nor England is likely to accept. An unprovoked aggression is no doubt a most difficult thing for a courageous and senior nation to bear. A wise and well-meaning nation will have exhausted every resource of tact and diplomacy before plunging into a sanguinary war. They would not mind making the largest possible concessions compatible with safety and honor before bringing on a war, whether the opposite nation is weak or strong. There are many causes of excitement astir, but we firmly believe that neither Lord Dufferin nor the Cabinet authorities at home, headed by Her Gracious Majesty the Queen, are likely to be led away by that excitement. Those who direct the affairs will be guided by the Almighty, and He will keep their heads cool and their minds placid. If all of us have failed in checking Russia before she occupied Merv, we have now no reason to

quarrel with her if she has advanced as much as she reasonably could below Merv and Sarakhs. All that can be done justly and fairly is that she must be prevented from plundering and tampering with Afghanistan. If she has entertained any criminal design on Afghanistan ; if she is even half sure that she could stir up a revolt in Afghanistan and incite the Afghans to turn upon the British as they advanced towards Herat ; if she has any reason to believe in the inconstancy of the Afghan ally of the British or his fatal unpopularity or incapacity ; if she is really inspired with the idea that she can pour down overwhelming forces of all sorts into the plains of India ; if, further, she is animated by the base hope of replenishing herself by widespread plunder and a probable conquest of India and Afghanistan ; if, again, she does not store much anxiety on the losses which may be inflicted on her by the British Navy or by other causes springing from a war in Europe or Asia, then we must say that the preparations for the war by the British should even be more energetic and more extensive than now. We cannot always be animated by what we were able to do at the Crimea. Since then Russia has humiliated a great Empire, considerably improved her armaments, received powerful accessories to her strength, and has come close to mines of gunpowder, which our Government will have no ordinary difficulty and anxiety to prevent from bursting. We cannot be easily led into a war ; we should not allow ourselves to be. We have done well in making a weighty demonstration at Rawal Pindi and actually sounding the Amir as to his various leanings, tendencies and temperament. We do not doubt that by this time the able, sagacious and vigilant Viceroy has been able to forecast what the Amir is likely to turn out in different sets of circumstances. Is it possible that he may be overwhelmed by the faithless attitude of his own nation, and by any concealed strength of Russia, which may be deeply designing for the subjugation of Cabul and Candahar ? It is greatly to be deplored that we are not perfectly sure as to the real strength which Russia could put forth in all directions if a war broke out. In case of a war, whatever the British may be able to achieve in other quarters, India must be saved from harm's way. It must not be made even the scene of war, though the British arms may triumph here eventually. The conflict must be entirely confined to the northern and eastern boundaries of Afghanistan, for it is indispensable for the British to become so far powerful that Russia should be routed at the very threshold of her movements. It would not do for our Govern-

ment to proclaim war, and then allow it to drag its murderous course towards Candahar, the Panjaub, and the Sindh. If a blow is to be struck at the Russians, it should be struck at once and conclusively. The fire should be arrested as soon as it is ignited ; it should not be allowed to spread on the frontiers of India ; nor in the heart of Afghanistan. It is deplorable that we do not yet know what forces of the Amir may be available. They will probably not be removed from the country, lest it should rise against the Amir and enter into dangerous confederacies with internal and external foes. We have no doubt Lord Dufferin must have put the Amir in a proper way in reference to ensuring the tranquility of the Afghans, while war is proclaimed. The very fact that Abdur Rahaman has turned out a strong ruler may provoke troubles against him as his country is again made the scene of carnage. If internal anarchy breaks out ; if the Russians threaten him with the revolt of the inimical tribes and chiefs who owe him a grudge ; if he finds that the Russian arm turns out stronger than expected, is it likely that he will continue to side with the British ? though, if he is a man of fidelity and friendship, he might prefer a residence in India or England to a breach of trust with the British.

The advance of Russia on the Afghan frontiers however unjustifiable, and the vigilance displayed by England, are circumstances far from being deplorable. The present event—if not leading to any great war—must be comparatively gratifying, remembering that in the time of Lord Lytton, on the mere attempt of Russia to establish an embassy at Cabul, our Government were compelled to invade Afghanistan and undertake a ruinous and protracted war. It is desirable, therefore, that Russia is now placed within the practical range of Indian operations ; for, when everything was dark and uncertain about her movements, we could not check her ; but now that she has brought her outposts close to those which we cannot possibly suffer to go in her hands, we know what permanent defences we ought to raise, and how to bar the way of a foe to India with an almost absolute impunity. Henceforth it must be understood that the Indian Government will have practically to become the masters of the Afghan boundaries ranging on the Russian side as far as their inviolability from the Russian aggression is concerned. The British Government did not listen to the humble voice raised by the present writer years ago that Candahar should not have been abandoned, and that taking hold of the opportunity which their own installation of the Amir had offered them, they should have taken

perfectly friendly measures in guiding him in the reorganization of the resources of his kingdom, and so constituting the military organization of our frontier State that no enemy could have taken Afghanistan by surprise as has been unfortunately now done. The consequence of the British retreat has only emboldened Russia to steal a march several hundreds of miles closer to us than before, without our Government being able to repulse the criminal encroachment at once; while Russia, as she advances, has been laughing in her sleeve that once more has she succeeded in setting the British Lion in a roaring agony! Rather than that we should have suddenly to advance a large army at an enormous cost, not knowing if Russia has serious intentions, or is simply making a fun of us, the Indian Government should now see that their ally can make his own stand at a moment's notice. What is now required is a beneficial intervention in Afghan affairs to render them prepared for an evil day. We should do a great good to the Afghans, so that, as a nation, they may stand with us, and we may not have to rely any day on a broken reed of a ruler, who may be popular or not with his people. We cannot be satisfied with simply lavishing our wealth in propping up the Afghan kingdom, while it has been taught to look to us in the day of its troubles! We must certainly continue every reasonable assistance to the kingdom, but at the same time we cannot forget the other obligation that we should endeavour to make Afghanistan strong for itself, by organizing its forces and placing them under a mild but firm and conciliating European and Indian supervision. Excepting this we can very well let the Afghans do very much as they like, while they are always led to adopt peaceful methods towards their neighbours under Russian influence. We have been cheerfully placing our resources at the Amir's disposal, and the return should be that he honestly uses a part of his own resources in bringing up the efficiency of his army so far that he could for some time protect his kingdom against all wanton aggressions. In coming times we cannot pull on with a fanatic Amir as with one hopelessly incompetent. Afghanistan should be placed on the same footing as the Nizam's Kingdom, but with a greater immunity granted to the Amir in respect of his internal affairs. India has to take care that it does not wage a war with Russia without the sternest necessity being proved for such a step. As yet India has done no harm to Russia, and we do not intend to do any. Russia may have to settle old differences with England, which may have worsted her

more than once. It is, therefore, the interests of India not to sow the seed of revenge in the breast of any nation. In case of gratuitous aggressions against India, it knows how to meet them ; and in that case it must certainly do everything in repelling an invader, and even chastising him. It is highly probable that now since Russia has far advanced towards the Afghan frontiers she will be permitted by our Government to lay hold of more territory than she could legitimately claim. The Amir will be asked to make a little sacrifice to ensure a permanent peace, and experts on our side will, no doubt, point out the strategical points which we cannot, under any circumstances, yield to Russia. If she is altogether incapable of conducting a successful war, we should use all our influence in forcing Russia to give up her recent possessions, which undoubtedly form a part of the Amir's kingdom. The present negotiations will tend to clear the character and extent of rapacity which Russia is apt to employ. It is futile to believe that Russia merely intends to make a diversion on the Indian frontiers to seize Constantinople. She will be in a position to attempt the latter task as also to plunder India, provided she found England weak at any moment, and by any cause. We must, therefore, strongly and respectfully urge Lord Dufferin again to prepare without delay a complete and comprehensive measure for the permanent defences of India and Afghanistan. The armies of both the general and the local Governments of the Native Chiefs should be so constituted and distributed that, while the principle of Imperial Unity is observed in every interior portion of India, we should be able to annihilate at any moment any rapacious foe raising his head on the Afghan borders to menace innocent countries. No half measures will answer the serious purpose we have pointed out. All patriotic associations and individuals in British and Native India should unite in getting the various European and Native schemes of self-defence carried out without fail, now that all parties are agreed that, if we should continue the old indifference, Russia would not mind injuring India in a manner that would cripple it for one century. We see no cogent reason why the strongest measure should not be adopted to place India on a footing of an Independent Self-defence mainly controlled by the Sovereign Power. It gives us satisfaction to believe that our present Viceroy seem destined to carry out that full and pregnant unity in India, in which both the princes and the people will rejoice and take a pride, and which can always impose a check on the criminality of foreign designs.—*12th April, 1885.*

We have had to write this two days previous to our publication and cannot say what the next day may startle us in reference to the war apprehended on the Afghan borders, and in Europe and Asia in general. Statesmen of the most uncommon ability and the most profound experience and shrewdness may fail in forecasting what turn the present strained affairs may take in the immediate future. There are a few controllers of events who know what might take place, but even *they* must feel a certain amount of diffidence in framing a perfect forecast. With such deterring difficulty before us, we must satisfy the anxiousness of our readers to know whether peace or war would result from the present conflict.

The anxiety to know what is in prospect is nothing compared to the public dread which a war between England and Russia must excite in India. With a thousand pities on those who have spoken disparagingly of Russophobists, though we have not been one of them as popularly understood, we must now be prepared to know that a war between Russia and India may eventually become inevitable. Let us all, however, offer our sincere prayers to the Almighty that the black cloud now threatening us may quietly pass off.

So many various forces and complications do control the present course of affairs. Our Government not having checked the Russians at Merv, not having accustomed the Afghans to British presence and British friendliness in organizing their resources, not having strengthened the Afghan frontiers from Cabul to Herat, the Muscovite thinks he must be a fool not to aspire after the possession of Herat. He will not all at once say, "I want Herat." The garrisons of the Amir there are very weak. The British forces will take some time to appear, if they at all appeared there. He can say with some plausibility that the Merv Turcomans are entirely ours, and their region extended very near up to the Paropamisus Range. Well, that range may be the natural boundary of Afghanistan. With this ulterior view the Russian Generals of ferocious patriotism have ousted the Afghans from Penjdeh. As they have not met with any reprisals they are bound to proceed further. A mass of Afghans may thereby be exasperated; another murderous conflict may ensue; and the Russians, according to circumstances, may plant themselves at Maruchak, or leap into badly defended Herat. Should the affairs be transformed into a regular war, the Russians may probably be prepared to bring on about a hundred thousand

men to take up some impregnable position for conducting an attack on both Cabul and Candahar. Our hope is, to avoid a world-wide calamity, England may adopt more or less the frontier suggested by Russia by binding her against using any aggression against Afghanistan in the future, and to refer any dispute or grievance on the part of the Russians to the British Government.

We anticipate with extreme pain that the great motive power which may move Russia upon Herat, if the Grand Old Man fails in smothering the dreadful Bear in the *Kbud* of peace, will not be the immediate conquest and ruin of Afghanistan, but to spring a disastrous surprise on this innocent country which has done no harm to Russia. If there was the remotest chance of this dire event occurring, we cannot but throw thousands of pitics on our national and princely leaders of India that they do not awake from their slumber and ask the British Government to exert every nerve to add at least two hundred thousand men to our existing forces. We heartily wish we may be wrong in apprehending the unspeakable danger as we do. But is this the moment to continue crying before the Government that no more elective freedom is granted to the country, or that the Council does not contain sufficient native patriots?

Let every mind be now exercised with the most painful anticipation that brutal Russia, on breaking the fetters of peace, may take a straight way towards Hindustan. If it did not fear losses in its own Kingdom and in Asia Minor, it must be fired with the ardor of putting India to plunder and rapine. Its demands will be unreasonable; its advances outrageous and provoking; it may impudently set the whole frontier of India in perfect terror; eventually cause the British troops to move forward, notwithstanding the pains of the Amir not to let them intrude into Afghanistan; and wage a sanguinary war with England beyond Candahar. It may demoralize the Amir and the whole of Afghanistan; present be ore him a most tempting picture of the extension of his sovereignty, and basely desire to put India to fire and sword.

We implore Government not to be too confident in respect of the interior resources of India. Are Government merely to rely on the loyal professions of so many helpless children of the soil? Do the Government for one moment suppose that the fanatical elements in India will remain quiet, while the most clumsy, at the same time a very powerful, country fiercely endeavoured to plunge India into the flames of war? We have

raised a warning voice years ago—we have repeated it all along the last two years. We have written for years together about the gross inadequacy of the defences of the Empire. Where are the three hundred thousand men of our Native States, to organize whom we have long beseeched the Government, both publicly and privately, both in and out of season? Where are they, we ask? Supposing the Russians gradually amassed three or four lakhs of all sorts of forces to make way towards Hindustan, where are the mixed British and Native Troops to garrison the interior of India, while the main army of our Government would be divided in Afghanistan itself to repel the foreign foe on the one hand, and repress domestic anarchy on the other?

Every one, however, asks the question, will there be a war after all? There is a possibility of it, as Russia understands that she is much stronger at home than she was in past years, and that she has now extended her conquests close to the outlying boundaries of India. She believes, we think, to be in a position to harm England much more in India than England could damage her in Europe. In this case unless Germany honestly and firmly offer mediation, Russia may provoke a great war. Though the Cabul Amir may be trusted to conduct his own campaign, that may only be to a certain extent. For, in case of failure on his part, from whatever cause, England cannot but give battle if the Russians neared Candahar, or even a remoter point than Candahar. Our Government may do well by concentrating its resources rather nearer our base of operations than far away from it as Herat. Previous to this intervention, the Amir, it is hoped, may be actively guided by distinguished European military commanders and assisted with sufficient instruments of war. In case of any untoward default on the part of Afghanistan the difficulties of our Government may be greatly increased. Certain powers, including Germany, may possibly wait till the belligerents may be so far exhausted that an opportunity may present to them to intervene, in different directions, by the prospects of certain territorial extensions nearing them. These subsequent moves will be as well regulated as consummate moves on a chess-board, though the world itself might shake with the excesses of a carnage so terrible that it never before witnessed the like of it. Should a war assume serious proportions at the present crisis, each Power may try to re-adjust the balance of power in its favor, and each one struggle to acquire new acquisitions for itself on which it may have set its heart. If

we are right in the general view we take of the internal motives of the various Powers who may be expecting to benefit themselves in consequence of a general war, we are also right, we believe, in supposing that both England and Russia will do their best to avoid a war, the former more so as it is singularly free of any selfish motive in opposing Russia, while the latter is susceptible of being moved by a mad and criminal design on India. If England is not materially backed at the present moment by an European power in chastising Russia, OUR SOVEREIGN is quite right in not drawing her sword till the moment comes to vindicate Her integrity and dignity. A further development of the present events will more clearly mark out the time when Her present energetic preparations may bear their essential fruit. HER MOST GRACIOUS MAJESTY cannot, we think, take a single premature step in consequence of which Russia may be emboldened to precipitate a big war which may yet be prevented. We would permit Russia to fully incriminate herself in Afghanistan, while we shrewdly calculated her real strength at various points, and on various occasions, and mustered every energy and resource in organizing a strength sufficient to crush Russia at the very first stroke of our action. In the interests of the highest humanity we shall pray to the ALMIGHTY, every hour till the crisis is over, that He may, on this critical occasion, guide the invincible Arm of the Good Queen aright, and discomfit the foe who offers such wanton aggressions against her peace—which is the peace of the World ! Amen—19th April, 1885.

It cannot be denied that the Indo-Afghan-Russo affair is at present in a most unsatisfactory condition. No one in England and India has been able to say publicly, and with confidence, whether there is to be a war or not ? Meanwhile, it is apparent to everybody that both Russia and England are making preparations for war on a large scale.

The public are, of course, most deeply interested in deciding whether Afghanistan and England should declare war against Russia or not. The highest authority of the land—our own able and energetic Viceroy—has issued a solemn statement some time since that he decidedly dislikes war, but that if it was forced upon England the people of India should understand that it would come upon them in spite of the best efforts of England to be thoroughly unselfish, forbearing and peaceful. The Vice-

regal declarations as well as the consummate and cautious procedures of the Ministry of England, as guided by the Grand Old Man, must so far allay the public anxieties.

The reasons which may eventually incite England to declare war against Russia will be of the weightiest character. As we have said for the last few weeks, the more or less territory coveted by Russia on the Afghan frontier cannot be determined into a deliberate war on either side. The writers, both here and in our mother country, who urge a war upon Russia for her alleged duplicity in seizing Penjdeh and massacring its Afghan garrison, have not sufficient foresight and sagacity in counselling England on the general question of the utmost gravity. Neither England nor India can punish Russia for coming close upon the Afghan frontiers and endeavouring to filch out of the Amir as much of his frontier line as she can urge some ground or other to get into her possession. It must be clearly understood—which no writer seem to have yet done—that the territory which Russia now exerts to get for herself belongs to the zone, as to the proprietary of which the concerned Powers have been debating for the last two years—in fact ever since we were alarmed by the Russian advance upon Merv. The tribes above and below that place have acknowledged sovereignty of an unsatisfactory nature and have always made a muddle of the sovereignty rights over them. It must also be further understood what, too, no writer has yet comprehended, that though the Amir may be able to establish his right in any legal civil tribunal on the sovereignty of a part of Russia's recent possessions, this simple right of a sovereign is not in itself sufficient to forbid a foreign power from forcibly possessing itself of the said disputed ground for geographical, ethnological, or other ostensible reasons, provided that the Amir is unable to assert a similar pretension extending up to Sarakhs, and, further, is not backed by force of arms, which seem to us as the only valid argument which can operate in the uncivilized region where more than a mere civil contest has taken place. Up to this movement Russia has followed the only argument that would tell; and for all legitimate purposes of a war, while the Amir has showed his incapacity at Penjdeh, the capture of that place is no excuse for England to espouse his cause so far as by declaring war against Russia. We may form a low estimate of Russia's morality, but adopting this ground as a *casus belli* will be as rational as attacking Russia for her ill-treatment of the Georgians, or for sending out her military to crush her innocent

peasants. That Afghanistan could not at this moment set up a counter claim against Russia in respect of the portions of tribes which have an ethnological affinity with the Amir's own subjects, is the fatal inability which has caused loss to our Ally and must compel him to settle the negotiations with Russia as quickly as possible with a view to prevent any further violability of his frontier. If Russia at this moment chose to ignore all she had declared in reference to the Afghan frontiers from time to time, neither England nor Afghanistan can hold her *practically* responsible for breaking her promises. We repeat that the only valid argument which can tell against encroachments of this sort is the perfect ability of the Amir and of the Power which supports him to offer an effective resistance on the spot. It has, again, not been clearly understood that Russia has not conquered Penjdch by means of an army corps of warlike proportions. She has conquered it by surprise and stratagems. Her action has not been serious enough to violate in a decided manner the integrity of the Afghan Empire, the action only meaning to decide, as much as possible in her own favor the delimitation line proposed to be laid down for herself and the Afghans. It cannot, again, be contended that Russia was bound, under the pain of war, to meet the English Commissioner as soon as they appeared on the debated zone. Unscrupulous as she has been, but commanding a greater material strength *on the spot* than either the Afghans or the British, she has been active enough in seizing the frontier points which she wanted for herself. The encroacher is an independent power as much as the British, and could not of course be coerced into any constrained action except by war. And war could not be proclaimed by a first class Power of the highest culture and humanity, except under provocations of a startling and horrible character imperilling the peace of large populations.

What is the true position of affairs then? It is not by any warlike measure that Russia has taken Penjdch. It has been taken by a violent measure of moral turpitude, but in virtue of a superior material prestige. The act smacks something of a brigandage, and is more disreputable than the act of a set of adventurers who, by pluck and brute force, break up an uncivilized community and subjugate them into a submission to which they were never before subject.

We have here shown how Russia has been able to place her aggressive action on the basis of a position of sovereign impunity which

has simply turned the forward claws of both the British Lion and the Afghan *Cheeta*. The Russians will probably keep themselves encased in this position of impunity while continuing to intimidate as being prepared for war. They will introduce a state of things denoting chronic unrest and mutual resentments. The Amir will allow none of the two Powers to be represented at his Court. He will probably lack effectual instruments on his borders to cope against Russian machinations unless the British Government succeeded in introducing capable foreign officials in his service, who, by dint of firmness and conciliation, might succeed in holding down the Russians. It is not likely that Russia will unreservedly accept the intervention of the British Government in any matters of dispute or disturbance affecting the Russian and the Afghan frontiers. We must be prepared for the times when Afghanistan will be subject to the Russian influence a good deal to the detriment of our own interests. This fear at least would have been absent to-day, had the British Government remained in Afghanistan and established political agencies and security when it was last overrun by them. The Russians are likely to prefer remaining in a state of chronic unrest and indefinite impunity with a view to subjugate Afghanistan and employ it as a base for an expedition against India, whenever they found themselves checkmated in any part of Europe or Asia by the rival power of England.

From the present moment India's responsibility towards itself and the responsibility of the British towards India have been infinitely increased. Our Government must eventually completely subjugate the Afghans; otherwise they are sure to be by the Russians. We earnestly recommend that a few thousands of the conflicting tribes of that country may at once be entertained in the military service of India to familiarize them with our temper and treatment. With Russia so close to them the Afghans cannot be left alone. They are sure to be absorbed by Russia if we still persisted in acting upon the milky humane sentiment of letting them alone. If Russia is allowed an influence over the Afghans they will be turned into a force inimical to India. If this is to be prevented, as it must be, the only course left is to occupy Afghanistan after some time in a firm but extremely conciliatory manner. We are quite sure that if we steer clear of war now, we shall have one with Russia at no distant date. It is, therefore, imperatively necessary that we should fully secure Afghanistan as our own country for military purposes. As the Russian

advance into the Afghan country is possible, not having England close enough to forbid her movement, the British Government must command overawing military strength both on the Indian borders and in Afghanistan itself. For it is not likely that Afghanistan, unaided, will be able any time to repel the Russian aggressions. The safest method for England to follow will be to take the most careful account of the military strength which Russia can hurl against us from time to time, and then to augment our own strength to a higher point of efficiency with a view to crush our foe hopelessly.

The improbability of war in the immediate future will depend upon the understanding that may now be arrived at between Russia and England. If the former gives sufficient guarantee to prevent future encroachments, Russia will not think of concentrating troops on a warlike footing. If England is unable to obtain an effectual guarantee, though the delimitation may be accepted by both Governments, the present unrest will continue, and forces will be advanced on both sides till a war was declared. It is not felt by the public that Russia has already gained her object to some extent by forcing England to incur enormous expenditures. If Russia does not bind herself down to permanent peace, but is determined to enter Afghanistan with the object of touching the sorest point of England, which is India, or of enriching herself and her dependants in a shameful manner, then England is bound to adopt the most unquestioned methods of war which must certainly end in the most complete triumph for the British arms in the East. Unless, then, Russia fully agree to treat Afghanistan as a neutral zone between India and her Central Asian Empire, solemnly binding herself against having anything to do with the Afghans, there will be nothing left to England but to teach her a lesson by which she would be forcibly removed beyond Merv. Afghanistan may be left alone on the condition that it shall have no dealings with the Czar. The moment these are commenced, the British Government must occupy the country to drive back the intriguing Russians.—3rd May, 1885.

THE Russians stormed their way up to Penjdeh a few weeks ago. We then anticipated that their next move would be towards Murchak which they are now reported of having actually occupied ! Here is the fruit of leaving our frontiers

The Beat on its
Black March,

unprotected ! It is well that there was no conflict with the Afghans. And we are of opinion that there ought to be none till such time as they could offer a stout battle—till such time, too, as the wronged and insulted India were able to carefully ascertain the degrees of military strength which Russia can bring against Herat, Badakhshan, Cabul and Cashmere. The Russians will, no doubt, continue to proceed, while England puts her questions to explain her unprovoked encroachments ! We earnestly desire that the Afghans may not be provoked into a war till they have been mortally offended and till they are prepared to contest with Russia. That hungry Russia is designing to push on some overwhelming force with the express desire of bringing about anarchy and looting in India, we stated some weeks ago ; and for the first time this week a correspondent from Gulran, moving with Sir Peter Lumsden's Commission, has confirmed this fear of ours, in a long warning letter published in the *Times of India*, which every one ought to study for himself. It remains to be seen how far will Afghanistan and England tolerate the black march of the Northern Bear. Russia has even pushed further down the frontier line proposed by herself before the appointment of the Commission. It is very doubtful if the Afghans will be able to occupy Balamurghab, the Kushk and the Burkhut mountains, which issue from the Paropamisus Range, in sufficient force to repel the disgusting stratagems and violence of the Russians. Any weak stand made there will be immediately availed of by the latter in pouncing upon the Badghis and the Jemshids and in fact occupying most of the Herat region. The Russians' ascension from the Kushk will be the signal for England to declare war against Russia, unless she absolutely suspends her encroachments below Balamurghab and Gurlin. We do not doubt that the British Government will take long before declaring war. As soon as the whole line close to the Indian frontiers has been patiently and immensely fortified, the moment may come for the hundred thousand of our brave and forward warriors to advance and crush the barbaric power seeking so dishonestly to assail our united home of freedom and political glory. She would deserve nothing less than hopeless destruction all along the Persian and Afghan frontiers ; while Turkey, Austria and Great Britain maimed her in Europe and in the seas protected or invaded by our powerful naval fleet. If Russia is not closing upon her own destruction and ruining her own internal Kingdom, she must soon check her rapacity and insolence towards her forbearing neighbour, the Afghans. The aspect

of affairs will be entirely changed if the latter are any time found lukewarm in the cause of India when threatened of being assailed by Russia. Her cunning with the Afghans as affecting our own security will always have to be carefully counteracted, while Persia is firmly retained in our cause by even giving away Herat to the Persians if this concession should be eventually required for the protection of India and Afghanistan.—*3rd May, 1885.*

Our strong presumption explained several weeks ago that England will, in a general manner, allow Russia to have the boundary she claims on the frontiers of Afghanistan and not declare war against her though she attacked Penjdch, has proved to be correct. Many now ought to feel surprised why should so much bitterness have been displayed between the two nations and millions spent in preparations when England has been ready to concede and Russia willing to make no further move than that involved in the boundary line she suggested before the appointment of Sir Lumsden's Commission. Just at present all threatening appearance of a sanguinary war has vanished in thin air, and even with Herat within her clutches Russia is satisfied with her inhumane massacre at Penjdeh. Can we now affirm positively that Russia was really not in a mood to declare war, or that for a long time she does not intend to kick up an active strife at the gates of Afghanistan? The results as now appear permit us to answer in the affirmative.

As soon as the last shred of this contemptible affair is settled—we call it contemptible as viewed in relation to the vast amount of money spent after it!—an earnest inquiry ought to follow with regard to the circumstances which have created such exasperations and resentments and caused an enormous expenditure. We might then probably know that there have been some grave defects in the diplomatic constitution of even such great nations as the Muscovite and British. We shall probably come across further derangements. And these would relate to the want of all arrangements and precautions on the whole of the border lines of Afghanistan as touching the transitional region which the Bear has been systematically swallowing. Had a proper look-out been kept up in all those directions, of course including those where at present we hear of no notable dispute or anarchy, we should not have had all the disquieting

rafan and waste of the last few months. As we have complained for years, the want of a thoroughness of action in Afghanistan has been at the root of all the evil. It may be that we may have avoided much greater evils that we may be better able to know hereafter.

We are extremely happy that an independent arbitration has been referred to to decide who have been the parties at fault in respect of the Penjdeh affair. To us it appears undoubted that the deplorable massacre would never have occurred but for the deadly resentment felt by the Russians at Lord Dufferin's brilliant action in joining the Amir at Rawal Pindi and binding him down to an open and close alliance. As Abdur Rahaman declared that he would deal with the enemies of England with the sword which the Viceroy presented him at the Durbar, so General Komaroff put to his own sword hundreds of innocent Afghans on the Khushk, meaning that that was the reply to the insolence of the Amir towards Russia. The resentment was barbarous and overstepped every limit of fairness and moderation. Though, as we said the other day, the massacre was not a sufficient cause for undertaking a wholesale war between the two Empires, we may hope, however, that England will insist on a fair adjudication of the Penjdeh question. India and all civilized countries will be interested to know whether the Russian conduct was unprovoked or otherwise. If it were a gratuitous massacre, it would be well to make it clear for the condemnation of civilized nations.

It would be difficult just now to say if costly preparations for war could have been avoided by any action omitted by England. India has reason to be proud of England that it has shown remarkable unanimity in sanctioning the large supplies asked for by the Ministry to complete the preparations for war without a moment's delay or hesitation. Russia must now be fully deceived in her calculations.

She must have greatly doubted the earnestness of England to go for a war, but she has been terribly deceived in the extensive arrangements which have been steadily going on to bring about the necessary preparedness. She has been further miserably deceived in her anticipations that, by assuming a hostile attitude on the Afghan borders, she would produce anarchy both in Afghanistan and India, though it must be remembered that once she had succeeded in plunging both countries in war.

All the recent events clearly show the unscrupulous conduct on which Russia any time would be bent as regards India for the mere grati-

fication of her old rivalry and animosity with England. We are clearing out of the present dangers by the consummate ability and tact displayed throughout the present crisis by Lord Dufferin in India and Mr. Gladstone in England. But for this marvellous patience and capacity displayed, war would have been proclaimed by this time, and we do not know what would have been the calamities in store for us. But fortunately we see the signs of England compelling peace of the world to be kept sacred, while securing the utmost possible self-respect by a dameanour which might well put Russia to shame ! We trust we may now soon hear of the final declaration of peace and the securement of an understanding so satisfactory between the three Powers that no possible loophole may be left for any future threatening of peace. A grave responsibility now rest with the Ruler of Cabul to secure a permanent protection of his kingdom against Russian aggressions. The Indian Government will, no doubt, assist him fully, and at no distant period we must induce our Government to state publicly the measures actually achieved by them in securing Afghanistan against further Russian encroachments. Not only these measures have to be carried out, but the Indian Government will have to effectually devise for an observation being continuously kept up in relation to Afghan affairs as affecting both Russia and India. A wide interest must start up in India in all that concern the strength and motives of Russia with a view that no day may find us unguarded. The time is past when our patriotic cares may not travel beyond the merits of municipal government or forest administration.—*24th May, 1885.*

PUBLIC interest in the present political situation will not be abated till final understanding between England and Russia is actually effected. There has been much delay in arriving at this result because it is to be achieved not by the armament of England, but by the intensely peaceful professions of its Prime Minister. There are no hostile demonstrations made by Afghanistan on its threatened frontier, and its most powerful Ally has just ceased even the military demonstrations it made 700 miles away from the impudent Cossacks. The Czar probably does not care two straws when a final agreement between him and Abdur Rahaman is effected, as he knows well it is not his own frontiers which have been put into a sad plight, but those of his Afghan neighbour. The question for St. Petersburg

Treaty Stipulations
for the future.

is that of advance, and how much short of the Paropamissus range its advance should stop. As far as its objective point is concerned, the northern Bear has crept quite up to it, and its next move may probably be the fulfilment of its long-conceived dream.

The problems now before England for solution must be unusually difficult. It may easily concede to Russia a few nearer points towards Herat if she is honestly able to show that, by claiming a larger strip of the Afghan frontier, it is not any preconceived design of occupying Herat that she is acting upon, but the removal of real administrative difficulties only is meant. We dare say, as she has the Gladstone Ministry to deal with, she will find without much difficulty sufficient ethnological grounds to base her larger claims upon. It is difficult to see how England can repel her rival from a region when once she has put her foot into it unchallenged, though it will now be confessed on all hands that the nearer Russia comes to the heart of Afghanistan the greater has she the chance of sowing the seeds of intrigue in that Province.

What we now fear is that the stratagems of Russia may prevent England from getting Abdur Rahaman to raise fortifications in the Herat valley. She may make a show of renouncing some strategical points in favour of the Afghans; she may even stipulate not to place any formidable army on her own frontier. The question then will be, are the Afghans to desist from strengthening their own defences at the very gates of their kingdom? While Russia will be making her roads and railways joining her base proper with her outposts by telegraph, can England act rightly in agreeing that the Amir of Cabul should do nothing to strengthen his vulnerable points on the front? The tribal animosities may any day force the daring Russian Generals to enter the Afghan territory, and any section of the Afghan subjects—either concerned or unconcerned in the quarrel—resenting the Russian aggression, may lead both countries to a serious fight. In that circumstance the defenceless state of Herat, or of any other boundary, may prove disastrous to the interests of Afghanistan. The Russian provocation may be such that England may not with any fairness prevent the Amir from retaliating, or she might feel justified in declaring war against Russia if the Amir in the least hesitated to defend the integrity of his country. Concede, therefore, as much of the frontier claimed by Russia as you can, but any suggestion for abstention from strengthening the outlying defences of Cabul and Herat all along the forward Afghan

line cannot be listened to for a moment. The Muscovites might as well ask the Amir to disband his forces and go and rule at Peshawur !

We know that the treaty concluded between Abdur Rahaman and Earl Dufferin is yet a profound secret. We hardly believe that any of its provisions does not provide for a highly unfavourable contingency of this sort. If it has not treated the Amir's country as an active repeller of India's enemy, then the treaty will be of no value whatever to India. We do not think we err in our belief that the treaty has fully provided for the British occupation of Afghanistan as soon as it became evident that the Amir required military aid from the Indian Government, or that he failed in effectually dealing with Russia when she presumed to attack his kingdom. The treaty must have further bound the Amir to augment and improve his forces, to render rapid communications for them easy, and to give effect to a satisfactory system of frontier defences. In the event of any serious contingency of the last degree, the treaty must have fully provided for the military administration of Afghanistan by the British themselves. We could easily liberate Afghanistan from all such obligations if we felt sure that it was a country of very little use in the hands of an enemy. If we did not thus care for Afghanistan, its warlike tribes in the hands of Russia would be a formidable tool in her hands for the pillage of India by the Russians. By driving Afghanistan under the iron heels of Russia our anxieties will certainly be multiplied. At any rate the frontiers of India should not be single, but duplicate. India's enemy having his base close to Herat should be well weakened in Afghanistan before he could attack the frontiers proper of India. If we neglected to have our frontiers far-stretching as we have pointed out, we provide a powerful base to our enemy, which now he has not. We must have an ally in advance of us who will be able to chop off one or two feet of the Bear before it could crawl up to Beluchistan or Peshawur, where we may be able at once to give it the final crush. If we could not trust Afghanistan, it is useless then to spend our resources on that country. But all we know of that country just at present is that if we did not interfere, the Amir will not be able to hold it loyal to our purposes. Our object is then to make it strong by means of every possible exterior assistance. As far as this aim is concerned, our efforts must be sleepless. It is not so much a sudden Russian raid as her silent culpable intrigues which have to be feared. Creating a disturbance by such intrigues, she would

attempt further conquests in Afghanistan with a view to disaffect the Amir towards India. We shall have our own difficulties with Afghanistan to be removed from time to time. The Amir will be required to establish a steady, progressing, decent Government if he expected to cope with Russia. His aim should henceforth be to base his Government on the lines of a tolerable civil administration and a very strong military organization. He can no longer dispense with the close diplomatic and other active assistance of the British, though our agents may be as few as possible and the best selected ones for holding an intercourse with him at Cabul. Though his rule may be stern it may also now take to the sympathetic turn to win over the minds of his turbulent subjects, or provide occupation to those who breed mischief in and out of his territories.—
31st May, 1885.

LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL has in the present month delivered two very interesting and effective speeches about India, entirely with a view to impress upon the British Parliament the serious necessity felt for saving India from the increasing perfidy of Russia and to show the enormous value of India to England to that part of its leading community which presume that England will lose nothing by severing her connection with India. We need not expect from Lord Randolph any gushing Liberalism to please young India somewhat beyond bounds, but the speeches he has made since his return from India show that though made of a sterner stuff, he is quite alive to all the substantial problems relating to the safety of India and its development on the lines of western civilization. He would not care to make any amount of sentimental concessions to the rising leaders of India and then nurture the emasculated idea of abandoning India a prey to anarchy. He is deeply impressed with the divine mission entrusted to England to work out the final emancipation of India, and produces facts and figures showing how India provide maintenance for millions of families in Great Britain and Ireland. Besides these millions depending on India, an enormous amount of capital belonging to England has been permanently invested in India. Lord Randolph has reasons to doubt the capacity now shown by England in dealing with the Russians who have approached the frontiers of India with dishonest and dangerous designs. In His Lordship's opinion Her Majesty's Ministers are not dealing with

Lord R. Churchill
on the present position.

the present serious affair in a spirit of firmness, foresight and ability which the task demands.—

"As to the security of India, he would indicate only a few of the methods by which it could be provided for. It could be provided for, in the first place, either by the improvement and perfection of our frontier, by the negotiation of powerful alliances, and by the tightening of the bonds of union and of common action between England and her dependencies, or it might be provided by the concentration of inexhaustible and irresistible defensive resources. There were many other methods, but what he feared was this, that these methods would all be neglected and postponed in the extravagant—perhaps purposely extravagant—attention which was being given to a little sandy strip of desert and the paltry skirmish between two barbarian chiefs. (Hear, hear) If these were neglected or postponed, he knew that great and incalculable damage would accrue to the empire

How deeply Lord Randolph feels the present responsibility himself, may be gathered from the very impressive conclusion of his parliamentary speech —

"He felt sure that all these difficulties and problems would assume gigantic proportions and become insoluble and unmanageable if the result of these negotiations with Russia terminated in humiliation for England and diminished security in India. (Cheers) He knew perfectly well how very powerless one member of Parliament was against a great Government, and he knew well how powerless even from numerical weakness was the action of a united party. That being so, it was not his intention to make even an appeal, for he was too weak, but he would make a supplication couched if they wished it, in any terms, however humble, which their dignity demanded, because he felt earnestly upon it. (Cheers) He implored Her Majesty's Government in dealing with this crisis, if it were not too late, which he feared it was—this crisis which he believed if wisely and properly treated, might turn out one of those great opportunities which occurred rarely in the life of a nation—he implored them in dealing with this crisis to allow two thoughts chiefly to prevail. In the first place, to keep a vivid memory for the past perfidy of Russia and a clear and unclouded view of our present attitude and position, and, on the other hand to think only of the interests of our Indian people and of the immeasurable duty we owe to them. (Cheers) If these thoughts only were to animate their minds and guide their actions, he believed that even Her Majesty's Government at that hour might effectually protect and preserve the honour and dignity of the empire. (Loud cheers)"

The essence of Lord Randolph's noble and fair expostulation is that the Government in England do not seem to be a sufficient match for the progress which Russia has made on the Afghan borders to the great detriment of India, and that, unless the present negotiations result in the maintenance of the time-honored credit and prestige of England in the East, Great Britain, as an Imperial Power, would be landed at no very distant time into disasters and humiliation. The soundness of Lord Randolph's advice is unimpeachable. We are sorry His Lordship has not pointed out in any of his speeches what is the definite action which England should now take

in her present negotiations with Russia. We should like to know that action if it could be taken without embarrassment and without danger. The British Commission have undoubtedly not met with full success, but their presence and vigilance at and beyond Herat have effected an immense good to India and England. We hope the Commission will be retained there as long as every difficulty has been removed. But for them the Russians would easily have found pretext to chase the Afghans down to Herat and to occupy it in the end. The most desirable thing that may result from the present negotiations will be this, and which is probably meant by Lord Randolph : Russia, while being given the frontier she claims, with one or two exceptions, should bind herself to refer to the arbitration of England any dispute which may arise between the Russian and the Afghan countries, and she should on no account attempt interference or violence in the territories of the Amir. At the same time she should abstain from offering any obstacles to the Amir in his work of strengthening his frontier. The Russians in these circumstances may either require that the Afghans should not make such a defiant show, or that if this be allowed Russia must also strengthen her own side. Unless the Amir is capable of treachery he will strengthen his military defences sufficiently to cope with those of Russia. We hardly think Lord Randolph believes that England can prevent Russia from fortifying herself in the vicinity of Zulficar and Penjdeh when the Herat fortifications are remade. If a quarter of a century's blow was to be inflicted on Russia, that was only possible if Candahar had been occupied and a railway built up to it when the British forces could have marched to Herat to prevent or avenge the massacre at Penjdeh. The only outlook now is for patching up a peace with Russia, and then to strengthen the position of both India and Afghanistan to be fully prepared to repel the Russian aggression when raised on any pretext in Europe or Asia. It would be easy for Russia to be any time unscrupulous. What His Lordship might mean is that after peace is concluded Russia should not be left free to deal with frontier matters any day without British intervention. He might further mean that the Afghan and Indian defences should be brought to perfection without delay and without hesitation, while Russia has established her position so close to Afghanistan. We cannot for a moment deny the potency of such conditions, which could not by any means be obviated from the present negotiations with Russia.—31st May, 1885.

Does even a patriot of India dread what is possible to happen to our country a few years or a quarter of a century hence ?

Reflections upon the Modern Dangers to India. The whole might of patriotism is exerted to get a handful of natives of India admitted into the civil service, to secure the free talk of another handful of us in the local municipal boards, or to force half-a-dozen native orators into the Government Councils and the British Parliament. We would move heaven and earth if the rights and privileges of landholders are questioned, or even if a sentimental grievance can be made out for the impoverished ryot, or an Englishman has insulted or maltreated a native.

I do not for one moment mean to say that the work performed by our patriots in India is generally such as we can afford to disregard. It is one in which the most capable and the wisest of statesmen and politicians are not unfrequently compelled to be warmly interested. All I mean to maintain is that while they profusely employ their energies in getting comparatively unimportant matters mended, they have as yet not been able even to perceive the sources of such probable dangers to India as might some day make short work of the lesser aspirations by which they are now so entirely controlled. We should all see that while learning the alphabets of patriotism as it were, we do not fail to realize the serious events now in rapid progress, which, if not practically dealt with, may land us in national disasters that may for ever seal the fate of India, which now can even hope, and strongly too, to be a free and prosperous country in future. I have said that our country can now fairly hope to be a free country at some future day. But adieu to this bright hope—which Great Britain has lighted in our breasts—if ever India was trampled under the iron heels of the hungry and wily Cossacks.

You semi-slumbering and meek but dear patriots of India ! Can you fairly for one moment admit that the country is not risking the chance of being in a few years plunged into a tremendous anarchy and semi-barbarism, unless every city, every province, every state, and every nation of India rise as one man, unite themselves, and force the Paramount Power to increase the naval and military strength of India at least three-fold than it now is ?

I cannot admit any person in India to be a faithful and a wise patriot unless he keenly feels the humiliation and disgrace now attached to his

country, which Russia has covertly dared to menace. Our princes are not the Khanates of Central Asia. Our countrymen are not the nomad, looting, murderous tribes of Merv and Turcomania. We are not the men-stealers, the cut-throats, and the banditti of the desert-steppes beyond the Caspian. We are the sons of valiant conquerors of world-wide empires of old. We are the inheritors of inextinguishable influences of humanity, of high virtues, of God-like piety, of the first and prime sources of that pure and refined language, literature, crafts, sciences and philosophies, which have transformed the face of the earth. Listen, ye crafty Bear of repulsive North! we are heroes in the Realms of peace, of progress, of contentment, of matchless self-sacrifices, and of united loyalty towards our Political Master, to whose hardness we cheerfully yield, but whose innate, ever-glorious, almost ethereal, design of restoring us our dear unity and our dearer freedom and humanity we can never efface from our breasts—not even at the point of the bayonet, under the roarings of the canon, or the devastations of our broad fruitful fields, and dear contented homes. We are the creatures of patient industry, tolerant in worldly evils and deficiencies, grateful in scantiness and thriftiness of blessings. Mind, ye rough and bloody Cossacks and their insensately ambitious Czar!—we have solved the curses of overpopulation, of national and sectional rivalries, of the various pinching wants of humanities, of the feuds of factions and kingdoms, of social disorders and complications, and of a thorough amalgamation with the forces of the most powerful modern civilization. We have never desolated foreign kingdoms; we have never attacked the homes and hearths and religions of any foreign nations. In effecting the combination of our country we have fallen and have reaped the fruits of weakness and anarchy. Hear, further, ye greedy Russians!—we have secured our present peace and our present status—as proud as it is harmless—after endless sacrifices; and the merciless pursuers and castigators, and the evil eyes of other nations' wealth and prosperity shall not be the impudent or the sly threateners of this country that has done thee no harm! Receive this warning, ye Russians, on the hand of a pure and a truthful son descended from a dynasty, the like of which ye can never claim: don't venture to trifle with those who have drunk much deeper into the streams of human culture and courage and supernatural sciences and mysteries—who are much better learnt in the secrets of divine

power and divine knowledge than thy own race, which is far more dependent on brutality than on humanity.

I tell, then, to the native and British patriots in India—Arise ! arise ! or you are fallen for ever ! You are yet dreaming over the gigantic strides of marches, which Russia has effected like an irresistible torrent of a river, right up from her far away home, through wide expanses of seas and deserts, and mountains and rivers, till at last she has occupied the foot of the great mountain ranges which now form the only barrier between her and ourselves. I challenge you all to reflect upon the possibility of her attempting to demoralize all India, and to say that her efforts, if the existing state of things continue, can only fail. Remember, that India has not a self-willed and uncompromising despotic master, all for herself, as Russia has one for herself. Remember, that Great Britain has not yet so organized and so multiplied its fighting resources as to enable India to hurl irresistible and overwhelming armies, both on land and sea, against any foes which dared to invade her with clear intentions to subdue her and vitiate her resources of wealth and contentment. Beloved friends of easy patriotic feelings, remember that Russia having once secured a foothold in Afghanistan, will also see in India a prize far more worthy of being secured, than any either in European or Asiatic Turkey, in which so many other conflicting powers are interested. Remember well that, with a view to design the expulsion of the British from India, she will quiet the fears of Turkey, advance mild incentives to several other powers whose active hostility she might thus assuage. I question any one in India to explain how England will be able to secure active allies in case Russia does nothing more than endeavor to subvert the Afghan and Indian Empires ? I question further any one who wishes to answer me, what number of effective naval and land forces will be available for the undoubted defence of India, should there gradually ensue a general conflagration of war in both Europe and Asia ?

We must not therefore be found unprepared for any day of trouble and danger. India must somehow or other be made capable of punishing her wrong-doer herself, if possible without necessarily relying upon any great foreign help. Every patriotic prince, every patriotic subject of the Queen, whether British or Native, should exert in bringing about the reorganization and increase of our various forces. We must all call upon our Government to declare the maximum strength that would be

indispensable for the Indian Empire and for the full protection of its open ports on any day of emergency ; to devise measures for an increase in the imperial armies by measures of economy and investigations into the sources of various funds, used and unused ; to assemble the provincial Indo-British councils and provincial native administrations with a view to ascertain the respective shares they bear in the local and general military needs of the Empire, and to recast these shares according to the means, preoccupations and extent of each administration ; to fix upon the limits and manner of reductions in, or additions to, the land forces and naval strength of each of the Indian administrations, the principles of arranging the mixture of various elements of the forces of the different provinces and states, both locally and in times of war, being also settled ; to determine upon the responsibility and share of Great Britain in applying these permanent measures of safety in the interests of her Empire ; to fix upon a prompt method of carrying out the reforms, as may be thus settled, in each of the states and provinces ; to frame a charter under which the princes, noblemen, and the ordinary subjects in India could reasonably aspire after occupying high military posts and a certain number of them, and those particularly selected, could find an immediate entrance into the military academies of England and the military services in India, the creation of such academies in India being also considered with a view to take immediate action thereat.

One may now be inclined to ask, Why have the public men in India failed to request the Government to look after securing the full military strength of the Empire ? I would at once reply that we have given no proof that have understood our gravest want, our sole ambition being to call out for reductions in the military as also other public expenditures of the country. Its growing expenditures have no doubt caused us anxiety, but the failure in grappling with the difficulty is shown in the absence of the method to be adopted in obtaining the reduction of those expenditures which legitimately call for a reduction. The failure, again, is evidenced in perceiving what expenditures, and in what directions, they need to be enhanced in an urgent manner, and what are the sources of revenue which ought to be tapped for obtaining the further funds essentially required. The policy with which we have waged our battles with the Government has been as unsound as it has proved eminently misleading. All our halcyon of security and prosperity for the

country is embodied in reductions of military expenses and of the public taxes levied which we have advocated on every conceivable occasion. What is now to be discovered and decided upon are the approximate limits of the yield of each province and each state of India and of its expenditures to fit in with the maximum requirements of the times. There is no help but to make searching inquiries into the resources of every state and province in India so far as public policy may warrant such a course. Unless this great public method is enforced, we shall not be able to know the root of our drawbacks, as far as is desirable to know it; and unless we are acquainted with this root we shall never be able to marshal up our resources with a determination that shall strike awe in the hearts of our aggressive foes. I would ask my fellow-patriots whether they would prefer the least chance of being subject to a bloody revolution in consequence of an universal sanguinary war, or pinch themselves a little more than now with financial burdens which may at least serve to prevent violent disorders in India and a re-awakening of the terrible feuds and jealousies of old, which must upset every kingdom and drain it entirely of the resources left after the telling changes already passed through.

The public sense in India as to the fighting strength and the money reserves it should command would be ludicrous, if it were not tending towards disasters which would take one century to mend, once they were allowed to take place. Our patriots do not dream of creating a united materially powerful India on the basis I have pointed out, because they have somehow or other held to the belief that the military strength of India can even be curtailed; that the public taxation must be absolutely reduced, and not enhanced; and that the integrity of the Native States should not be touched, as if an advocacy like mine would for a moment mean that any state should be burdened with an extra farthing if it already has any force commensurate with its capacity.

When I consider the position of the Government I deplore that it is only a little more hopeful than what the present condition of the leaders has brought about. The Government of India cannot initiate any large measure unless with the hearty co-operation of the India Office and the British Parliament. The party differences of the Government of England operate too strongly against any vigorous and far-seeing Viceroy daring to adopt a broad and independent measure of the kind

India so badly needs to-day. We cannot expect very serious attention being paid to the question I have here touched under the temporising foreign policy of England's party administrations.

We may centre our hopes in the present Viceroy so exceptionally able in all that concern the permanent safety and prosperity of the country in his charge. I therefore think that both British and Native India should go to him united, respectfully pointing out the grave obligation resting on him and his gracious Sovereign in respect of the broad, popular and powerful measures required to permanently secure the ends of self-defence of the country, which is fortunately now under his distinguished rule. It is high time for every prince and every leader in India to know that we cannot any more rest content with the primitive military organization of India, in which its soul and conscience are entirely absent. We must feel ever grateful to our Government for hitherto employing the best protective measures that were possible in the absence of due co-operation from the important members of the Indian nationalities. But the times have now changed, and are still fast changing. An immense military power has approached close to the Indian frontiers, while there is not a power of any importance in Europe, the interest of whom has not been awakened in the Empires of the East, and whose disposition is not influenced by considerations about our own Empire. In any future collisions, therefore, these modern interests of Europe, Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, China, &c., India must be prepared to find herself seriously taken into account by one or more of the contending factions belonging to the principal and subordinate empires of the world.

It is hence my emphatic opinion that the ordinary and princely leaders should unite in pressing the Government to solve our naval and military difficulties in a comprehensive and national sense so that every member and every community of the Indian Empire may patriotically contribute to our fighting strength, and each of the many national divisions of our Empire may take pride and glory in becoming its actual bulwark of strength and contributing to the stability of the Queen's benign predominance in the East. I ask all my countrymen to move and break the ice themselves with our rulers. It is excusable in a certain sense for the British Government not to take the initiative themselves. Our spontaneous action will remove their reserve and mistrust. We must be ready to devise such plans in surrendering the additional forces and resources for the security of

the empire as they could entertain with cheerfulness and confidence. I am sure that once easy conferences take place between the Viceroy, the various princes and the presidential leaders of the Indian nations, an admirable workable basis will be arrived at for the adoption of detailed measures in each State and province affected. The reforms I have indicated are to be laid on a broad foundation, and have been due in India since many years. That they have not been undertaken and realized has sadly interfered with the progress of beneficial unity between the rulers and the ruled in India. The greater and the more cordial this progress between them, the closer will be the hold of England upon India, which is the highest consummation to be desired for our country. I therefore earnestly implore my countrymen no more to neglect the most vital question in which their dearest interests and aspirations are immediately involved.—*5th July, 1885.*

THERE is some great unrest yet in the air with regard to the strained relations between India and Afghanistan on the one side, and Russia on the other. We receive news of the latter increasing her forces on the Zulfikar side and sending down a larger bulk of her army for the occupation of the new territories she has forcibly occupied. We further hear that the British Mission, under Colonel Ridgeway, are moving towards Herat, and that the Amir, instead of being assassinated, as falsely reported by the Russians, is moving down towards Herat with a large force. There is again some well-founded talk about a British cantonment being erected at Candahar. A direct question was put to Lord Randolph Churchill on the subject in the House of Commons, and he said that "it was to be remembered that Afghanistan was an independent State." The Noble Lord did not make his meaning sufficiently clear, and yet it was stated when he was given the India Office Seals, that he was too inexperienced and rash for such a high office ! His meaning was either that as the Amir was an independent prince, he might or might not agree to a British cantonment being established at Candahar, or that the result of the negotiations which may be pending on this point was uncertain. A later telegram, however, states that "under the pledges which England had made to the Amir, it might be necessary for us to aid him in the defence of Kandahar." It will be remembered that we were the first

The Afghan Difficulty.

writer in India who exhaustively demonstrated in a pamphlet, extending over 50 pages, that the proposal to evacuate Candahar when urged was very undesirable and ought not to be carried out, and that retaining the British hold on it in a most amicable manner, the military and financial organization should have been introduced by us under certain methods which would have proved popular in the province. Ideas of this sort have been steadily taking hold of the public mind, the most significant sign of which is the railway extension from Quetta as now undertaken. We quote below with satisfaction the following passage from our contemporary of the *Times of India* as bearing on this question, especially as it has some semi-authoritative view about it :—

“ Say what we like about the danger of advancing from our present outposts, the strategical value of Kandahar for the purpose of checking invasion can scarcely be overrated, and, indeed with Kandahar in our hands, the fate of Herat, now certain to become Russian, would be comparatively unimportant. Kandahar can be readily connected by the extension of the Quetta Railway (the “ Kandahar Railway,” as it was originally called), with the main railway system of India and with the seaport of Kurrachee. The tribes between it and the Indus are far from being as warlike as in other parts of the country. The districts round are open and well adapted for military operations, while the resources of the valley of the Arghandab alone are sufficient to maintain a large force. Here our troops would not only be massed to meet an invading army coming from Herat, but no Russian General would care to choose any other route so long as he was open to a flank attack from Kandahar. The advantages of establishing a cantonment at Kandahar is very great, both from the ease with which it could be accomplished and the facility with which communications could be kept up, and once at Kandahar, it would not be necessary to attempt the difficult and almost impossible march to Herat. We should then have what we lack now, a definite policy, and our troops would only advance beyond Kandahar for the purpose of encountering the enemy upon ground that had been previously selected. Here we have in so many words given what is, we have good reason to believe, the deliberate opinion of the military advisers to the Government of India, and that being so, it is not surprising that it should form the first important feature of the new Conservative programme. There is even a precedent cut and dried for the establishment of a British Cantonment in the remote centre of a foreign territory with every advantage to the surrounding people, and with no loss either of dignity or revenue to their ruler.”

That precedent was creating Quetta as a British outpost taken over by our Government from the Khan of Khelat, to whom the payment of the revenue realized by that station has been guaranteed by British India.

As the troops on both sides are moving, while the frontier difficulties are yet unsettled, some anxiety is naturally created in regard to the security of Herat. It is highly improbable that the Amir will permit Herat to fall into the hands of Russia without an appeal to arms. When once the

arms of both Powers clash, Russia is not likely to concentrate her force on any one point, such as Herat, but will take that opportunity of committing inroads on every accessible point from Herat to Cabul. We shall have a great difficulty then to settle. Can India permit any large portion of the Afghan frontiers to be ruthlessly violated by Russia? Can British Government refuse aid to the Amir when he calls for it, though Russia may be far away from Candahar? The public do not know how far beyond Candahar will British forces proceed to chastise the Russians. Nor can we say with certainty if the British Government will permit Afghanistan to be deliberately thumbed by Russia, supposing she is able to subjugate certain portions of the Afghan frontiers, and quarter herself permanently on the Amir's country. Of course the occupation of Candahar on the British side will be a good answer to Russia. All this, however, would mean that after all the integrity of Afghanistan has been violated. It is deplorable that the British did not quietly undertake the management of Candahar when they last time went up to Cabul. Had that measure been achieved four years ago, Russia would not have ventured to violate Penjdech, and the frontier there would have commanded much stronger force to be backed up by the British from Candahar. The integrity of Afghanistan, which has now a greater chance of being violated, would have thus been preserved intact, and invaluable time gained in the interests of the Afghan Kingdom. The result of the earlier precautions would have prevented the ugly expediency of forcing two swords into one scabbard, as matters are now situate and are likely to develop further in this direction. Poor Afghanistan has now the prospect of coming into the position of a nut between two crackers. It will probably have to conciliate both the Powers, any serious difference between whom may convert that province into a scene of anarchy and bloodshed, just as Turkey is also expected to become if some of the Powers happened to fall out between themselves. We already see good signs of the new Ministry being able to deal with the frontier difficulty satisfactorily. Lord Churchill, our new Secretary of State, has already shown great calmness of spirit which must be entirely in accord with that of this Council and the able Viceroy in India. We must, however, beg that not a moment should be lost in utilizing the armies of Native States and improving the efficiency and strength of the British armies, both European and Native.—*19th July, 1885.*

WHAT is the condition of things between Russia and England, though the warlike demonstrations in their grosser form have ceased, and the British Ministry has also been changed?

Russo-Afghan affairs
and the new Ministerial Policy.

We answer that the position has not much improved since orders were given for the movement of our troops. The nations are still negotiating. The misfortune is that the Afghans being a much weaker power than the Russians, the latter have the audacity to keep a bitter dispute open with regard to the suzerainty of a tract of country which the northern invader is intriguing to have for himself. To contend for possessing the pass of Zulficar on the one side, and Meruchak on the other, is simply the demand of brute force. The claim cannot even be listened to. And yet Russia has the audacity to muster increasing forces near these places. She has descended into the Afghan plains at her pleasure. She can have no right to choose comfortable points there, when the Afghan power is ready to protect its own territory. If Afghanistan is a prey to anarchy—if she is menacing the peace of any neighboring Russian tract or tribe—if British India has failed in checking Afghanistan from committing wrong against the Russian nation, supposing Afghanistan was capable of it, then the *hustudy* and persistent action of the Russian Government in seizing upon the Afghan outposts, one after another, would be intelligible enough. As matters stand, the Amir commands our sympathies only the more, since the British Government have failed in protecting him at Herat with the necessary force in just the same manner as the Russians have done in protecting the country they have occupied with the usual desperation of a powerful conqueror.

As matters stand the Afghan position, first at Meruchak, and then at the Zulficar, is, we fear, very anxious just now. The Czar with his well-known fuss has sent out instructions to his Generals and troops to avoid every conflict with scrupulous care. One of his trustworthy Adjutants lately stated that the fear entertained in India and England, that Russia intends attacking Herat, and then India, is altogether a mad fear; and he deplors that such misunderstanding should be created. Intentions and assertions as these coming from Russia should, as a rule, be dishonored in earnest and quietly, instead of relying upon them. We should be much mistaken if we thought we had absolutely no reason to apprehend an unseemly conflict between Russia and Afghanistan in the neighborhood of Herat. It is absurd to suppose that were England unprepared for a

war with her in Europe, she would not adopt every means in her power to seize Herat. It is highly desirable that our new Secretary of State—than whom no statesman can better yearn after the peace and contentment of the dumb millions of India—should find some means of satisfying us with authentic information as to the capacity of England to crush Russia should she venture to harass us more on our frontiers. We should not be surprised if Lord Randolph, as soon as he took charge of his high office, took secret and sure steps to obtain full information with regard to the forces which Russia could bring before the Afghan frontiers, in Central Asia generally, and in Europe at all points that she would wait to be attacked by England as soon as she dared to violate the Afghan integrity contrary to her solemn promises.

It is clear that Russia no longer thinks it a lucrative business to let the Afghans alone by settling upon any of the practical boundary lines indicated to her. The present chronic dispute there she has established as her profession. The British Commission now working cannot be removed, even if the demarcation be peacefully settled. We hardly err, we think, in predicting that it may be transformed into permanent institution at no distant date. Unless a strong diplomatic force is located at Herat, the agents of the Russians would always be on the look-out to raise a conflict and occupy Herat. Russia herself would be interested in watching for the most favorable conjuncture to act upon her most cherished object of seizing Herat. She cannot have a less object even now. We have to guard against numerous artifices of Russia as also against any causes, physical or political, which might prove adverse to us, and favorable to the Russians. We repeat again that the British Commission at Herat is now a God-send in the interests of not only Afghanistan & India, but Persia and Central India generally. We only fervently hope that the Commission may be gradually so strengthened that it may serve to extend our wholesome influence and prestige in those regions.

The conduct of the new Government in respect of the present negotiations—which, as the Prime Minister in his impressive declaration of the policy of the Ministry stated, are of the gravest importance—is unexceptional and all that could be desired. Lord Salisbury truly said that he and his colleagues were bound to respect the pledges given under the former regime. No doubt they, therefore, have to contend with special difficulties in assuming full freedom of action. It is a great relief,

however, that all parties in the Parliament are practically united as to the action remaining to be taken in arriving at "a satisfactory conclusion" with Russia. We have in this connection the high authority of the Secretary of State to bear us out, and whom we have great pleasure in quoting below on the subject :—

"With regard to the frontier of Afghanistan I understood the right hon. gentleman to throw some doubts on the absolute and literal accuracy of the statement made by the Marquis of Salisbury in the House of Lords last night, that the British Government had promised the Amir security for the possession of the Pass of Zulficar. Having seen the despatches of all the transactions that took place and the subsequent telegrams from the Viceroy of India, I am of opinion that the statement of Lord Salisbury was literally true, that the Amir of Afghanistan placed himself entirely in our hands—(Mr. Gladstone : "Hear, hear")—that he offered to accept any frontier which we might think advisable for his interest and security, provided that we secured to him three places, one of which was the complete possession of the Pass of Zulficar. I would also say that Lord Dufferin considers himself absolutely bound to the Amir on that point, and that he had acted with the entire support, knowledge, and approval of the late Government in that respect. But I wish particularly to acknowledge with much gratitude the remark of the right hon. gentleman confirming Lord Salisbury's statement, that the Russian Government are under a promise to concede the Pass of Zulficar to the Amir of Afghanistan. Such a declaration from the right hon. gentleman cannot fail to have the most marked effect on the negotiations which are going on—negotiations with respect to which I know no reason at all why they should not terminate in a manner satisfactory to the country but which, at any rate on this point, will have the advantage of being supported by a practically united House of Commons. (Hear, hear.) Of course the House will understand that none of the members of the Government think it necessary to withdraw in any way from the criticism which we felt in our duty to make on the negotiations as conducted by the late Government up to the time they left office. We perfectly comprehend the nature and the drawback of the inheritance that we have received from that part of the world. We shall try to the very utmost of our power to bring it to a satisfactory conclusion. Undoubtedly in this work the support of the right hon. gentleman, which he has indicated he will be prepared under certain circumstances to extend to us, is literally invaluable, and I am sure that the earnest words which fell from him to-night with regard to the immense value of the security of our Indian frontier will tend very considerably to tranquillise the apprehensions and to rejoice the minds of almost all of our Indian fellow-subjects." (Cheers.)

We have no doubt that the intelligent public in India, as also its governing authorities, will cordially endorse the views of the Secretary of State just quoted. Those who considered that Lord Randolph's assumption of power would be fatal to the negotiations conducted with Russia must now be a good deal disappointed, and we take some credit to ourselves that before Lord Randolph was placed in office we predicted that the course of his policy would be worthy of Great Britain. And this is no less

true when we speak of the Premier himself. Nothing is so safe and satisfactory than when the principal parties are not at loggerheads with reference to imperial policies. Mark how the noble Lord spoke about the concurrence which he had secured from his adversaries by his sheer ability, true-mindedness, and straightforward vigor, displayed in the interests of his country and of our own, which he has lately learned to admire, support, and place it on a path out of harm's way :—

"I think that the House will be of opinion that, after the valuable and exhaustive remarks of the right hon. gentleman opposite, it would not be at all consistent with the high position which he occupies if those observations were not immediately acknowledged and commented upon respectfully by some member of the present administration. I am sure I am only speaking the sentiments of those who sit near me when I venture to thank the right hon. gentleman for the considerate, and I may say the magnanimous, treatment which he has given to the proposals of my right hon. friend. (Cheers.) As far as the right hon. gentleman is concerned, none of us ever expected anything else. Owing to certain events which immediately followed the fall of the late Government, Lord Salisbury, with the full assent and approval of all his colleagues, thought it necessary to ask for some kind of guarantee, but in the attitude which the right hon. gentleman assumed in the negotiations I do not think any of us were inclined to assert that that attitude was not perfectly constitutional, and one which might serve as a valuable precedent in the future." (Cheers.)

The conclusion of Lord Randolph's speech was telling and comprehensive; it shows at once the magnitude of the task undertaken by the Ministry even in the midst of its insecurity :—

"In conclusion, I will say that I believe the policy of the Government to be, as regards domestic legislation, to clear up and get out of the way of the new Parliament certain arrears of legislation upon which no great controversy exists, and the settlement of which may confer great social and political benefits on the people. Their policy in foreign affairs, as far as they may, as far as they can, will be to labour with this one great object, and that only, that they may by a firm, rigorous, and consistent policy extricate our country from the numerous foreign difficulties, anxieties, and complications now before us, and so bring about a state of foreign order and freedom from foreign alarm that the new Parliament may be able to concentrate its attention on the political and social future of our people unembarrassed and unimpeded by any foreign danger." (Ministerial cheers.)

Lord Salisbury and his colleagues have so well conciliated their opponents by their cautious, moderate and yet strong policy, that we hardly doubt of its ultimate success. Many things tell in their favour, in that it is not the ends of personal power which they seek—and this has been unreservedly admitted by so great a man as Mr. Gladstone—but the truest and the best interests of the commonwealth which they now single-mindedly labour to achieve. We do not believe at all that either Lord Salisbury or Lord

Randolph cares what their fate would be in the coming elections. That they are merely interested in securing the ends so pithily put by the Secretary of State in concluding his speech, we do not for a moment doubt. A policy at once so calm, masterly, broad-minded and impartial must disarm the bitterest opponents while it raises confidence and high aspirations in men of universal and invaluable wisdom and experience like the present Viceroy of India. It gratifies us most when opposite parties thus sink all petty differences, and contribute to the safety and well-being of the Empire.

The merit of Lord Salisbury's exposition in reference to the serious condition of the negotiations on the Afghan frontiers is very noteworthy. We are tempted to place the greater part of it before our readers :—

"The differences, or the chief difference, affects a certain portion of the frontier probably not very intimately known to your lordships, which is called the Pass of Zulficar. The importance of that pass, be it great or small, is not a matter which comes before us for our consideration, because the dominant condition under which we deal with it is not a consideration of its importance or non-importance to England or Afghanistan, but it is the fact that England has promised to the Amir that this pass shall be included in the limits of Afghanistan, and from that promise so given it is not open to us to recede. It is of vital importance that we should establish in the eyes of all who trust us or depend upon us, not only in Asia but elsewhere, but especially in Asia, that the word of England, once given, will be sustained and adhered to. (Ministerial cheers.) But I am bound to say that this promise given to the Amir of Afghanistan was only consequent upon another promise given by the Court of Russia that Zulficar should be included within the territory of the Amir of Afghanistan. Differences have arisen as to the precise application of the promise, and these differences are now the subject of negotiation. It is perhaps rather early for me to express an opinion as to the issue or as to the mode in which these negotiations will pass along, but, as far as I have had an opportunity of judging, they are conducted by the Court of Russia, as they are undoubtedly conducted on our side, with an earnest desire to arrive at an amicable settlement, and I hope, therefore, that an amicable settlement may be anticipated. At the same time, in hoping that that will be the case, I am bound to say the negotiations have not gone far enough to enable me to speak in any positive manner. The lamentable domestic affliction which we all deplore has prevented the Minister for Foreign Affairs from pursuing the negotiations at this moment, and we must regret it all the more because M. de Giers has in all these differences which have arisen between this country and Russia deserved our sympathies doubly. (Hear, hear.) My lords, I would not at the same time ask you to attach final and conclusive importance to these negotiations whenever they are concluded. Without entering upon the question of the views which various potentates in that part of the world entertain, it is a matter known to all who have studied the subject, however slightly, that the whole condition of affairs in those countries is in a state of unstable equilibrium—(hear, hear)—and it is not in treaties or agreements, however useful, that we must trust for the defence of the precious interests we have in

those countries. Although we shall cultivate the confidence and friendship of the Amir of Afghanistan, it is not to the friendship of the Amir that we must trust for the defence of our own possessions. It is to preparations, skilfully devised and vigorously and rapidly carried out for the defence of our frontier in all points where it is weak, or, in order to prevent the tide, erect bulwarks which shall not only defend the frontier when it is attacked, but which shall stretch out far enough to prevent the tide ever rolling to its foot. (Cheers.) It is preparations of that kind which, I trust, whatever be our political changes in England, and whatever party in the State may hold predominance, will, from this time forth, never for an instant be abandoned or released." (Cheers.)

Our readers will see from the above extracts how completely in our past papers have we anticipated the authoritative decision now arrived at as to the policy which British India has to follow in relation to Russia's approaches in Afghanistan. The operation of public opinion for the last few years has rendered one opinion more rational than any other, that Afghanistan is not to be thrown into our enemy's hands, for we cannot help taking them along with us in repelling his invasion even long before it touches the border-land of India. That the Afghans are a great force, either for the good or the evil of India, is a fact entirely forgotten in upholding the theory, that we should best reserve our resources by having nothing to do with the enemy when he violates Afghanistan. If he is allowed to do this, he will use that country as a tremendous force against India. May we not be so indifferent as to give up to the foe so deliberately a warlike nation which, if not kept under our control and friendship, will permanently remain a thorn on our side. It is mischievous and suicidal in this state of things not sufficiently and in good time to augment our poor and antiquated resources. We must hereupon heartily congratulate Lords Salisbury and Churchill for declaring a policy which is at once manly, reassuring and intelligible. It ought now to be vigorously followed out in a practical manner so that we may let the Bear sit at rest below the Paropamisus Range, with her fore feet chopped off as a chastisement for venturing upon a proclamation of a shameless and highly criminal brigandage, virtually issued against a country which has never done her any harm.—1616
August 1885.

PART II.

THE ARMIES OF THE NATIVE STATES, OR THE MILITARY REORGANIZATION OF THE INDIAN EMPIRE.

ALL well-wishers of India will be gratified to observe that the question of reforming the armies of the Native States has come to the front again—note the *Pioneer's* article extracted in the *Times of India*, June 28. That such conservative journals should admit the necessity of making these armies more useful to the country than they now are is altogether a good sign of the times. The *Pioneer's* suggestion, however, is one in which it would be difficult, we fear, for any Native Prince to acquiesce, for the manner in which it proposes to utilize the armies would hardly be doing justice to the sense of reasonable pride which intelligent native rulers may entertain on the subject ; nor could the armies be utilized in the empire to secure the maximum result expected from the working of this large body of men. The passage in which the measure of reform is suggested is well worth quoting below to show the state of feeling prevailing in some influential quarters as to what importance could be attached to the valuable resources possessed by Native States in the shape of their armies, however indifferently composed for the present :—

“ The fact is, we have in the armies of Native States a practically inexhaustible mine of wealth from which to furnish the reserves that our own native regiments so sorely need. In our opinion the best and safest manner in which to employ this wealth of fighting men is to incorporate them in the ranks of our own army and let them fight our battles shoulder to shoulder with our own admirably trained and disciplined native soldiers. It may be contended that their armament and training will render them totally unsuitable for such employment, unless previously trained in peace for that purpose ; but, as already pointed out, there is a danger in thus perfecting our proposed allies during peace, and certainly no steps whatever should be taken which would have that result ; but if used as a reserve to augment the strength of, or fill the gaps in, our own regiments, there is no reason why they should be trained in peace to the use of weapons of precision. Any one who has seen the excellent troops maintained by the Nizam and Scindia or by the Chiefs of Mysore, Cashmere, Puttiala, and others, can scarcely doubt that the pick of

these armies would form a very valuable reserve, and that a few weeks' training under British officers, after the outbreak of war, would fit them to enter the ranks of one of our regiments as drilled soldiers. There are others who would require greater training, and might not be ready for months; still they would be seasoned men accustomed to soldiering of a sort, and not that half-starved youths who were tempted to enlist by high bounties during the Afghan War, as they would, at all events, serve to fill the gaps which active service would soon create. In other words, the best men would be first taken to augment the strength of regiments, and the rest, as their training was completed, would go to replace losses." * * *

To adopt any policy like the above in seeking an amalgamation of the one army with the other would very likely be termed niggardly, and is, therefore, not likely to command confidence in Native States. At the very outset such a policy would in itself show that the Paramount Power could not place sufficient confidence in the armies in question. This the British Government are not likely to do. If they think of calling upon the loyal princes to render their armies more efficient and more useable, nothing is likely to be done to lower their position in the estimation of the Empire. The *Pioneer's* plan would be "not to arm, equip and train them in peace up to the recognized standard of efficiency"! To do so would be "a dangerous experiment"! What all that is needed to be done is to neglect the armies altogether in the times of peace and enforce a compulsory enlistment in the time of war, when they should be hastily drilled and used merely to fill gaps in regiments, or augment their individual strength, or furnish their individual losses. No general would trust them with the work of guarding a line of communication or watching an insecure frontier. Nor are they thought fit for fighting purposes under one banner. If any such counsel had the slightest chance of being heeded to by the Government of India, no better way could be found to stifle the discussion of the question altogether. The question has been found difficult to approach for years together—a lamentable circumstance in the history of this country. But there is a practical treatment of the question which, if adopted, would, we think, secure unanimity of all sides.

Some specific use ought to be made of the armies in question, and that in an honorable and confiding spirit. We have no faith in a radical reform of these armies by placing them under British officers who should straightway discharge all the men whom they found useless and bring up the whole body to the standard of the British army, and then allow it to act as an integral body against a formidable foe. There is no chance

such a radical change being carried out, nor would it be a safe or wise measure. The principal chiefs whose armies are taken on hand should know they are their own body, and that their efficient or inefficient condition would be their credit or discredit. In ordinary times the function of preserving peace in any native principality should devolve on its own army, though its reform under British guidance should no longer be delayed under its own control. More expenditure will have to be incurred in pensioning off disabled people, but the posts of principal leaders in native armies should no longer be allowed as sinecures. They should be trained in military work as the plan is already, to a certain extent, adopted by the Baroda Chief. It would be a foolish waste of power not to allow proper armaments to the armies of the Native Chiefs who are known to be loyal to the supreme power and whose firmness, intelligence and integrity can be relied upon as sufficient to ensure the obedience of their armies. Though such armies may be made as effective as those of the paramount Government, their distribution in the time of war will rest with the British. The armies of Native States in the aggregate may always be kept inferior to the total strength of the imperial army. Any large or important part of the country should not be overborne by the feudatories' army alone. In the first stages of experiment the army of the most faithful and active of the allies of the British should be allowed the honor of brigading with the British force in a war. The advanced and the reserved columns for active work should be thus composed; the main portion of this body will be the British army. A war on the frontiers may bring about this important arrangement. The mass of the army of the feudatories will have to be employed throughout the country for garrison purposes. At each principal point of collection the whole of the force need not, and should not, be feudatory. To counteract any element of mistrust or danger, such local and watching forces may be composed of equal parts of the imperial and the feudatory. We thus propose the much-needed augmentation of the Indian forces, whereby larger masses of troops will be available on the frontiers than are now possible. The scheme is to be recommended for its entire feasibility and decided economy. The scheme can be carried out without adding to the expenditure of the Empire. In the case of diverting some of the Indian troops to Europe or in any parts of Asia, a part of the feudatories' forces largely led by the British army would also be despatched, the more zealous and daring of the

native chiefs may readily seize the opportunity of distinguishing themselves in new quarters of the globe. We have often strongly maintained that the military strength of India is dangerously inadequate, and that the resources of the Native States in this direction are as woefully neglected as they are invaluable and extensive. If only two lacs out of the four with them can be brought up and utilized, India will gain full seventy-five per cent. in its numerical military strength, and that without adding a pie to the permanent military disbursements of the country. When so feasible, let the extent of the quota from each State be confined to its own resources as held in due proportion to the requirements of the imperial country to which the State owes its safety. It would not be difficult in any case to impose a reasonable requirement on every State with special reference to its situation, traditions and capacity. The requirement, again, will be made in a manner which would at once raise the usefulness of a State while stimulating its useful ambition. It is by extending the full measure of confidence and efficiency that the existing army of the Native States can be saved from its present demoralization and show that use to the country at large without which the present danger to its safety cannot be avoided. The reform that should be taken in hand is to be earnest and not a mocking affair, as the *Pi's* plan would surely make it so. Such a plan is not in the least expedient nor politic, but apt to create resentment and discouragement. The drilling and equipment of the native troops under notice ought to commence at once in their own congenial soil, with a little of healthy foreign seed introduced, and under the lordship of their indigenous masters. Don't tell them that their forces, if at all used, will be used under a casual hot-pressure system and as odds and ends of the Imperialists. No, they should be treated as a due part of the integral imperial system. Both the internal and external integrity of the Indian Empire as well as that of the individual parts of the Empire, demand that the present useless and ruinous military system of nearly a third of that Empire should be promptly checked and rendered healthy and self-acting. It is indispensable that this act of amelioration should be taken in hand without delay. A conference of the Viceroy and Governors with the Native Chiefs and the Residents at their Courts would solve many a difficulty which may crop up in carrying out this measure. When matured and put into practice, it will be the best answer to Russia for its wanton attempts to disturb the peace of India. It is the

immediate increase and parade of our military resources that may ensure impregnable frontiers for India and Afghanistan. It is this earnest and formidable attempt that we can fortunately at once make, which will satisfy Afghanistan as to our irresistible strength in protecting it and exacting its willing loyalty to India. The measure suggested by us will ennoble whole Native India, which will thereby feel natural pride and pleasure in contributing to such a large purpose as the defence of the Empire. The proposed scheme would scatter the strength of the feudatories, defend the whole country against foreign aggressions, and produce a sense of self-preservation and self-respect, the want of which has been perceived by the worst natural enemy of Great Britain and India. It would be deplorable to lose a single month without reflecting on the serious responsibility resting with our energetic, far-seeing, and so sincerely well-wishing Viceroy of India.—6th July 1884.

IN 1878 attention was drawn at the Government of India as well as abroad to the subject of the Forces of the Native States, especially in relation to the advances made by Russia towards the Indian frontiers and the marked insufficiency of the Indian Army for operations beyond the frontiers and in connection with the internal and coast defences of our country. A somewhat exhaustive brochure was then published on the subject by the present writer and dedicated to His Excellency Sir Richard Meade who, in a previous discussion, had generally approved of the views and proposals of the author. Some practical result of that discussion is gradually coming to the front, which we hope in course of time may bear good fruit in the interests of Native States and the Indian Empire in general.

We have no leisure just now to review the significant articles now appearing in the *London Times* dwelling on the military strength of the principal Native States. As it seems possible that the question of their armies may be taken up by the new Viceroy, who is expected at Calcutta in December next, the Native Press may well watch the conduct of the coming discussion. The views and proposals put forth in "The Forces of the Natives of India considered in relation to the defence of the Indian Empire," if finally borne out, must undoubtedly add to the value and integrity of Native States who, in return for their usefulness, are very likely to acquire a potential voice in the conduct of the Empire leading to

individual and mutual safety and welfare. It may be fervently hoped that in any discussion that may hereafter be started between the Paramount Power and the feudatories, no force of sheer might may characterize the discussion. The question is one eminently needing the cool and perfect head of statesmanship combined with that kindly, sympathetic and benevolent temper exercised in relation to the subsidiary powers which may be expected to result from broad and dispassionate imperial instincts. For the present we may content ourselves with the following extracts from the aforesaid work. I said in 1878:—

"I am prepared to prove that the day is come when it is the first duty of a Native State to contribute its material strength to the suzerain power; that it is to its own great benefit that it should relieve itself of maintaining an indifferent army the great bulk of which is unused; that it would add to the dignity and glory of a State to give the British power a controlling authority in reforming its army; that it would conduce to the permanent protection of the State itself if its army, in an improved state, is allowed to move out of its territories to serve the imperial object of the country; that no injury will be done to any deserving set of men, or nobles, &c., of the State; that no just right or privilege of its own, any denoting public good, will be injured; that the military forces of all Native States are the natural contributories of strength and solace to the Empire which has kept them together, and which is merely formed of these and other sorts of government prevalent in India; that lastly, were Native States to stick to their old ideas and associations, they would some day seriously endanger their own existence.

"The offer of Native States to make over the conduct of their military establishments to the Paramount Power should be suited to the circumstances of each State making such an offer.

"The features of this proposal which has in a general way very well met the distinguished support of some of the highest authorities are as below:—

(1)—A small portion of the army should be reserved by the State for its Police and domestic purposes, and all such Sirdars, &c., connected with army whose condition would not permit of joining the Imperial column, should be utilized by the chief in his local service, or in any other feasible manner, as far as possible.

(2) * * * * * Sirdars of high position, who may wish to be trained for active military service, and all others so inclined, should be specially encouraged and vested with authority in detached imperial companies in such numbers as may be compatible with other conditions.

(4)—Funds should be provided by the Native State for the maintenance of its contributed number, generally not exceeding the cost incurred by it at home.

(5)—Every Native State furnishing the force should have a guiding military Council, of which the President may be the Minister of the State, the Vice-President the British Resident, and the members to be composed of a select number of intelligent Sirdars and officers of the State on the one side, and the British Divisional Military officers on the other.

(6)—The proportion of Native officers to the British to be fixed by this Committee according to the general principles agreed upon by the State and the British Government.

(7)—It would be the interest of a Native State to see that the Native Sirdars and officers contributed along with the army are capable of taking an active part in the direction of the force, and that they progress in their experience of military duties as much as their British brethren.

(8)—Any decisions with reference to the personale of the higher ranks of the army, or the dismissal of large batches of men belonging to the original strength supplied by a Native State, or the introduction of large number of new men, to be authorized by the Military Council who would consider it their special interest in assisting the British commanders in the reform of the force deputed for individual and general purposes of the States and the country at large.

(9)—The active employment of the army from time to time to rest on the decision of the Paramount Power, and any extraordinary charges resulting from the termination of any active service, in which it may have been engaged, to be borne by the Paramount Power.

* * * * *

"These dependents of Native States would come to know for themselves what they are, and how deficiently they fulfil the real function of their lives. The noblest instincts could be instilled into them both to enhance the credit and high services of their State, and to make them of real use to the country at large. The States would gain immensely in the way of securing the permanent proprietary of their territories, and may expect to get valuable rights and privileges hitherto unenjoyed by them and such as could be got by propriety. They could always count upon the services rendered to the Federate Empire, and command weight in the Imperial Councils. Such of the Chiefs as would themselves be able to take command of their troops, in conjunction with British commanders, or be capable enough of directing strategic movements in a war, might have that ambition fulfilled. This, I am sure, would be practicable in course of time when the scheme is well developed. Nothing can be more desirable for the British power than to have a large number of capable and trustworthy Generals at their disposal when a war is waging. A competent Raja of one country may command the army of another Raja, or a portion of the British army. The rising Chiefs may become as proficient in the peaceful arts of administration as in the movements of armies, when the Empire required to be defended. The object of the whole Empire would be one, and the armies of the most opposite characters could be unified, as well as the various Chiefs and their noblemen themselves. When a natural feeling is introduced into them for adopting these innovations, they could surely move freely among the greater bulwarks of the Empire owned by the Paramount Power, and identify themselves with the prevailing national object. Such splendid examples of a thorough-going, high-bred amalgamation will, I am certain, prove contagious; and one of the greatest barriers existing in the way of the unitement of the rulers and the ruled might be thus removed as if by a charm.

"I boldly advocate the introduction of loyal and capable Chiefs and Sirdars into the Imperial army as far as present circumstances may permit such a course. It would be a novel one really, but it is eminently practicable; and to be carried out actually, steps should, of course, be taken with due caution and in exact proportion to the novelty of the act. And why should we in Native States not rightly understand such reserve, and court and solicit such introduction? Are we not placed on the high path of welfare to desire a progress further and further in that path? All of us in Native States more or less understand that we are under the best possible

rule, and that if the British were to move out of India, there would be dire anarchy and confusion in the land. Yet the desires and aspirations of all members of Native States are by no means of a uniform and elevated character. The vision of some is too much concentrated on self, and too little regardful of the commonwealth which either secures all the discordant elements of the Empire together, or loosens and undoes them. Such as would expect to be profited by anarchy could not be many. But there are many too weak to exercise any salutary influence, supposing the country was plunged into anarchy; while among the subjects, none of us need be surprised if there be a few disloyal classes among many millions, who would, if they could, revolt to upset the Empire.

"All the different forces of India should, without loss of time, be unified in all practicable ways. Let the British soldier, native soldier, and the sepoy in Native States, move and act together. Let not the discipline of the latter be any longer delayed. Our States could supply a lac and fifty thousand men at least. These are ready at hand, and can anything be more deplorable than that their training should be delayed even for a day? Shall we not energetically look to the peace of our own country? Is India so enlightened yet, that any part would be safe from the rapacity of low and fanatic classes, when the army of that part was largely withdrawn to combat any serious danger to the Empire at large? Or can it be supposed for a moment that about three lacs of British and native troops are sufficient to guard the whole country, as also to wage any sanguinary war on the frontiers, or in other parts of the world, where the most serious issue may be at stake, in consequence of complications both in Europe and Asia, too sad to imagine?"

"We cannot a moment too soon awake from sleep. The question is no longer confined merely to the British Government; it is of the gravest import to Native States. It is legitimate for them to take the deepest interest in it. The present is a splendid opportunity to make their weight felt in the highest Councils of the Government of the Empress, to gain substantial privileges, and to finally fortify the respective position of each State, as also of the Empire which is formed of these reorganized kingdoms. The serious danger of withholding any sympathy from the efforts of the Paramount Power to protect India from the ravages of impoverished, but wild and greedy, powers could not be too often, nor too sufficiently, stated. I say this most unreservedly to all my dear countrymen in India.

"I do not think there would be the slightest harm in the transfer of the forces under notice to the British. If they are well trained and equipped, they would be useful to the Native States every day. If they are allowed to lie in their present condition for an indefinite time, they would be worse than useless when an occasion should arise for their use. Their withdrawal from their Chiefs would be a glorious withdrawal—the withdrawal meaning from a province where they reaped no honour for their Chief, to a sphere where they would be mentioned with pride always associated with successive actions of valor and triumph. They would always bear the name and colours of their Chiefs; they would never lose their individuality; indeed they would gain an individuality which they have not at present. Further, in the absence of his own regiments a Native Chief might have any British regiment from the vicinity to attend a ceremonial, or for any other object, if their presence was much desired. What can be more honourable to the feelings of a Chief than that any part of the Imperial force could be availed of by him to meet those purposes which are at present ill-fulfilled by his own force? The combination, again, of the

different armies in India must result in individual and general security. Wherever a large force may be necessary, there it may be composed of the English, the British-native, and the purely native forces, so that all unsafe elements may be properly counterbalanced in any part of the country, or during any active crisis, when, instead of any mutinous passion being stirred up, the highest devotion towards success could be secured in all the parts of the forces alike."

Though it is possible the author may with his further experience improve upon the original scheme elaborated by him in his past work, the above passages quoted at random have been sufficient to give a safe turn to the controversy which has more or less continued since 1878, and which may probably in the next year occupy much more serious attention than before.—*5th October 1884.*

Our contention of several years that the question of the armies of the Native States cannot long remain unattended to is not wrong, considering the closing advance of a giant power whose friendship towards India cannot be relied upon, while the military resources of the native rulers of India in general are more a waste than a source of strength to the country. Apparently, under some official inspiration, but hardly with the cognizance of ultimate authority, a series of valuable articles have appeared in the London *Times* on the military strength and attitude as also the moral and material capacity of the various native rulers. Glancing through these articles we find them well enough within the four corners of treaties and obligations entered into when the light of civilization had not pierced the land, when the murderous, anarchical and treacherous political elements were arraigned against the consolidation of the East India Company. With the repressing and amputating powers exercised by them these powers were still moderated by just and benevolent impulses. There were grossest forms of anarchy then to be dealt with. That grossness has now disappeared, giving place to much milder forms of maladministration. The results that have followed the conservation of the sources which so largely represented the brute force have proved welcome in the interests of the Empire. The results dictate that the same policy, modified according to changing conditions and circumstances, should continue in the British dealings with Native States. The immenseness of the British power must itself dictate that it should be exercised with as much tact and forbearance as firmness denoting public good. Wherever that power, in its moral and material aspects, has not been able to overcome or reform the mass of

The *Times* on the
Army at Baroda.

with "rulers of martial spirit," and so forth, as the *Times'* writer puts so plainly.

The young Maharaja who has difficult conditions to fulfil to maintain contentment among his subjects and at the same time to gain British esteem, might often find himself in the position of a nut between a pair of crackers. The force has been existing since generations bound up with the Sirdars' and Silledars' institutions of old. They cannot be cast away, nor can the able-bodied be pensioned. Every means is reported to be employed to exact various services from those who before used to idle away their time. The Chief gives promise of capacity to check wasteful expenditure, and there is no doubt that useless encumbrances are gradually weeded out. There is some good show of a military spirit at Baroda, which His Highness, perhaps, very legitimately inherits from many generations of rulers. There is no doubt that in times of trouble the force at Baroda would require looking after, but certainly much less than at some other Native States. An anxiety of this sort only runs common with the rest of the country, and it would not be fair to take any State to task for it, excepting in the sense that each State is bound to persevere in the reduction of useless rabbles with a view to provide more funds for the welfare of its subjects. If a Native State is expected to take this step, Baroda, we believe, will be found quite in advance in such matters. We need therefore much closer information to endorse the remarks of the *Times* that "the peoples between the Chumbul and the Nerbudda are now "given over by our excessive tolerance to the Mahratta tax-gatherer to be "fleeced and shorn for the purposes of an unnecessary and perilous display "of martial power." It is very probable that the closer our information about the dealings of Baroda with its army, the more shall we be satisfied as to the intentions existing in keeping it down and gradually increasing its efficiency. To seek to abolish an army of any State is almost an impossible task, for then all States should simultaneously do the same. No Chief will lower his prestige by divesting himself of his own influence, while other Chiefs remained in his time-honored position. The obstacles are various and, in particular instances, insurmountable, in seeking to discharge large numbers of forces like that of Baroda. Fully cognizant of these difficulties we early took up the question of the reforms needed in respect of the armies of the Native States. It would be wise to limit the strength in each State. It would be wiser to permit compact forces to attain every reasonable

efficiency. And it would be a much wiser act on the part of the British Government to devise that ultimate control and manipulation of the Native States' armies by which the security of the empire and its individual members may be ensured, every Chief may feel emulation in possessing and regulating a disciplined force, and no State may have reason to complain that its own position and services have been lowered or neglected, also to the loss of its own resources. The dissatisfaction of large numbers of subject populations cannot be courted without finding proper compensation for them. Nor can the revenues of any State be permanently alienated for the maintenance of a force which would be disproportionate, looking to both the wants of the individual State and the Empire in general. Keeping these fundamental principles in view which have yet to be recognized in British statesmanship at service in India, the Baroda kingdom, under its present painstaking ruler, is only likely to attract that sympathy in its task of reorganization which must eventually draw upon the high help and regard of the Suzerain power.—12th October, 1884.

It is the apprehension of a war between Russia and India which has made some little stir especially among a few thousands of educated natives of India as to their right of being enlisted as Volunteers. A few Madrasis have already found entrance into the British Volunteer Corps of Madras. Calcutta has produced upwards of 400 natives, who have petitioned the Government of India to admit them into the Volunteer Corps. The Indian Association have spoken direct to the Viceroy to sanction and extend native volunteering. There are similar movements in other parts of India. The Anglo-Indians are not likely to show much enthusiasm in furthering these Indian applications. They do not at present look upon them with much disfavor, because the probability of a war with Russia is not quite imaginary yet. A few sections of them would just now even actively support this native aspiration. But as soon as the chances of a war have vanished, the Anglo-Indian community will lay full stress on the legal prohibition against the formation of Native Volunteer Corps, and in reference to admitting native gentlemen into the European ranks of Volunteers—probably a vast majority of them will discourage any such innovation.

At any rate the offers of our countrymen to become Volunteers to fight their country's cause have just now uniformly pleased our Rulers as well

as the whole of the Anglo-Indian community. The substantial part of these offers come from the Indian Princes, some of whom could not fail in bringing into field a very large number of fighting men who could hold their own against the most disciplined forces. Since the general native communities could not yet form themselves into Volunteers, they need not think that native India could not offer any real strength to the British Government in times of emergency. We have not the least doubt that were the resources of India put to the severest test, independent native India can at once safely put forward a lac and fifty thousand men for mixed and active services. If doctors, barristers, judges and merchants could not just now find their aspirations to become Volunteers realized, they will find great satisfaction in the reflection that the Paramount Power can no longer afford to neglect the help offered by loyal native rulers. The Government is now quite convinced that it could no longer be satisfied with lip loyalty, but it is the material co-operation from native India which will henceforth be expected of it, whenever a foreign foe entertained any criminal design on India. We cannot explain better what we mean than by quoting below one of the sonorous and pregnant sentences to be found in the Lahore reply of Lord Dufferin to the Deputation of the Indian Association :—

“As you truly say, the princes and people of India have shown a truly noble and generous spirit of loyalty towards the Crown and the Government of Great Britain on the first alarm of external disturbance. In doing so, Her Majesty and the English nation recognize alike their courage, loyalty, and sagacity, for who could count the calamities which would fall upon its inhabitants were India to become the theatre of a foreign invasion, or were its ancient but re-vitalized and progressive civilization and the peace and tranquillity it now enjoys to be overwhelmed and broken up by an irruption of the fire and sword and all their revolutionary concomitants. But, happily, these dangers are too remote to affect any practical scheme of politics or administration. The normal forces of the Empire are more than sufficient to maintain the inviolability of our territory, and amongst those forces there is none more potent, more honourable, and more invincible than the consciousness that behind the organized and disciplined angle of the Indian armies is stored up that inexhaustible fund of popular loyalty and courageous enthusiasm to which you have so opportunely referred. In any event you may rest assured that, should circumstances require it, Her Majesty's Government will know how to avail itself in an effectual manner of your noble offers of personal service as well as of the various contingents of the Native States which have been so generously placed at its disposal.”

No doubt it is only cold comfort to know that the British people might admit large bodies of native gentlemen as Volunteers when the country is placed in positive danger. In times of peace, or even doubtful peace, very

few natives need expect to aspire after fulfilling their glorious birthright of practising how to defend themselves and fight for the freedom of their country. The Viceroy spoke in no uncertain tone as to the impolicy of hastily conceiving a measure of raising Volunteer Corps of natives throughout the country :—

“ Without pronouncing upon the merits of the representation which you have made, either in regard to the revision of the Arms Act or the formation of Native Volunteer Corps, I must frankly tell you that both are matters which must be discussed and adjudicated upon on their own merits, apart from the circumstances of the hour ; nor would you wish me, I am sure, to pronounce upon them on this occasion of my casual visit to your city. Indeed, Government could not commit a greater mistake than to allow itself to be hurried incidentally into a decision in respect of two much grave and important questions, which, even if they were resolved in the manner you apparently most desire, could not receive an effectual and advantageous application, as you yourselves would be the first to admit, either universally throughout India or unaccompanied, where they were applied, by qualifying regulations which it would require great forethought and consideration to devise.”

We cannot help admitting that no large decision can be passed at once on this very important question. We can cheerfully sympathize with the difficulties felt by the Viceroy in accepting the recommendations made by the Indian Association. But we believe the Viceroy is inclined, when His Excellency is freed from his present anxieties, to order practical enquiries being made as to how far it would be practicable and judicious to admit native gentlemen as Volunteers. The question must be solved at no very distant date. Native India cannot be refused a privilege which is at once as essential as honorable to their feelings. It is not likely they will long be insensible to the humiliation of being refused the right of self-defence and fighting for their own Government, while a semi-foreign community, like the Eurasians, can, in virtue of law, exercise this right. The measure in favor of natives cannot, it is true, be hastily or indiscriminately applied as the Viceroy very properly indicates. But its gradual, limited and tentative introduction should no longer be delayed, and the native leaders should labor and make apparent the numbers and character of their countrymen who are prepared to assume the functions of volunteering. As no hasty measure can be enforced simply because there may be some immediate chance of war, so the British Government cannot certainly take active steps to raise any large Native Volunteer Corps. In the first place let those come forward who can. It will then be the business of the Government to see if persons of approved loyalty and stable character could be selected therefrom. Selections could

only be made from the highly-educated classes and from the aristocrats, merchants, officials, traders and landholders sincerely attached to the British rule. The duties of Volunteers being certainly not easy-going, there will after all not be many natives inclined to become Volunteers. While the task of making undoubted selections may not be difficult, the proportion of Natives to Europeans and Eurasians may be light till the experiment is actually worked. A field for volunteering should be opened on a limited scale in every possible direction ; for instance, some Hindus and Mahomedans may join a regiment of British soldiers ; some Christians and Parsis may join native regiments. Natives of approved character may also be admitted into Police corps located in towns and villages. And purely British Volunteers may also contain small numbers of Parsis, Sikhs, Rajputs and other sorts of natives. By following mixed methods of some such character as this, fresh element of strength may be created in moderate degrees to be mixed up with the various existing ones, where both cannot combine for any doubtful purpose, but may exist for mutual checks. It will be in the hands of the British authorities to regulate the number and character of Native Volunteers intended for each of the integral military, police and volunteers' sections proposed for them.

In a certain sense when war is apprehended the Government cannot be frightened into adopting any extended Native Volunteer movement. Hence the question put by the Indian Association to Lord Dufferin at Lahore was very delicate. It is of little use to be fussy when great dangers are apprehended. We ought mainly to see the difficulties which would beset our Government in founding a novel institution. Let our leaders be told the truth : they are hardly able to show any abiding enthusiasm in any difficult venture. As soon as all apprehensions of war are over, they will allow the question to pass into oblivion, and the Government is not likely to care for their eventual indifference. Those desirous of starting a volunteer movement cannot possibly succeed unless they go before the Government in calm times and induce it to sympathize with their object by laying before it a practical and moderate measure which we have to-day suggested. We are sure if our leaders go before our Government in a business-like and sober spirit, they will very probably succeed in having some safe movement, in which everybody could have some confidence, initiated, without exciting mistrust, ridicule, or opposition.

—*26th April 1885.*

SIR LEPEL GRIFFIN has recently given the public an impression of being a hardy Briton differing very considerably from writers like Messrs. Keay and Blunt. Impartial men, little influenced by sentiment but a good deal by reason, are not likely to condemn Sir Lepel, nor applaud the writings of the former as the result of a logical and perfectly well-balanced mind. It is true that the Rajputana Agent to the Governor-General has very mercilessly dealt with the rather extreme views which Mr. Blunt recently gave to the world in the cause of the natives of India by unreservedly maligning the British administration of India. In this instance we beg leave to say that both Sir Lepel and Mr. Blunt have shown themselves as writers in a certain measure holding extreme views of a conflicting character. We do not deny that the former had some excuse to run down the latter, though it is quite clear that when a public controversy springs from strong personal sympathies or antipathies not fully controlled by consummate moderation, the great issues which the general public would like to interest themselves in are likely to be a little obscured.

In the contribution of Sir Lepel Griffin to the London *Times* on the subject of the armies of the Native States he has acquitted himself as proficiently as any just, strong, and perfectly upright politician would have done. His letter is a calm, thoughtful, and generous reply to the series of articles published by the *Times* some time ago as penned by a very able and earnest writer whose information seemed to have been as wide as his conclusion was ludicrous in the very respect in which it was expected to be of any practical use. We had noticed these articles when they appeared, specially in reference to the forces of His Highness the Guicowar. We are much gratified to observe that a political officer of so high a position as Sir Griffin has expounded nearly the same views on the question under notice as we have done for the last few years. He has effectively refuted the contention of the *Times*' leaders, that the armies of Native States should be disbanded because, as persistently held by the writer, they were dangerous, both numerically and in a military sense of view, and were specially maintained by imposing a grinding taxation on the subjects of the Native Chiefs!

We can at once admit Sir Griffin as a great authority on the question of these native armies. He has been intimately connected with about a hundred of the ruling princes of India whose territories lie scattered

between the high ranges of the Punjab, Himalyas, and the Nerbudda. He has been accustomed for many years to inspect their forces and their forts. He thinks that the British Government would be greatly benefited by utilizing their forces, and the risk incurred would be nothing compared to the advantages which could be secured. The forces are not a burden on the States, but they are a source of pride and employment to the Chiefs and the people. The duties performed by these forces are so peculiar and useful that they could not be performed by the British troops. You cannot, therefore, condemn them as dangerous and useless.

These forces would be dangerous to the British supremacy in India if they belonged to any Native Chief from whom the Government had wrested the Empire. None of the Mogul Emperors now exist, nor the descendants of the Mahratta sovereigns with either an army or a kingdom. The ancient Hindu and other kingdoms now existing have either been scrupulously preserved by the British Government, or have acquired sovereign authority simultaneously with the latter when it upset the transitionary native paramount power of India. Among the numerous chieftains of India there are very few who, by nature, cannot be thoroughly loyal to the British to whom they all owe their preservation and continuous prosperity. They cannot, therefore, be hostile to the British. The great Rajput and Sikh States, as also Cashmere and Mysore, have all been saved by the British Government, while others might have been ruined had they been suffered to continue their murderous raids in the past times.

Taking the instances of Oodeypore, Jeypore and Jodhpore, Sir Lepel thinks that, as the British Government has done only good to them ever since its relations were opened with them, they will always remain loyal. The British Government rescued them from the Mahratta wave of the last century. The bulk of these Rajputs belong to the military class whose blood has been kept untainted for thousands of years through strict marriage laws. Whatever the dissensions between themselves, all the Rajput subjects would turn out against any foreign aggression as by tradition they have bound themselves to the Chieftains to defend them against any common foe. They are all trained to horsemanship and arms, and their Maharajas being such good and cordial allies of the British, we could reckon upon the services of many thousands of Rajput warriors whenever any emergency arose. It is the opinion of the distinguished Political that, so long as the Chiefs are loyal, their forces will fight on our

side. And as they are entirely recruited within the limits of the States, a safe proportion of any increased or reformed force of the British may be secured from these brave Rajputs and the other clans who have traditional sympathies with the English Government.

It speaks well of Sir Griffin that he has candidly and honorably exempted the Maharajas of Gwalior and Indore from any blame in reference to the constitution granted by them to their armies. We have the pleasure to quote this passage below :—

“With important Mahatta States, such as Gwalior and Indore, the constitution of the regular force is different. It has often been publicly stated that Maharajah Scindia forms a numerous reserve by passing his adult subjects quickly through his army. The statement is not only incorrect, but has no shadow of justification. The great majority of the regular troops of Maharajah Scindia, as of Maharajah Holkar, are foreigners from the north. The reason for this is that the Mahatta principalities were formed in recent years by conquest alone, and have little in common with the cultivating Hindoo population, which is unwarlike and dislikes military service; while the pay which these States offer is not sufficient to attract the Mahrattas of the Deccan, who, moreover, have lost much of their old predatory spirit. It is thus evident that the armies of Gwalior and Indore are less under the personal control of their Chiefs than those of Sikh and Rajput States. This was shown in the Mutiny when both armies broke away from control, although both Scindia and Holkar were personally loyal. At the same time the right to maintain their respective forces is the subject of distinct treaty engagements, and I know no reason why they should not form a valuable addition to the strength of the Imperial army, as the loyal and distinguished Maharajahs who own them would certainly desire.”

Only the other day we expressed our conviction that the confusion and dismay caused in the early days of the Mutiny in the capital of His Highness the Holkar, who had then but recently assumed power, need not be the criterion by which to judge the unenviable position in which the Maharaja had found himself. Although his army had rebelled, His Highness himself was “personally loyal.” Now that the Maharaja has become of ripe age there need be no surprise that he should be anxious not to allow the slightest taint of suspicion of old to attach to his good name. Sir Lepel has done well in publicly confirming the British faith in the loyalty of one of the most important Native Chiefs of India, who will consequently be greatly encouraged in his noble wishes as far as they may tend to contribute to the security and prosperity of the Indian Empire. Similarly, in respect of His Highness the Scindia, the notion that has been prevalent of his passing his adult subjects quickly through army has been pronounced by Sir Lepel to be entirely unfounded,

"the great majority of the regular troops of Maharaja Scindia, as of Maharaja Holkar, being foreigners from the north." The nations of India as well as the British community will gradually come to learn what important purposes the armies, like those of Indore and Gwalior, serve in the interests of national safety. While the regular imperial army is far below the maximum point of efficiency, we cannot make light of the forces of the Native States. They may not have been managed properly in the old times, when they were perhaps placed in a compromising position quite unawares. The notion that they are dangerous is only now being slowly exploded. As their utility is now being urged, the time may come when their safe employment will be placed beyond doubt as it ought to have been years ago. It is a sign of the times that one of the most trusted political lieutenants of the Viceroy passes the highest eulogy on the character of the Indian feudatories whom he acknowledges as being fit to become the trusted allies of the English Crown. We would quote below the able passage on this point :—

"If the princes of India are loyal with a loyalty which would stand the severest strain, as I affirm that they are, then the armies they maintain need cause us no concern. We must accept the lessons of history ; and it is no presumption to have full confidence in the friendship of those who have stood by us in good and evil fortune. Look at the black Mutiny days with the Nizam holding the Deccan quiet for us, Holkar maintaining order in Malwa, and the forces of Cashmere, Puttiala, Jhind, Nabha, and Kapurthala marching with us to Delhi, their gallant princes at their head. Remember the late Afghan war, when the Sikh contingents did admirable and memorable service on the frontier. See to-day, when the Mahomedan States of Hyderabad and Bhopal offer their troops for service in the distant Soudan. These offers are genuine. I was discussing her impromptu and uninspired offer of service with Her Highness of Bhopal a few days ago, and I am convinced that it would give unfeigned joy to that chivalrous Princess if her soldiers were allowed to fight the Mahdi side by side with the soldiers of the Queen."

If these armies are not to be utilized by their Chiefs or the Paramount Power, what is the country always to do with the 350,000 men and 4,237 guns of the Native Rajas ? They are not drilled and equipped in the modern sense of the term. Many of these forces could not fire a gun, and if they did their guns would burst ! They are only armed with the smooth-bore, matchlock, blunderbuss and spear ! And these arms are found with the best part of the native forces, which, again, hardly number 30,000 ! Sir Griffin has such poor opinion of the military strength and arms in Native States that if "he were to throw together the armies of twenty States, horse, foot and guns, into a crucible and melt

down, they would not produce a residuum of military force and efficiency equal to a single breechloading British battery " ! If it is wrong on the part of the Native Chiefs to tax their subjects for keeping up antiquated forces, which are mostly unusable and are over and above the wants of their territories, it seems to us much more unaccountable that the Imperial Government should not get them to fulfil the full and legitimate object of these forces. It would undoubtedly not be an easy task to ascertain the correct number of the feudatories' forces which can be permanently set apart for ordinary and extraordinary regular duties. These forces, with all the reforms to which they may be subject, will still have to answer the different irregular purposes for which they now exist. While these purposes are served in a reduced degree, the same being unavoidable, the imperial needs will have to be provided for to the extent which individual Chiefs could bear consistent with their resources, and all the really unavoidable employment of these resources in directions peculiar to their kingdoms.

We may congratulate the Native States of India on having for themselves such a just, sincere and discreet friend as Sir Lepel Griffin.—*24th May, 1885.*

It is well on the present juncture to listen to administrators and politicians who have acquired invaluable experience of the real capacity, wants and weaknesses of the Indian Empire by serving its vital interests for successive generations as it were. The high Politico-military authority who has this week favoured us with the following on the present situation, is one of those who have rendered India highly distinguished services for a period only less than half a century. The part which we should quote from his valuable letter is brief and pregnant with indications of a sound policy, which India now wants, and which we have no doubt Earl Dufferin, as we stated at the very moment he placed his foot on the Indian shores, will do everything in his power to secure for the Empire, which His Lordship now vigorously administers. Here is the extract above alluded to :—

"You will have heard long ere this reaches you, that the prospects of war are for the present in abeyance. For this I feel thankful, for we are not prepared for such a contest as war with Russia, and *the mere idea* of such a struggle must be most mournful to all real well-wishers of India. What is now needed is that we should prepare for this war, come when it may, and that both in India and England.

"I trust that some means may be found of associating the Military Forces of the Native Chiefs with our own, and gradually raising their efficiency so as to fit them to work and serve with ours.

"The erection of a certain number of fortresses at important strategic points on or within our frontier, from Peshawar to Kurrachee, is also needed, for the support of our troops and the security of the country. These fortresses, with a proper system of railways and strong base positions, would be of immense value if war unhappily took place. I am not at all in favour of sending troops to Herat, but we should be in a position to occupy Candahar in force, if necessary from Queita, which would be the head-quarters of our Army Corps."

There are strong parties, both here and in England, who deem it a cowardice on the part of the latter not to adopt the severest possible measures against Russia with a view to save India from her future aggressions. The fact is England has been taken unawares as far as the military organization required for an extensive war is concerned. It is the same with Afghanistan. However some may reproach England for failing to check the progress of Russia when she descended from Merv, we may only now admire the tact and patience with which all our authorities combine in driving away the war-cloud from the East and the West. Our distinguished Correspondent, who has the most favorable opportunities to watch the course of affairs and form an authoritative opinion thereon, has struck the true chord of national feeling when he says that he feels thankful that the prospects of war are for the present in abeyance, for, as he shrewdly and boldly perceives, "we are not prepared for such a contest as war with Russia, and the mere idea of such a struggle must be most mournful to all real well-wishers of India." India has no experience of war with a great Western Power backed by hordes of fanatical warlike Asiatics. Russia having unopposed advanced upon the Afghan frontier, cannot under any condition provoke England to war with her unless she dared so far as to openly violate the Afghan Kingdom. A petty Penjdeh conflict was the insane act of a covetous Russian General not affording the remotest ground for a *casus belli*. No discredit, however small, can be attached to England for not forcibly ousting Russia from the region below Sarakhs and Khoja Saleh. The discredit, however, will be serious if we now so concluded the negotiations that a chance may be left to Russia to continue her raids against the Afghan territories at any point

from Cabul to Zulficar. This is the time to decide upon the real line of our frontiers where we can assert our strength with the greatest advantage to India, both politically and militarily. It should be carefully decided whether our maximum strength should be displayed so far up as Candahar or at Quetta only. As we before maintained there is no help but to maintain a solid base for our operations, the correctness of which view is now borne out in the above extract, in which it is pointed out that, when necessary, Candahar should be held in force, while Quetta is maintained as the head-quarters of our army. When the negotiations are concluded we shall be able to know—(1) what precautions have been taken to secure Afghanistan against the Russian raids; (2) what measures have been devised for re-casting the military organization of the whole Afghanistan; (3) what vindictive means have been agreed upon between India and Afghanistan, should the latter, on account of any cause, betray any sort of weakness in protecting itself, or become a source of danger instead of support to India. It is almost certain that unless the Amir avails himself of active British help in so regulating the affairs of the Russo-Afghan frontiers that Russia may have no pretext to interpose, there will be every chance in future for Russia to extend her territories in the heart of Afghanistan, or establish her protectorate over it. In case the Amir permits sufficient British influence to be established in Afghanistan, the Indian frontiers would be less liable to danger. But whether this be the case or not, the Government of India cannot help bestowing their most serious thought on vastly enhancing the *permanent* military strength of the Indian Empire. We have first of all contended that India should be made self-acting for her effectual defence, that she ought not always to rely upon another country for the purposes of her own defence. We earnestly trust the question of the military strength of India will now be viewed from this point of view by all authorities whose voice must have weight in the settlement of this question. It will be required before we have made substantial progress in the attainment of the ideal that ought to be attained at once. But there should be no delay in inviting some of the Ambitious Princes to reform portions of their forces which could either be employed for garrison purposes, or as auxiliaries to the British Army proceeding to a battle-field. Another wise measure would be to actively foster the native volunteering spirit which has now appeared in India. One of the most valuable and wisest administrators who has long

and most faithfully and actively served India—we refer to our Correspondent—says with confidence that the forces of the Native Chiefs may be rendered fit for working with the British Army. And many of our present political officers, if questioned on the subject, will reply to the same effect. It would be dangerous in the highest degree to neglect this question longer. It is fortunate at the present moment that neither England nor Russia is prepared for a war. It is excusable for Russia to be unprepared, for she has gained her point without a war for the present. Having secured a very favorable base, may we not safely conclude that her next step will be to subjugate Afghanistan by her innate stratagems and daring violence displayed on the first opportunity she could avail of? Can any one say with certainty that Russia is not even now preparing for a war, even if it be that any failure on her part to get all out of the present negotiations that she would desire may hereafter be held as an excuse for advancing upon Herat with a comparatively overwhelming force? It has not been stated anywhere that our own Government, without causing any cessation in the preparations undertaken a few weeks ago, are bent upon increasing and improving their armaments of all classes. It is possible that England may long be placed on a false scent altogether, while the object of Russia might be to temporize till she could occupy Herat in force and unresisted by the Amir. Once she seizes Herat she would not get out of it till forced to do so by a military defeat administered to her by England. Russia knows well that England will not send her forces to Herat; and, further, if she be not quite prepared for war, Russia is not likely to have the least compunction in seizing the fertile valley of Herat, thence to threaten both Persia and India. When our Correspondent states that the British are not prepared for such a contest as war with Russia, he probably means that England, in case she declared war, would not for the present find a powerful ally to join her against Russia; and England, without a first class ally to range on her side, cannot smash Russia in the way it would be desirable to do for the security of India. Under these circumstances Russia must even now be maturing her designs to enter Herat. Let us not, therefore, be lulled into sleep.

All India must, therefore, be astir. Every State and every political association in the country should pay the most serious attention to the proposal we have been advocating for several years and to the apprehensions we have just explained. We are expected to be ready at any moment to

face Russia with an overwhelming force. And where are we to have that unless a permanent addition is at once made to our army by England, as also by availing ourselves of about a lac and fifty thousand men of the Native States? These men would not be fit for the field at a moment's call till they have been brought up by the drilling of a few months at least. The only check which can now tell against the rapacious designs of Russia is the most efficient preparedness for war against her the moment she proved false in diplomatic intercourse, and the moment she showed signs of committing violence upon our neighbouring country. Are we perfectly sure that the Amir has no double game in view, or that he may not eventually elect to please both Russia and England? It must be remembered that Russia will always be closer to Afghanistan than England, while the former will be far more ready than the latter in either bullying the Amir or making to him unscrupulous concessions. Henceforth, the Amir will always feel the necessity for being subject to the most accessible powerful friendly influences, owing to the intrigues and complications expected in his own kingdom by the close situation of ambitious and designing Russian Generals. A constant rivalry being thus created between Russia and England, the only remedy left in the hands of the latter is the invincibility of her arms.—*7th June, 1885.*

It is a grave State circumstance that the Indian Empire, as one of the most important and largest States in the world, should not be able to bear such ordinary financial burden which may be brought about by hostile threats from a neighbouring power. The Russian advance and contumacy upon the Afghan frontier has, of course, plunged India into some extraordinary expenditure, which may eventually come to about one-fourth of a year's revenues of the country. Already, therefore, an anxiety-inspiring Circular has been issued by the Government of India calling upon all the subordinate Governments and the Local Boards to narrowly watch every expenditure with a view to reduce it as much as possible, and prevent its increase in any shape and direction in which it may be possible to keep it down. The outcome of this warning may result in the saving of many petty expenditures and in the suspension of much larger expenditures calculated to be of great value to the interests of the commonwealth. It is undoubted that the action taken by the Government of India is unavoid-

The Question of
Reserves and Retrench-
ments.

able and is perhaps the only effective one which they could take as dictated by the constitution by which they are ruled. A republican or a most prosperous Government might adopt a similar action ; the only difference would be that none of these Governments, when conducted on a more rigid and a more patriotic principle, would resort to an identical course of enforcing retrenchments in current expenditures except in a far more radical condition of tightness than any which the mere brag of an offensive, blustering neighbour may tend to produce in the ordinary run of matters.

The enforced position of the Government of India, taken singly and individually, is apt to tempt our sympathetic feelings much more than those of disapproval. In the course they have adopted they deserve every support that the public bodies can lend them. Little or no power is left them to question the legitimacy of several crores of annual charges incurred in England for the more or less assumed benefit of India. It is only a Viceroy who sees nothing wrong in public policy to offer himself as a martyr, who can boldly touch the bottom of the Home charges and of some of those incurred in India, and can rigidly question the propriety of any extraordinary expenditure when sought to be wholly foisted upon the poorly managed revenues of India. India, however, is so badly situated that we are not likely very willingly to demand martyrship from our Viceroys. Such statesmen would not be tolerated in England, while the prospects for India would not be improved. For, in this case, really able men would be discouraged to come out, while secondary characters would only be too willing to snatch at the prize, which so few can now covet.

That so vast a country as India should not have in reserve an interest-paying capital at least amounting to one year's revenues to meet emergent calls, such as famine or war, is a fact only less deplorable than the other pertaining to our present very weak defences. We have urged in a work some years ago that no enlightened finances of a large Empire like India can be safe or creditable unless a hundred crores of rupees were always safely locked up not idly but well, to be employed only when a really bad day overtook India. We cannot help remarking that it is hardly creditable to England that holding, as it does, the first rank in the administrative services of the world, it should have as yet failed in securing for India some essential reserve, which the most ordinary spendthrift would think of doing for himself. This one of the most vital questions has been disregarded in a

manner that must invite an adverse verdict of the world on the inefficiency displayed by the British Government in so far as this woful deficiency so unmistakeably betrays. If India were plunged into a prolonged and disastrous war—which God forbid—it will have to incur a debt which, joined with the one already existing and eating up a good portion of our current revenues, would grievously disable India in a manner that generations might feel its blasting effects. We must candidly say that this would not be a result which could at all hold the British Government in a better light as compared with the rule of the extinct native despots.

Whatever the failure of the English Government in securing reserves to meet unexpected contingencies, no local administration is likely to fail in complying with the urgent orders of the Government of India. Barring the consideration of a more serious compulsion coming upon the Government of India as they apprehend in certain conditions of future birth, it is not unlikely that the various administrations will loyally show certain amount of savings in conformity with the Circular. But the measure enforced is singular enough to suggest another of infinitely higher import. It would be well if the latter were to be gradually considered for being operated upon.

It is necessary to know clearly and practically what such a measure should be. It could not be undertaken piecemeal. The question of sufficient reserves could not be fully disposed of until the question of the adequacy or otherwise of the present revenues is judged upon from all points of view. To-day's standard of the soundest condition of the Indian finances does not indicate anything beyond a surplus of some lacs of rupees. The year in which there is such a surplus is deemed a favourable year; but a greater number of years proclaim deficits and not any surpluses, however small. No public works or unforeseen expenditures of any magnitude could be undertaken without going to the market for a loan and adding to the present crushing indebtedness of India. No funds exist out of which the capital of this debt could be liquidated in some measurable distance of time.

It is no doubt a comparatively easier matter to speak of such evils than to point out such means for their abatement as would commend themselves to the attention of those responsible for the country. It is a matter of regret that no constitution has been yet formed for the

full rational responsibility with regard to our finances. It is not merely the British Government to blame on this point, for the public of India have not yet succeeded in moving them towards the above end.

In two ways an important obligation towards India is now being neglected which the Press of the country has not yet pointed out. A good portion of the expenditure with which India is saddled is what it ought not to bear. But if such disbursements are to be stopped, some of the powerful interests in England would suffer; and these interests are, therefore, in our way. The other way in which the common interests of India are wronged is the haphazard and very deficient manner in which its people are taxed. Certain sections of them are adequately taxed, while many of the influential and important sections are either not taxed at all, or taxed in a very light degree. We make bold to say that from 15 to 20 crores of rupees are thus left unrealized. If this sacrifice is considered a compensation for an equal amount more or less unjustly absorbed by England every year, no greater error in statesmanship could be committed. We have further to maintain that not less than, say, 6 crores of rupees are also annually lost to the country since they are actually spent by Native States on their armies, which are now as much useful in times of emergencies as bundles of sticks. This startling waste of the country's resources may some day cause us heavy repentance which would then be of no avail.

As we have already observed it may be easy enough to point out many heavy items of expenditure which India may not be called upon to bear, but it is very difficult to insist on their discontinuance on account of the vested and powerful interests which they have sustained for a long time. It is most lamentable that questions of enormous illegitimate expenditures, of expenditures which require to be regulated, and of sources of revenues indifferently levied, or pitifully neglected, are not permitted to be discussed from opposite points of view in the subordinate and supreme Councils in India as in the Parliament and India Office at home. No constitution can be established for the Indian Finances in both countries unless this primary condition is fulfilled. We have for many years advocated that all the Councils which we have stated should command the assistance of paid executive members and honorary members, independently nominated, before whom and their Government colleagues the annual Budgets should come for elaborate and unfettered discussion. No item

of either expenditure or revenue will then pass unchallenged, while original financial expositions may be expected for the relief of the present financial distresses which are a source of great danger and discredit to India. Every Council should have the independent Executive Member, of great talents and ability, to study and explain every financial feature and difficulty. He will make the task of the honorary members easy and worthy of weight. Whereas now not only that there is no representative member who can tell the public how financial affairs are managed, but even if such freedom were granted to the legislative members, they are not likely to become acquainted with the hard business we are now speaking of. The present number of honorary Councillors is very few ; the number being deplorably inadequate as judged in relation to the multifarious and complicated questions which a popular representative and authoritative Council can deal with. The double featured representation in each Council of executive and honorary functions will command real power and numbers which must certainly influence in the long course the financial administration of the country. None of these members need have any power to suspend any measure of Government. All they might do is to pass ample criticisms on a properly formed budget before it is passed, and thus give the public every opportunity of dwelling upon the financial affairs before the new year's operations commence. It is the definite revelations and discussions taking place in the Council that are calculated to produce substantial results, and no general condemnation or exhortations which generally proceed from self-constituted bodies who are not in possession of the spirit and information to be found in actual working Councils. Sound and durable reforms very much depend upon a true and constant knowledge disseminated in the public, who are then in a position to have such reforms enforced. To impart a further guarantee to the conduct of the Indian Government, the India Office at home must necessarily also have paid executive representative members deputed from India, whose functions will be the same as those exercised by similar members in India. The India Council should meet on all suitable occasions and discuss with the independent members every fiscal measure of importance, whether applied, or intended to be applied, in the future. This would be one effectual way of fairly counteracting the glorious uncertainty of the party Government in England being able to discuss Indian matters on broad

specific grounds on every occasion that such discussion may be demanded. The India Council can thus be made a miniature Parliament for India, in which its interests, whenever interfered with by England or the Indian authorities, may be discussed in daylight with an emphasis and authority which are sure to tell on the British nation in England. The Council will thus be represented by extreme but prudent members from India, both in executive and honorary capacities. It may be left to the option of able representatives to proceed from India to attend the Council meetings for whatever sessions they chose to do so, provided that the number of such irregular members did not exceed beyond the one fixed, and the intending members gave previous notice of their intentions to start and the questions they proposed to discuss as falling within the range authoritatively prescribed. The difficulties existing against the introduction of natives in the Parliament are so great that we may confidently recommend the adoption of this measure as a solid concession to the Indian nation. It may be desirable to balance the popular element in the Indian Council by permitting the Indian Government to depute members from among their subjects and servants in whom the Government may have confidence. Every opportunity and facility may be given to throw full and independent light on every concern which affect the national resources and strength of India. It is in this manner that by slow and gradual processes a Parliamentary school may be opened on some rational basis, both in India and England, in relation to the Eastern interests of the British Empire. In that school, in the first five years' period, will be found the cream of Indian culture, and agricultural, educational, mercantile, municipal, official, and princely aristocracy. No greater safety-valve can be created just at present for modern India. No more effectual answer can be given to those who have the knack of propounding crude and impracticable theories of popular government, even with original and practical suggestions before them, and who deliberately ascribe every evil motive to the governing powers of the two countries.

It is by permitting the association of independent, searching and fresh elements with the Councils in India and England that the responsibility of the Executive Viceroy and of the Secretary of State for India will be lessened, while every possible facility may be secured for promoting the finances of our country and devising the considerable measures which its permanent security needs more and more every day. We cannot too

often repeat that the Indian Empire is in the greatest danger owing to its extreme financial inefficiency in providing adequate defences against the treacherous and formidable advances of Russia, which have the demoralization of India as much as of Turkey and Persia for their object. Unless, therefore, the financial resources of India—both British and Native—are handled and manipulated in a fearless and masterly manner through the aid of the united national voice of India, our country must remain in constant and serious jeopardy for its very existence and freedom.

The princely and other numerous leaders of the country should be taken into confidence with a view to make this large country *entirely self-acting at any moment of danger*, in reference to its ability to repel aggressions from any and all sides. The present endeavours of the Government of India to secure reserves for unexpected contingencies are no doubt commendable and all that is desired; and yet these endeavours, looking to the demand of the hour, may be said to be merely scratching the surface. We, therefore, earnestly hope that Earl Dufferin may be graciously pleased to move in this matter in a manner that may at once inspire public confidence as to utilizing the vast material, moral and intellectual resources of India which, we would respectfully submit, its safety and consolidation demand—most imperatively demand—without an hour's loss. Considering the time usually taken in considering and adopting measures of acute and popular representation, such as we have above indicated, we trust and hope that our hints will not be deemed impatient, for they are suggested after a study of our country's politics extending close upon a quarter of a century.—*14th June, 1885.*

WHEN a certain Aryan god was much incensed by the conflicts and grievances of his lesser satellites, he gave vent to a curse to the effect, that the affairs of human kingdom shall ever remain unstable. The community were not then radically divided, nor were they widely dispersed from each other.

The Liberals in
extremis, and India's
opportunity.

A curse of this sort seems to have affected the Government of England since many generations. The national voice which once raised Mr. Gladstone as its own crowning glory, is on the point of discarding him from its potent influence. If he and his party were omnipotent in wisdom, and prescience, and energy, they would yet be formed an idol for the

permanent worship of the population. But rightly did one of the Asiatic gods declare that a monopoly of strength and wisdom shall not lie with any single man, or a single nation.

We may not, then, be surprised were the Gladstone Ministry to come shortly to an end. We are not inextricably concerned either in their defeat, or in their success. The Indian regard ought to be uniform for all the potential parties of England. We cannot abuse and malign the Conservatives any more than we could praise and applaud the Liberals. Neither the one nor the other party will always vindicate the constant and highest interests of India from disinterested motives,¹ dire and simple. When either of the two casts a kindly eye on India, the mainsprings must be moved by its constituencies. When one of them detects an Indian blot and exposes it, the party must be strictly regulated by the powerful interests of its home-ridden constituencies. If one of these parties comes out with a generous concession for India, it must be understood that the interests of its constituencies are not thereby imperilled, or that it mattered little to them in what way the Indian question brought up would be decided.

It so happens, then, that the abstract sense of right or wrong, just or unjust, bears but a minor reference to the influences which underlie the administration of this large empire. The statesmen of England directing our affairs for the time being may ever be so able and honest, that would not be the sole reason of any good or evil done to India. Our large fates are controlled by the most intricate, the most elaborate, and the most conflicting mechanism which move the clock-dial of our own mother country. There is not a statesman in England—however high or slight his ability—who does not watch this mechanism; who does not adapt himself to this mechanism; who is not himself swayed by it; or who does not ingeniously contrive to put it in good humour, and contrive to evade it more or less when very inconvenient for wholesale adaptation.

Oftentimes some disgust is excited in our mind what perversities stalk throughout England in reference to the administrative acts of its conflicting parties, and, what is worse, in reference to what is really good or bad for the Empire of the Queen-Empress. We suspect that there has always been but a thin line of demarcation between the politics of one party and those of the other. This becomes apparent from the generally uniform policy which is observed by the Opposition when stepping into office, though it is undoubted that each party, when placed in office, tries

to mend what it may strongly deem as the errors or the deficiencies of the one it supersedes. The mischief is that the succession of a new party does not take place till feelings on both sides are thoroughly embittered and exasperated. We need not, therefore, be surprised that when the new party comes in, it is partly influenced by a certain amount of perversities which stick to it as dirt and filth till they so far germinate that they expedite its doomsday to readmit the very party which it once ousted. It must not be forgotten that the party which enters triumphantly has its own glowing costumes side by side with its dirty rags, and with this ludicrous combination it is installed on the *rajgadi*. Far more lucky than either of these transient parties of England are the modern Rajas of India, whose power and influence last till their life-time. It is possible, however, that what individual persons lose in England is gained in their national interests.

It cannot be denied, however, that a party may help us to turn over a bright page along with a dark one. The bright one which the Liberal Ministry has shown us is in the embodiment of the able Viceroys appointed during its tenure; and the black one is its hasty and reproachable abandonment of a railway intercourse between India and Afghanistan, the disastrous effects of which are marked in the recent advances and impudent aggressions near Herat—the end of which we have yet not seen.

The question for consideration now is how long shall India entirely remain the football of the contending factions of England. How long are we to be fed with the mercy and patron-morsels issuing from these illustrious parties of England? Let our leaders know that we do not even enjoy the right and vote which the millions of labourers in England will very shortly enjoy. What the reformed suffrages of England can say. Every interest in England, whether represented by aristocracy, industry, art, or, what is much more, numbers, is now equally represented. It is poor India alone which all those elements put together if it is neither represented in India, or out of India, we can place but little faith in the adequacy of its defences, and while all our giants of strength are demoralized and crippled!! Where are the leaders of India? What are they about? We were thankful to know that our scheme for starting a vigorous daily journal in London was to be considered in due time. We respect-

fully beg not a day may be lost in maturing this most serious project, which Native India should be proud and eager to achieve.

It is a burning shame to enlightened India not to let itself powerfully felt in the very heart of the British nation. Take note that the ordinary labourers of England have got a voice in its administration and in our own too. And yet no chief, no merchant, no landlord, no patriot of India can say to-day that his nation has compelled England to listen to the wants and aspirations of India. We have permitted the people of England to lie in dense ignorance in reference to our dangers and pains. They sadly want enlightenment from the East to dissipate the prevailing dark clouds of the West. No number of telegrams and petitions and effusions from the Native Press can ever tell as much as a single patriotic paper in England conducted by a vigorous and trustworthy native staff from India and daily published and widely circulated there would do. It must be a paper of great independence, authority and power, having ample resources at its disposal, very cheaply printed, and commanding news and information from all the East as well as from every town of Great Britain and the Continental countries. The main staff must be composed of well-paid patriotic writers residing both in India and England, who should depend on the strength, honesty, and wisdom of a very large patriotic committee living in principal parts of India. One of the first hopes for extensive reforms in India is centred in the full working of this institution to be introduced in England by the direct and genuine efforts of India.

We have here indicated one specific method by which we may prepare the people of England to evince interest in the various vital problems concerning this country. The proposed daily, which we have already termed as *The Sun, or, The Light of the East*, will have to be singularly independent of any factions in England. If honestly, vigilantly, and vigorously conducted, its support will be courted by every party in England. It would become a powerful supporter of the Crown. It would not be the tool of either the Tory or the Whigs. It will range on the side of any party which is in the right in the Empire's interests. It will side with every problem when its merits have been well sifted, and it became worthy of adoption by the State and the people. It would denounce any party which wilfully sacrificed India, or neglected its security or prosperity, when that appeared its life-blood. It would sympathize in the difficulties of the

Various communities of England by advocating their interests, though they may clash with those of the influentials. It would point out plans of relief and welfare to those who may be deprived of any gain that is now obtained by wronging India in various ways. It would lay bare all interested and hollow advocacy of the Indian interests, and induce the electoral constituencies to base their cause on their own legitimate interests. By the means of this organ we shall open up a sympathetic intercourse with England and her Colonies so as to be mutually helpful in times of dangers and calamities. Whether the Liberals or Conservatives happen to be *in extremis*, India will not have to be so anxious as it is now liable to be. Not until we have demonstrated this direct, this full-bodied, activity, that we shall be able to bring about wholesome changes in the Indian constitution and expect to become a part of the executive governments in India and England, or to enter the Parliament and the Ministry of the latter country.

We trust this movement may be undertaken without delay. There is no public object of so wide, consistent and disinterested a character—none more national and representative than the one we have elucidated from time to time. Every Province and every State ought to be interested in this national venture which will strike at the very heart of the British nation, who are so slow to move in respect of securing our permanent protection and developing our material resources. The remedy is no mean one which we have pointed out as one of the several which might afford some redress for the humiliating and insecure position in which we find the country now placed. Five years after such a journal is started, India might meet with anger, scorn and its own innate strength the rapacious motives of any foreign Power which ventured to endanger its peace without its having done anything to harm that power—as the case now is between Russia and India. One of the measures which that journal will have to persistently advocate would be for bringing about the reorganization of the Indian finances and its various military and naval organizations, to render the Empire fully self-acting and invincible, on critical occasions of foreign dangers, or of internal disturbances and calamities.—28th June, 1885.

It gratifies me to observe that the *Times of India* has not only advocated the bold policy of taking the native princes into the confidence of British-National-India, but has once for all boldly adopted my suggestion, that the Viceroy should summon a

The Great Change
is coming!

Grand Council to inaugurate the scheme which would be, as the *Times* truly and honestly says, received with "acclamation" throughout India.

Whether there is to be a war or no war with Russia in the immediate future, the measures of self-defence for India should be placed on a reformed and permanent basis on nearly the same scale as may be dictated by the active and available forces of Russia, Persia and Afghanistan combined, and according to such combination as may be effected against India, should the development of further events render this circumstance possible. If such a combination were ever to take place—and it is best to take the gloomiest view in such matters—it may also be presumed that one or more of the European Powers will confederate with Russia against India and England. In such an emergency, each dependency of England should be made sufficiently self-acting for its own defence. It is on this great ground of expediency and equity that I would respectfully solicit His Excellency the Viceroy to take the step right royally to unite India into one cemented bond of inspired loyalty, unity, and friendship, which alone will be the proper answer to militant Russia.

The nations of India—whether they be Britons, Hindus, Mahomedans, Parsis, or Christians—should with one voice denounce those Russian demons who have threatened innocent India with the bloodiest anarchy, plunder and carnage that the world has ever yet witnessed. Is this brutal threat in return to any evil done by India to Russia, or any similar threat first levelled at Russia by India? No! "England is spoiling our interests "in Turkey—it does not allow us to swallow it wholesale, therefore ye "mild and wealthy India, we want to devastate thy fields, thy treasuries, "thy hearths and homes! Our barbarous and hungry legions desire "plunder and wealth; hence shall we seek thy devastation." A native saying runs—"you never did me any wrong, neither did your "forefathers; but your oxen have mocked me,—and that is enough"!

I now put this question earnestly and respectfully to every British and Native Officer, to every prince, to every patriot, to every trader and merchant, to every zemindar and social and religious leader of India,—is National India to pass over this brutal insolence and burning insult without mustering a dignified capacity to enable her to smother this villainous design in its very origin?

It is in pursuance of this black design that the Bear has violated a territory that it should have kept inviolate. Its designs on Afghanistan are

not to bring about the degradation and ruin of India, what is the other motive? There can be no other motive: at least nothing better than the nefarious one I have been pointing out. Has she been able to tell us that one of these days Great Britain intend to usurp Native States; to loot the aristocracy; to destroy our arts and trades; to shut up schools and colleges; to interdict the freedom of the Press or a free railway travelling; or to employ measures for arresting progress and prosperity, and consigning the princes and the people to the bondage of servitude and misery? Can she dare tell us, that if we permitted the transfer of the Paramount Power to her that she could introduce higher civilization amongst us; that she can by a magic wand grant us a more beneficial and a more extensive form of self-government; that she could, in a similar manner, open new sources of industry and wealth to spread universal content; that she would tolerate the numerous free and enlightened governments of India; and that she would suffer its numerous nationalities to outstrip her own, in progress and prosperity, as they are so now already? Can she venture to state a reasonable period in which she could grant India a constitutional government, or Parliamentary and other free institutions? Can she admit that her Government would for any length of time, after her introduction, tolerate India's patriots and orators, as our noble English Queen does? Supposing Russia ever succeeded in seizing India, what would be the terrible amount of indemnity she would go on taking from her, and for what mortal period would she be instrumental in suppressing the national works of the country, which are now searchingly applied to the well-being of every class of the Indian populations? Questions of this sort, and of the utmost gravity, can be multiplied *ab libitum*. We know what the answers would be: they would be of the most depressing character. The threatening steps proceeding from a nation so hostile and so unrefined as the Russians are such as a right to meet with the deepest national resentment and anger of every community in India!

It is on the condition that Afghanistan is able to repel the Russian attack on Herat, effectually and ignominiously even, if necessary, by an armed compact with Persia, that India can be spared the new anxiety which would sit upon her heart should Afghanistan be cowed down by Russia. Situated as we are we cannot afford to have the numerous warlike tribes of Afghanistan and Asiatic Russia hostile to India bent on slaughtering

its foes and establishing their predominance over India ! It would be a fatal blunder of the most serious magnitude if ever the British Government allowed Russia to occupy Herat by force of arms ! It is of the utmost importance that India should be made strong enough to make Afghanistan its most friendly and its most respected feudatory, and to hold Russia for ever in check beyond the Paropamissus Range. I beg the public and the Government to note that if they were to suppose that nothing more than the Indian frontiers need be protected in the interests of India, we shall have to double up our resources, for we must then not count upon Afghanistan as our ally, but as the pliant and unscrupulous tool of Russia ever fed by her with the wildest of hopes and aspirations detrimental to India. It is by securing our firm hold on the Afghans that we can keep them as our friends,—as our active allies, in whose country we can gradually establish ourselves, both to make them strong and to render them our own help when their country was placed in danger. No crafty or violent means on the part of Russia should place us out of our guard, and permit her to subdue the independence and integrity of Afghanistan. We ought not to mind even a little irritation with the Afghans, for we know that it can be soon removed and our disinterested motives could be soon established there. The armies of the Native States should, therefore, be placed on active footing as early as possible; and let the British Generals and Native Princes all unite in declaring, as an answer to the Russian design upon India, that they can march upon Samarcund and Bokhara and restore the Central Asian tribes their old kingdoms under certain conditions. India may not actually go to this length, but let us so far be prepared at least. Let us be prepared with a fitting answer to the insolent design upon India so persistently held by Russia menacing our peace and happiness.

It must, however, be admitted that we cannot enter into any contest with Russia unless the most unavoidable necessity is felt. The Afghans do not entertain the best of feelings towards the British Government in India, but a few more or less serious affairs like the massacre of the Afghans at Penjdeh must produce a very strong feeling also against the Russians in the whole of Afghanistan. So far the aspect of affairs will contribute to the interests of India. It would be both politic and humane, therefore, not to let the Afghans become the pliant creatures of the Russians, for the former in being entirely friendly and subject to the British are likely to become prosperous and civilized, which they could not be under

Russian domination. Thus in the case of an extreme and rapacious Russian policy against the Afghans, our Government have to be sufficiently strengthened for coping with Russia in Afghanistan.

What, again, is to be guarded against is (and this has been more entirely lost sight of) the future machinations of Russia with the Afghans and their various leaders which may probably be exercised in securing a ready pass through the Herat Valley in case of a war in Europe. The present effort of Russia have a double aim; first, that of taking all the Afghan elements in hand either for a friendly or bullying treatment; the other being to command a military base in Afghanistan for effecting an approach to the Indian frontiers, whenever events in Europe and elsewhere impelled Russia to do so. If this were allowed, or both Afghanistan and India should be so weak as to be unable to check this inroad, the Russians will so far be able to utilize and vitiate Afghanistan against India. Here we perceive another reason why the army of India should gain a great accession in its present strength. Any time the Afghans are not fully able to check the Russians passing through their territory, India should have a large number of spare force to enter Afghanistan even up to Herat if indispensable.

I have always shown how dangerous it is to treat the Afghans in any other light than that of our active ally. We can never afford to do without them unless we have the ability of indefinitely adding to our resources—which we have not. We must generally rest content with the additional resources which Native States can spare for local and imperial forces, and this additional strength can make India self-acting in its defence in the event of a great war with Russia. I have no doubt that so sound and so capable a diplomatist like the Earl of Dufferin may be graciously pleased in good time to devise a quiet, unobjectionable and effective method of calling the council suggested in past numbers to prepare the native chieftains and leaders of India to take an earnest and active share in the reorganization of the military defences of this Empire. His Excellency can well produce in them that stream of loyalty and zeal and affection for the Queen, which will not cease flowing till the British Empire lasts.—26th July, 1885.

We cannot of course quote wholly in our very limited space the admirable leader in the *Times of India* of July 20 bearing on the necessity for granting a reform to the army organization of Native States. The leader is entirely in

Resuscitation of the
Armies of Native
States.

In reply, I am to state that His Excellency recognises, with pleasure, the wise and patriotic spirit evinced on the occasion by the promoters of the meeting. Lord Dufferin is a sincere friend of the Native Press in India. He regards it as an institution essentially necessary to the well-being and progress of the nation, and as capable of rendering the greatest service both to the Government and the people. His Excellency is an attentive reader of the native journals, regarding them as the legitimate channels through which an independent native public opinion expresses the wants and wishes of the community at large. When we take into account the extent of this Peninsula, the variety of its races, languages and creeds, the complicated problems involved in its administration, and the diversity of interests with which the executive has to deal, it is evident that the energies of a ubiquitous, honest, and intelligent Press is one of the most powerful assistants the Government can possess to the proper conduct of public affairs. There is nothing, therefore, which his Excellency will always hail with great pleasure than the exhibition by the Native Press of India of that dignity, self-respect, sobriety of thought and expression, and accuracy of statement, which can alone enable it to give due weight and force to the views it advocates. The resolutions which you have just passed are a significant sign of the progress the Press of India is making in the right direction, and it is on this account that His Excellency has requested me to express in as earnest terms as I can command his appreciation of the high and worthy motives which have dictated them."

Every one in the Native Press has to understand that if we desire to render the Government more kindly and more serviceable to our numerous countrymen, we have no light responsibilities ourselves to conform to, before we could succeed in our efforts to enlighten either the government or its subject races better than hitherto. We cheerfully acknowledge the service which Lord Dufferin has done to the whole Native Press in India in advising it how to conduct itself in discharging its important functions. We desire, therefore, that the above document may form a permanent record in our country.

We may quote one more instance of our writings having attracted due attention:—

"I have long been of opinion that the time had arrived for doing something towards utilising to some extent for general purposes the Armed Forces maintained by Native Chiefs, and for regulating the strength and character of these forces. Some time ago a writer in the *Times* published a series of articles calculated to create distrust and alarm regarding these forces, and urging their reduction as a danger to the Empire. The circumstances of these State armies were put forward in a very exaggerated and incorrect form in these and other similar publications in India itself, and the effect was to cause a feeling of alarm which was not warranted by the facts."

"I am intimately acquainted with the State Forces generally, and it has been my duty to watch them and in some cases to control in a way their organization. I have always regarded the question of their strength and condition as one on which the Paramount Power ought to have a voice; but I have never shared the view that they should be wiped out and abolished. On the contrary, I have always looked forward to the time when the whole question of these State armies would be brought under a clear and well-regulated system, by which a certain

portion of each such force would be constituted a part of the General Army of India, the requisite measures being taken to ensure its fitness to form a unit of that army.

"The Mutiny of 1857, of course, rendered anything of this sort impossible for a certain period from that date, but the time in my humble judgment has now arrived when this question should be taken up. The Great Chiefs of India were formed into a Grand Council of the Empire on 1st January 1877, and this was the first step towards giving them a voice and a real interest in the Great Empire that has been built up in Hindustan. Hitherto, little further has been done in this direction, but I trust that some real progress will now be made in utilizing this movement.

"I quite see the force of and agree in your remarks as to the danger of trusting *too much* to expressions of loyalty such as those referred to by you, but everything that is reasonable and proper should be done to encourage a spirit of recognition on the part of the Chiefs and people of India that their interests as a nation are bound up with England, and that, while they may have grounds of complaint against the Government on some of many points, they still look to it as the *only* protector and Head that can ultimately accomplish in India what that great country requires for the prosperity and welfare of its peoples.

"I can assure you that though, alas! there are many blots on the English administration of India, there is but one desire on the part of all right-minded Englishmen, viz., to do what is *just and right for India and its people*. What is needed is calm thoughtfulness, with a full knowledge of the facts, to plan and then consistent and wise action with *practical* measures suited to the end aimed at, and that will gradually build up the fabric all true friends of India desire to aid in erecting. Thoughtful writers like yourself are doing much to lead public opinion in the right direction with this object, and you have my most hearty good wishes in your efforts.

"Lord Randolph Churchill is likely to work great good to India if he remain in office. Till the latter point is assured, he cannot, of course, do much."

The Anglo-Indian statesman whom we have here quoted from a valuable communication he has sent us this week, deserves our respectful and careful attention. He is pleased to say that our writings which he has read "are of the highest importance to India and the British Government; but, unhappily, the subject of them is one surrounded "with *practical* difficulties of the gravest character." We have tried to perceive these difficulties, and we are glad that our eminent friend has frankly enunciated his views how far possible it is to fortify the interests of the Indian Empire and to promote the substantial aspirations of the princes and the people,—not merely in their interests but in the interests of the British Government also. He makes a most valuable suggestion that the Grand Council of the Princes which was inaugurated in 1877 might now be fully utilized. The suggestion is identical with what we have recently solicited the Government to do, and we respectfully hope it may be attended to in season. Perhaps the Camp of Exercise to be held next cold weather may be availed of in inviting the principal Princes of India with their substantial retinues of Sirdars and forces.

The Political Agents and the Governors may also be invited to this Grand Council. In past papers we have explained how possible it is to secure great practical results from this imperial conference. We do not think that any effective action could be taken unless this universal conference is called by the Viceroy, where the measures necessary for the full defences of India by the means of naval and military forces, and the advanced strain which each province and each native state could bear both for local and imperial safety should be candidly and thoroughly discussed with all the various authorities—whether British or Feudatory—who should thenceforth be animated by the Viceroy with this leading and predominant idea, that every British and Native authority should feel for himself and for the districts he represents what is the amount and character of fighting force that he is in duty bound to furnish for local and imperial wants, how is he to organise and render it efficient so that it may be everything for the purposes of unity, and barely anything for unpatriotic or mischievous purposes. The questions relating to combinations, distributions and proportions of the various elements of strength will entirely lie for disposal in the province of the Head Government, which will also command considerations in reference to the predominant imperial bulk of fighting strength to which every subordinate army will be subject. Questions of this character are most delicate and most difficult to handle with unreserved openness. It would, therefore, be highly desirable that the ground-work for ready and smooth action in such a Council should be previously prepared. The time is come when each principal section of the body politic in India should be made acquainted with its active obligations and brought to share in the task of protecting the empire as a whole. They should be influenced by the glorious part they have to bear in it, and induced to labor and sacrifice their resources in bringing about this end. We have already lost much precious time and far more valuable opportunities. We cannot afford to lose more, for a War may come upon India any time, and the terrible, but unquestioned, duty of securing Afghanistan for India may also face us any moment. The only question which should stir every Indian patriot deeply has been and is still most alarmingly neglected by them!—23rd August, 1885.

PART III.

INDIAN VICEROYS AND GOVERNORS.

A WARM discussion is now and then carried on in India on the subject of Government in the the principal administrators migrating to the cool Hills and the Plains. hills whenever feeling uncomfortable in the low-lying plains of India. This is not the first time when objections have been started against the exodus of Viceroys, Governors, Members of Councils and other dignitaries to Simla, Ootacamund, Matheran, or Mahableshwur. Though the objections have been often started, no practical result seems to have followed. The distinguished personages have continued to enjoy the time-honoured salubrious and glorious sanitariums without being much affected by the blunt, unsympathetic arguments dashed over their well-composed heads from the sweltering plains below.

There are the theoretical and practical sides of the question, which have to be dealt with in disposing of the controversy. First take the theoretical. Any public servant—he he the Viceroy himself or any less important functionary,—spoils his work, misunderstands his lieutenants, and lessens his interests and sympathies in matters affecting the people if he spends his service time far away from the localities in his charge. If his Lordship or his Honour has any right to enrol himself high up in the clouds, that right is admissible when he is very ill or finds himself depressed in spirits after much hard work. He has no right to find England in India in nine months or even four months in the year, when it is hot and miserable Indian plains, and not their delightful snow-peaked mountains, which he is bound to serve. There is some truth in this contention, but it is not free of some easy-going theory—democratic, or radical.

The other side of the question says that the highest British administrators have the hardest mental and moral work to do. The low-lying localities are directly watched by competent local officials. Their superiors have only to look into their business from a higher stand-point.

The superior minds should not be enervated by heat, bad climate, and low, confounding associations of indifferent men and things. The Viceroys and Governors are generally those who have not been acclimatized below ; their lives and health must be free of risks. The most careful and noblest expressions of policy are generated in the congenial climate of the hills, and not in the malaria and sickly heat of the lands below. This sort of plea is made up of truth, imagination, sentiment, theory, and is somewhat devoid of practical insight and sagacity.

Amidst the perplexities which this question creates one thing is certain, and that is, there would be no valid objection to a resort to the hills for two or three trying months in a year by the first-class dignitaries. The lesser ones cannot afford to go except when badly ill, or any salubrious locality is not near enough the scenes of their duty. A retreat to cooler regions is more permissible to European than to Native officials, the indulgence being regulated as above, and also dependent on the extent of furloughs enjoyed by the former. What adds to the moral and material vigour of European administrators, or really lessens their weariness and depressed sense of monotony in reference to their duties, is a clear gain to the public service. But who can deny that this generous feeling of expediency may be carried a little too far so that a belief in the necessity for extending retirements in distant hills may easily be multiplied. Especially as the European element in the Indian administration predominates, the custom of migration, when becoming unmanageable, should be held in check.

In all matters of close administration, its direction from distant hills is decidedly objectionable. A Viceroy or a Governor who has made himself personally acquainted with every district under him by close and prolonged observations can very well sketch out the condition of his kingdom, or elaborate an administrative measure on paper on the top of a charming hill, or in the bosom of a lovely valley, where the best of moral and mental faculties rise as by a touch of magic. But it is unfortunate that problems in relation to communal, national, or sectional interests often turn up which no mere sentimental fountains, however deep and pure, are capable of solving. The mere possession of mature powers of thought and feeling and perfect principles of conduct and measures is not enough for conducting the administration of a large and complicated country. The successful administrator is often a person as nimble and worn as the

cargo barque capable of traversing her own prescribed oceanic channel as many times as its business may require. In like manner a restless ruler is more a plunge-taker into any and every part of his lively dominions to acquire a searching knowledge of struggling men and things, than a frequent climber of mute Nature's glorious hills. As he cannot devise too many good measures, his bent will be to personally ascertain the feelings and wishes of the people affected by those measures, and not to move out of the centres where he can himself know them best. It is the constant moving among the various communities, and oft recurring inquiries into their condition and wants that serve to develop an administration, which is the end pursued by a thoroughly active and conscientious Governor. To him, therefore, a constant or prolonged migration to the hills is an intolerable nuisance. The normal condition of India, rather excepting that condition sectionally excited on a threadbare subject, undoubtedly demand that the governors of the country should pretty constantly move in the midst of their subjects, becoming cognizant of every popular condition and feeling, whether changing or stagnant, and frequently investigating public resources with a view to promote the amelioration of the people, whether this be possible in the beaten paths or quite outside them. It is by an administration conducted on the spot, and not from a distance, that a stronger hold can be kept on the working of the administrative details. The five years' tenure of office of a Governor or Viceroy we deem to be so short that it is one cause why frequent resorts to the hills become a necessity. A longer term will serve to bring about a better settlement of health to cope with the hard conditions of European life on the plains, while the action of European administration will be of a more abiding interest. It is at first sight singular that an indulgence allowed in the case of the highest functionary on the land, while not unfrequently resulting in the broadest benefits to the country, should, in the case of third-rate functionaries, when overstepped, end in a morbid flatulency of official action degenerating the concerned departments altogether. And yet it is the one unperceived evil blot on the administration that we have here hit.

We have only time to say that the official exodus to the hills, like many other public questions, can only be effectually regulated by constitutional progress and an efficacious division of work and responsibility as attached to the imperial exigencies of the country. The journalistic denunciations

are mere scratches over the thick crust of the time-honoured insti of flying away to the bracing hills at the first sign of official languor or inaptitude.—*6th July, 1884.*

THE phases of Indian history have taken to as constant a change as Lord Ripon's Indian marked in the history of Great Britain itself. It career. is enough if a Viceroy goes out and a new Viceroy comes in : a new page is then added to the history of the country. It cannot be maintained, as the London " Thunderer " said the other day, that our country has no history. It has a history, and a capricious history too. When a new Viceroy is reported to come out to India, he must either be the best or the worst man that can govern a large continent. As he takes time and goes on exercising his Viceroyalty, he is either a hypocrite, useless and mischievous statesman, or the very incarnation of the highest virtues of an administrator. He is either to be hooted out of India, or his name enshrined in golden statues. The whole continent may fall at his feet as soon as he places his steps on the Indian shores. The next year after that, our ears may either ring with onslaughts of rank abuses, or a deafening charms of hallelujahs. He has thrust back progress one full century, or has transported it through the future vista of a full hundred years. He has converted the nation into a mass of rebels, or has elevated them to be a happy and free nation. He is either the emancipator of the poor, or the despoiler of the nobility. He has either strengthened the finances, or ruined them. He is either a moral and educational benefactor, or a trumpery sentimentalist blowing out mere smoke. He is moved by territorial greed ; if not, he is only a foolish upholder of the rights of savage nations. He must either be a misanthrope, or a too pleasant man of the society. If he is not too yielding, he can only be too perverse. He can only be too sympathetic, or too unimpressionable. If he is not the Angel of Bliss to the country, he is only a Demon of Destruction. He is all-in-all, if not a noodle.

We need not pursue further such singularities of Indian public opinion. We are immensely amused at their appearance whenever a Viceroy comes and goes. Here is some history and some public opinion for the country—in spite of the *Times*—and what is more, both seem very capricious for the moment.

We are not going to fall and we have never fallen into any of these traps of public opinion. Between the conflicting traps we can perceive what things should be, and have been in the past. There is no placid national organ, in India unaffected by party spirit. What such an organ would say of the Viceroyalty of Lord Ripon on the eve of his departure from India is likely to be different from what any of the journals of the country have to say. All classes of journals have begun to speak out about the doings of Lord Ripon as Viceroy. Each class no doubt does its best to express the popular opinion. There is, however, not one journal in India which singly can create a perfectly true public opinion. We can only gather from various journals disjointed bits of truth, and make one whole approximate truth. It is not likely, therefore, that the public, in the present instance, will be guided by the utterances of any one or two journals.

The impartial historian of the future will say of the present Viceroy of India that he tried to do his duty, and did it well enough. No Indian Viceroy is expected to reap the fruits of his actions while ruling the country. At best he can only securely lay the seeds of good measures, which take a long time to fructify. The present exigencies of the empire will not permit any Viceroy to mature his policies and to personally watch their being carried through. Before he is able to see any of his large measures taken root, he has to bid adieu to the country. Like an apparition in the skies, a good and vigorous Viceroy like Lord Ripon appears and vanishes. We are therefore called upon to judge him not as an eternal being in India, but a very flitty one indeed. You cannot compress a fifty years' achievement, its approbation or condemnation, into a five years' tenure of office. Many of our contemporaries express either too much of hate, or too much of praise, for the going ruler. According to the time and opportunities at his disposal the Marquis has gone through the right course of business as admirably and as energetically as he could. Outsiders are not expected to know what amount of dreary routine work a Viceroy, above all others, has perpetually to go through. He is only visible to us by his large measures. His Excellency has displayed a broad and sympathetic heart, because he ever felt that it was the good Queen's desire that he should not rule India for any particular party, but for the good of its teeming millions. He had the disagreeable duty to tell an exalted personage that the Queen's

Indian Empire was based on righteousness. It is painful that one responsible functionary should have to say this to another, and set aside an imperfect attitude in the matter of a State policy. He showed a statesmanlike flexibility as soon as he perceived that in conceding a just measure to a section of the Indians he would cause a lasting heart-burning to the Anglo-Indians. The reproach that the non-official Europeans have hurled against his Lordship in respect of the Ilbert Bill will, we are certain, be disallowed by the future historian for the simple reason that Native Civilians deservedly required this minor equality with their European confreres, while Lord Ripon and the Government of India never anticipated before the measure was brought on that the Anglo-Indians would be so much offended. The Viceroy will be unmistakeably pronounced as being uncharitably dealt with, while he was timely and honestly prepared to modify the measure to suit the feelings of both Natives and Europeans. He stood the storm so well as to have proved his capacity to pilot the State ship safely through greater storms. In no past periods were educational matters so thoroughly sifted as has been under the able direction of Lord Ripon. The foundation work for a highly progressive educational policy has been laid, and we have no doubt that the edifice on that foundation will be started during the next Viceroyalty. An entirely new shape has been given to the administrative policy by countenancing the purchase of indigenous stores, by the reduction of duty on salt, by the wise policy of railway extensions, and by resuming railway operations beyond Quetta in reference to strengthening the Afghan frontiers against the insidious encroachments of Russia. He has shown the ability of repairing the mistake unavoidably committed during the change of the Ministry. The most complex question between the Bengal Zemindars and their tenants has been firmly handled at least for being fairly comprehended. The information that its discussion has produced will be invaluable in the interests of a careful and improved administration. It cannot be expected at this stage that a faultless Act can be constructed able to command the assent of all the parties involved. A proper basis has been laid for strengthening and popularizing the municipal and local funds' government throughout India. The leading people have been well invited to feel what fair share they could take in that part of the government if they have acquired the ability of so acting. We need not enumerate his measures of reform and development further, as it is not our

object here to describe his full career in India. We need only dwell here on some of its prominent points with a view to see if the country is warranted to place him in the ranks of the benefactors of the country. We should think that India will honour herself by treasuring the name of Lord Ripon among those eminent statesmen who are always remembered. We can only judge the broad landmarks of his policy. India stands in great need of being handled by many a successive statesmen of the type of the Marquis of Ripon. The Anglo-Indians will have no cause to be ashamed if they were to generously join the leading natives in paying him the parting tribute. They feel prejudiced towards him, but the prejudice is such as would have disappeared if the Viceroy had another five years to spend in the country. His incumbency has been too short to allow him to set himself right with all classes of the immense Indian population. It is the shortness of his tenure in India that has been at fault than any part of his character, which has been found perfectly capable of dealing with every variety of human nature. We may feel sure that had His Excellency but remained a few more years in India he would have conciliated the Anglo-Indians, while remaining a friend of the natives greater than ever. The confusion caused against him was too ephemeral. The public of India will therefore not look so much to the mass of his achievements brought into light as to the difficulties his Lordship encountered in attempting those achievements, and the sterling qualities he displayed in raising the country in the world's estimation. No Province in India ought to fail in honouring this great, high minded, unselfish and benevolent statesman, and perpetuating his name in India as a worthy example to be followed by his successors—*12th October, 1884.*

INDIA—the educated and aristocratic India—once more undergoes the agreeable conventional form of bidding farewell to its Viceroy in Transit. The retiring Ruler and devising measures of welcome for his successor. We cannot but warmly welcome the efforts made by Native India to hold ovations for the departing Viceroy and finding means for the perpetuation of his name. Our feelings of welcome are not due to any presumption that any one statesman could, in his short Indian term, achieve the lasting security, or the lasting prosperity of India, but because that end being impracticable, the Marquis of Ripon has shown sufficient tact and strength in ruling India so as to produce contentment in a majority

which can appreciate good rule. He landed in India when it was this sort of want which had to be fed. It is this truth which we all ought to perceive in common fairness ; and when the departing Viceroy struggled conscientiously to achieve this end, it is unfair to censure his Lordship for the results which any other equally good Viceroyalty would have achieved. We do not approve of the popular demonstrations for demonstration's sake, but because it is such demonstrations that are the real alphabets in the training of grand and united nations.

The one point in which the Viceroyalty of Lord Ripon will be deemed uneventful we shall indicate further on. The departing Viceroy will once more be reminded of his glorious work of advancing the freedom and prosperity of the Indian nations. That such a programme can be altogether cast away by any Viceroy is only next to impossible. And yet it may be that in having this laudable goal in view, the most eminent statesmen may misobserve the nearest, much more the remote, landmarks. It is seldom that this fact is appreciated in the struggles of the hour. Our own controversy, when the Ilbert Bill was pending, was all along influenced by this fact ; and it was quite expected that Lord Ripon, as soon as he and all else began to realize the emotions felt by a very small, though a very important, part of the Indian nations, should have moderated the measure in the way he did.

It is long since, however, the most momentous question pertaining to India has been but dimly perceived, and yet has never been able to attract the attention of the deputationists who, throughout India, seek to engage the attention of outgoing or incoming Viceroys. It is wise to direct attention on points of domestic development. But the wiser and more incumbent duty of the representatives of the people would be to point out, in the strongest and most imperative terms, the mine of gunpowder on which the Indian continent now rests. More specially since the riots in Bombay we traced the dangers of popular anarchy and fanaticism to their intensified origin in the North-West, and in Afghanistan and Central Asia in general, and to their feeding fuel which the rapid approach of Russia towards the frontiers of India had been supplying. The present is an opportune moment when we might usefully call upon the leaders of society, and writers in the Native Press especially, to draw the attention of Earl Dufferin, when he arrives in the country, in an emphatic manner, to the question of the permanent security of the country, whether it rests on

an organization incapable of being tampered with or giving way during an unforeseen contingency. This is the question which should have the prime attention of deputations going to welcome the new Viceroy. There was a time many years past when our awakening to the fact of the fundamental dangers to the Empire and of the primitive and disorganized state of its military constitution could not have been more than the awakening of a deeply slumbering camp, first perceiving the approach of the dawn fraught with good or evil. That time is now past. There is no need to be alarmed, but there is every need—the strongest need—to recognize and increase the military resources of the Empire.

The Liberal Ministry of England is strong and may not perhaps be expected to fall out with Russia by the means of their liberal professions. But it is not Liberals who would permanently rule India. Nor can the wisest prophet say that no materials exist for a future rupture between England and Russia. Nor can any one have the hardihood to deny that Russia is closing upon Herat, and that her onward movement is being constantly backed by increased forces.

We have been contending since many years, and have even taken special steps, pointing out the inadequacy of the British forces for emergent purposes, and the awfully mistaken notion of not permitting Native States to render their armies efficient. It may be politically desirable not to impose such taxes as the income tax upon the people for a while, but it is a political blunder of the gravest sort to neglect the warlike material of Native States, while we cannot boast of a military strength equalling even a third-rate power in Europe. No one can be more solicitous than ourselves to see that the Suzerain Power, in a delicate question of this sort, assumes no aggressive interference, and that the ancient Native States do not suffer in position and integrity for the reason of their becoming the means of better strengthening the Empire. We have elaborately explained the measures by which their just pride, reasonable ambition and vested interests may be satisfied, while they are gradually and securely turned to directly impart their military strength to the Empire. No injury can be done to any Native State in a pecuniary way, which already may be paying sufficient tribute to the Power that holds the country. No Native State, already unavoidably burdened, can be further taxed. Any State which, in point of external obligations, enjoys a marked immunity may well bear its own portion in a way that may be universally approved.

There should be an emulation created between Native States as to their respective capacity for a united defence of the Empire. What may be imperatively demanded of the Suzerain Power will be that noble unselfishness and self-denial by which, to a certain extent, native kingdoms may enjoy their own economy and free living. There will also arise cases in which the Paramount Power will have to bear the burden of foreign service when imposed on certain States, for the simple reason that it may be unjust to subject them to any additional expenditures. That the British Government will have to curtail their own expenditures in the directions that cannot be objected to, is another feature of self-denial, which they may well cultivate. We have always remembered the weighty words ^{as} Sir Richard Meade addressed to the present writer to the effect that ^{her} question of the armies of Native States is a two-edged instrument to handle. ^{be} But the measures we proposed he fully thought were worthy of the consideration of the British Government and the Native States. Some action was then commenced—in the time of Lord Lytton. But no masterly dealing with the question as a whole—such as may pacify, please and encourage Native Chiefs—has yet been attempted. Why should it not be? Why should not enlightened Native States make a move themselves when the new Viceroy comes? It is time that time-honoured suspicions should give way, and the Chiefs themselves should so skilfully move as to reverse all coming extreme actions, or the application of a foreign remedy. The worst in reference to the weakness of the Empire should be anticipated, and an unfaltering conviction maintained that the Queen's Government is the only foreign yoke which would never prove treacherous and calamitous to the various peoples of India. We would be the last persons to inculcate false theories—such as would tell against the interests of our dear princes and dear countrymen in India.

The ambassadorial antecedents of Earl Dufferin are of the highest order, and should, we believe, be most hopeful for Native States. It is in diplomatic skill, in a deep and kindly feeling of doing good, and not harm, to Oriental States in a state of helplessness, in a conservative spirit, of a moving and enlightened order, which looks for safety and preservation of noble and stable interests,—it is, again, in a perfect heart of the utmost tenderness and in a cool head of resolution, that he appears to excel most. No one can doubt his powers of kingly toleration, nor his statesmanlike courage, generosity and magnificence, nor his brilliant busi-

nesslike capacity to see through the forbidding difficulties of a delicate, as well as the most trying and complex question. It is one of the superb jewels of the highest moral and intellectual gifts of the supreme nation of the world which the present Venus of the Political Firmament of England has decided upon sending us ; and we may rest assured that he will not injure native India, but employ his powers in heightening the glories which he will silently receive from the hands of Lord Ripon. The Land that sent us a Mayo, a Lawrence, and a Montgomery, also sends a Dufferin.

The aims of the British in India are daily rendered higher. Those interested in the country cannot fritter away precious moments in passing mere complimentary expressions to new arrivals ; nor can they well subordinate public attention to points which must sink into insignificance compared to the serious question of the internal peace of the country and the external dangers to which it is besetted. The question we have brought forward ought to be discussed at once, and should have the keenest attention paid to it in the welcome address at Bombay. It is imperatively necessary to inform the new Viceroy, with every deference, that the appearances put up by Russia can never be trusted ; that it is unknown what complications in Europe and Asia may bring about for India ; and that its best safety lies in a prompt, skilful and harmonious manipulation of all its fighting forces, which must be brought up to a point of efficiency and sufficiency *without losing a moment*.—16th November, 1884.

A new Dictator of an august and benevolent type is coming out to India, and half the world is anxious to know what he thinks and says in reference to his new charge. There is no of empire in the world which, when it sends out a new Pro-Consul to a dependency, excites so great an attention of endless multitudes, more especially of the civilized world, as Great Britain does. Earl Dufferin, the incoming Viceroy, is so nervous as to his being at all spoken about when he would be working as our Governor-General that, in his impressive speech at Belfast, he feelingly said :—"So convinced am I of the truth of what I say, that I imagine the greatest success and triumph I can obtain is that from the time that I depart from these shores and wave a grateful response to the farewell you are saying to me to-night, even the echo of my name may never be wafted to your ears until

Earl of Dufferin at
Belfast.

"at the end of my official term I stand again amongst you, having won from the historian of the day no higher encomium or recognition than that my administration was uneventful, but that I had kept the empire entrusted to my guardianship tranquil and secure." We need not wonder at this touching piece of self-abnegation. It ought to tell with great effect on the non-official Anglo-Indians who attempted a little too much against the departing Viceroy. It ought also to teach the natives of India—we mean the inflammatory portion of them—how undesirable it is to bring on any strained relations between the Government and the Anglo-Indians, or between the latter and the natives of the country.

The utterance quoted is, however, a maiden effort so far as the Earl's cares for the Indian administration are concerned. His Lordship will find in a year or two—if not even in a less period—that every capricious breeze which sways the Indian atmosphere will waft his name and sentiments and action high up to the ears allwhere even though they may refuse to hear them. The anomaly of an Indian Viceroyalty, which we have perceived many years since, render the condition, rigidly but sympathetically put down by our future Viceroy, singularly inoperative. Earl Dufferin has marvellously concealed his inner intention—a truly worthy one—to dispose his countrymen in India to show patience and magnanimity on all questions pertaining to his charge, when these are likely to tax his highest qualities. The utterance strikes us as singularly appropriate as having taken place in a region which has given the Earl a greeting so sincere and so deeply enthusiastic which a mother or a father alone can give to an only precious and beloved child. "How badly we want you for the difficulties of our own home, but in a distant land, where you are now wanted most, you carry our fervent prayers for a renewed brilliant success which you have hitherto commanded, and that in the most trying periods of the exalted office you have held for a quarter of a century." Perhaps the following is the tenderest passage in the speech of the Earl delivered in response to the hearty wishes expressed to him in the Ulster Hall :—

"Least of all, how can I forget that memorable night when, on the eve of my departure for Canada, this splendid chamber was filled with friends who had assembled together to bid me God-speed, and to assure me that, in the opinion of those who had known me best and longest the honour then conferred upon me by her Majesty was not considered misplaced nor undeserved? The fact that I am again standing before you in analogous circumstances authorises me to

entertain the pleasing conviction that none of you regret the pledge you then gave for my good behaviour, or consider that I have done disgrace to your imprimatur. (Cheers.) That occasion ushered in the brightest and happiest period of my life—a period passed in one of the fairest regions within the confines of the empire, amongst a people animated by the most generous instincts, endowed with all the noblest gifts and qualities which distinguish the British race, and to whom I owe a debt of gratitude and affection, whose welcome burden I shall carry to the grave. Since that auspicious celebration twelve years have passed, during which in different capacities I have done my best to render faithful and loyal service to my Queen and country—(cheers)—and now again that I am about to proceed to a distant land, to undertake a task more arduous, more responsible, and, I may add, more honorable, than any which has ever been imposed upon me, can it be wondered at if, like the hero of old who was invincible so long as he was in contact with his mother earth, I come back here amongst you to gather fresh strength and vigour and renew my youth, by once more looking around on your familiar faces, by listening to your genial words of welcome and encouragement, by taking a farewell grasp of your thousand friendly hands? (Cheers.) It is true that the powers of Antæus faded into impotence as soon as his enemy lifted him from the ground, but I feel that, no matter how high the sphere to which I may be elevated, the fortifying influences with which I am surrounded to-night will follow me wherever I go, and in the darkest moments of lassitude and depression the recollection of this glorious scene will restore my faltering spirits, and make me more than equal to dealing with any emergency which may occur."

A few youthful writers now existing in this country may take heed of the tribute which a thorough-bred Irishman like Earl Dufferin has paid to the British race, to whom we may have faults to point out, but whom we cannot calumniate in foul language without casting a deep odium on ourselves. Earl Dufferin truly said that he owed the British people "a debt of gratitude and affection whose welcome burden he shall carry to the grave." It is by legitimate and submissive high service that he has won the esteem of the British nation, and not by, in the remotest degree, following the unfortunate proclivities of his less gifted countrymen which can only bring on disasters to those who sympathize with them.

The noble speaker touched the true chord of Indian difficulties when he said that a Viceroy in India can hardly choose between what was absolutely good and what was absolutely bad. He has often to decide on a delicate comparison of advantage and disadvantage upon either side, such as would render it very difficult for even those who have every opportunity of acquainting themselves with the elements of the case to discriminate between them. In this situation a Viceroy, who affirms of himself that neither amongst those who have lived and laboured and who have disappeared from the scene, nor amongst those who are still working for the good of England and of India, will any have set forth more determined to walk

fearlessly and faithfully in the unpretending paths of duty, is particularly liable to be misjudged, and his success or failure very wrongly estimated even by those fully cognizant of the intricacies of a question, but who yet cannot feel the arduous responsibilities of an Indian Viceroy. When an unexpected storm of feeling broke out Lord Ripon tried to follow the line of policy which his successor so shrewdly delineates. Every difficult duty of a Viceroy will be fraught with portentous consequences ; and the more such duty is unpretending the more likely will it now and then draw upon the deeper emotions of mankind. No Viceroy can go on in for the least compromising course of business without being rudely awakened to the startling changes of which, however silent, he may endeavour to be the cause. For everything in this direction touches the interests of the millions and the conscience and safety of the Imperial Power, "to whom Providence has entrusted the superintendence of their destinies." An absolute Viceroy no doubt deserves the highest confidence of those who are watching the drama from a distance ; and very often has he to pass over condemnations and criticisms affecting his policy and character as so much temporary "flaws of fleeting public opinion." Nor can he much seriously mind the "puffs" of public opinion. What we recently stated as to the insane tendency of the general public either to denounce or praise a Viceroy, in unmeasured terms, is fully borne out in the following pregnant passage:—

"Above all, let me remind you, my lords and gentlemen, that when dealing with such vast subjects as those which occupy the statesmen of Calcutta ; when handling the tremendous forces which are evolved out of the complicated and multitudinous political systems which exist within the borders of the Indian peninsula ; when endeavouring to mould by slow and cautious efforts the most ancient, the most continuous and the most artificially organised civilization to be found on the face of the earth into forms that shall eventually harmonise more and more with those conceptions which the progress of science and the result of experience have shown to be conducive to human happiness, the result of the ruler's exertions and the flower of his achievements are seldom perceptible at the moment, but far more frequently bring forth their fruit long after those that tilled the field and sowed the seed have rested from their unrecognised and sometimes depreciated labours."

The Earl has correctly felt that the time is past when England would be compelled to send out men for heroic achievements, for upsetting empires and revolutionizing the basis of society :—

"Their successors must be content with the less ambitious and more homely, but equally important and beneficent, work of justifying the splendid achievements of those who have gone before them, by the careful and painstaking elaboration of such economical, educational, judicial

and social arrangements as shall bring happiness, peace, contentment, and security alike to the cabin doors of the humble ryot, to the mansions of the loyal Zemindar and enterprising European settler, and to the palace gates of Her Majesty's honoured allies and princely feudatories."

We trust that the ideal here presented will be steadily kept in view, as no doubt it will be, while the new Viceroy passes through the bewildering trials of his great office. Sufficient material has been collected to see how the ryot as well as the Zemindar, the European settler and the Indian prince, can be placed in a position from which they may endeavour to reap equal contentment and prosperity. The Earl will have some share in putting a greater emphasis on the gradual fulfilment of this ideal. He has apparently attached remarkable weight to the pacific assurances of his personal friend, the Russian Foreign Minister, who is most anxious to secure lasting peace with England in Central Asia and a frontier that cannot be violated. If we had not read somewhere else of his having said that even with this assurance we ought mainly to depend on our own valour and vigilance, we should be induced to suspect that the Earl may occasionally be susceptible of a slight credulity. It is on a thorough reform and augmentation of the indigenous and imperial forces, effected as much as possible on existing basis of matters, whether in Native or British India, that our permanent security will depend. Place the highest trust in Native Princes and in Native Nobility as well as commoners, while being careful in avoiding odious taxation; and a good deal of the Indian Dangers must vanish in thin air. We hope it may fall to the lot of Earl Dufferin to give that repose to the continent which can never be secured unless its military or material strength is developed on a comprehensive basis. If he is able to achieve this work satisfactorily he will have won half the sincere credit that he may expect for his work in India. We perceive the Earl has already acquired a deep sense of the multiplying and complicated wants of the country arising from the spread of education, the extension of railways, and the congestion of populations. While naming those whom he would most cherish for their rare qualifications and brilliant achievements, he paid a most deserving and eloquent tribute to the Civil Servants as a body, which ought to give one enduring satisfaction in perusing, and which we shall therefore quote with renewed pleasure :—

"But, after all, gentlemen, there are but the fortunate few whom accident and happy chance, seconding their inherent merits and native genius, have made known to the world. Behind and beyond these there are hundreds and hundreds of other noble and high-minded officials,

unknown and unrewarded, who, in the solitude of their several districts, burdened with enormous responsibilities, compelled to sacrifice almost everything that renders human life delightful, are faithfully expending their existence for their Queen, for their country, and for those committed to their charge, with nothing but their conscience to sustain them, reinforced by the conviction which is inherent in every Briton's breast, that the sense of having done one's duty is better than name or fame, imperial honours, or popular approbation. (Loud cheers.) It is to join these men that I go, and though I dare say there may be many amongst them superior to myself in ability, as they all must be in experience, one thing I can promise you, that neither amongst those who have lived and laboured, and who have disappeared from the scene, nor amongst those who are still working for the good of England and of India, will any have set forth more determined to walk fearlessly and faithfully in the unpretending paths of duty."

It is impossible to do justice to such a difficult piece of oration as Earl Dufferin's at Belfast was, in the course of one article and with the few moments of leisure at our disposal. It is at once so heart-stirring—such master-piece of eloquent genius, and the outcome of the highest scholarly attainments, a perfectly well-cultured mind, a profound and tried statesmanship, and a warm, generous and all-embracing temperament.—30th November, 1884.

WHILE observing all that is now going on in various parts of India to The Town Hall proclaim trumpet-tongued the sincere loyalty and Meeting at Bombay. affection which Lord Ripon has won from the leaders of the native races of India, we feel as if we were in a happy home ringing with the joys and clamours of its inmates, more of children than elders. The lot of the paterfamilias commanding a large and cheery number of growing children is indeed enviable. As such the true patriot of the country, in whose heart there is space both for the native prince and the Empress, will see something to foster in this state of things. The Anglo-Indian community will gradually perceive this as something infinitely better than the angry and violent screamings of the excitable portion of the writers in the Native Press. It is much more pleasant to put up with the spontaneous joyous fun and cries of innocent loving children than with the results of severity breeding sulks and desperation in them. The steadiest and most moderate opponent of the Ilbert measure, whom we all ought to listen with patience for our own sakes if nothing more, now truly says while observing on the speeches made last week in the Bombay Town Hall :—"There was nothing to provoke criticism, and indeed the "time for criticism would be singularly ill-chosen. In the hour of battle,

"the troops ranged under different banners must fight for what they hold the right as vigorously as they can. But now on the eve of Lord Ripon's departure his many amiable qualities are those that should be kept more prominently in view." But there has been something practical in Lord Ripon which kept his amiability within moderate bounds ; and that was his earnestness in showing that he meant good to India, not merely with soothing lip-professions, but what may be meant by a straightforward practical action. The sectional excitements were an inevitable misfortune which, though they followed Lord Ripon's policy, were not the forecasted creation of that policy.

As the wisest of the opponents of Lord Ripon look upon the Indian demonstrations as "a monument of Indian gratitude to English good will," which, according to such sensible writers, will appear in prominence "when all the arguments and wranglings of yesterday and to-day are forgotten," we may be permitted to notice the recent proceedings in the Bombay Town Hall with deserved gratification and perfect composure. For, happily, there has not been the slightest attempt to raise counter-demonstrations, which should have taken place had the Anglo-Indians been still influenced by the hostile views which prevailed only a year ago.

The Town Hall assemblage seem to have moved the great city of Bombay. The Sheriff admitted the necessity for the meeting, though the European community were absent. Sir Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy, the Chairman, rightly anticipated that Lord Ripon may count upon the appreciation of the Queen and the people of England for the good he has done to India. In his opinion the retiring Viceroy has initiated a policy by which the permanent affection of the people to the British nation will be secured and both India and England benefitted. While closing his speech the worthy Parsee Baronet said :—"I wish Lord Ripon could be here this afternoon to witness for himself this enthusiasm. I wish that the great statesmen who sent Lord Ripon to us could hear us to-day echo the words in which Mr. Gladstone told the Commons of England that Lord Ripon was writing (to-day, we say, has written) his name on the hearts of the people of India."

The Hon'ble Mr. Budrudin Tyebji dipped into the remotest future with the brightest wings lent from the pure armour of the now fast closing Viceroyalty of the past four and a half years. "He ruled India exclusively for the benefit of its people." If he stayed in India a ten years more his

Lordship would not find derogatory to his high functions to look also to the interests of the ruling race, which, even in his short stay, he far-seeingly did. The honourable gentleman hoped that the consistent pursuit of his Lordship's policy will ultimately lead to "the fusion of India into one great and united empire, indissolubly binding the interests of Her Majesty's European Dominions with those in Asia." The doctrine that the present writer was the first to preach is now being taken by the public in precisely the same form as it should assume. Another valuable sentiment comes from him with a special grace, as the speaker is a thorough-bred Mahomedan gentleman:—"It mattered not to us that our "gracious sovereign happened to be a native of Great Britain any more than it mattered to our ancestors that the great and wise Akber, the "magnificent Shah Jehan, or the powerful Aurangzeb were descendants "of Mogul conquerors from Central Asia." Neither the Hindu, the Mahomedan, or the Parsi need be ashamed to reflect fully on this sentiment with a view to adopt it as his own.

Mr. P. M. Mehta made out a very good case showing how opposed to the British genius was the rigid and unsympathetic feelings of the Anglo-Indian opponents of Lord Ripon. He held that the best of the past statesmen who conquered and consolidated the Indian Empire acted on the notion that the British mission was only to prepare India for self-government, and then abandon it to its thousand and one races. "Perceiving that the people tasting the indulgence of the paternal rule, are trying to move too fast and become too troublesome, the Civil Servants, yielding to this impression, have almost invariably lost their old grasp of principle in the multitude of details they have to deal with ; and though rising step by step they sit in the highest councils of the State, and may deceive themselves into the belief that they possess their old cunning of statesmanship, the fact is that they have lost it almost altogether * * * Gentlemen, there never was a more anxious and critical period in the history of British rule in India than when Lord Lytton resigned. He left the country in a state of doubt and perplexity, of alarm and uneasiness. At this juncture Lord Ripon assumed the reins of office ; and fortunately for India, in him we get back the true old English statesman, wise in his noble generosity and far-sighted in his righteousness. It is no exaggeration to say that he has saved the country from grave disasters." That Lord Ripon has proved a sympathetic, generous and circumspect

statesman as worthy of the present times as the most famous conquerors and generals were in past times when the country was conquered, we have often and often pointed out. The best of natives will admit this without adopting all the acrid views of Mr. Mehta. He has launched himself on a too general and unwieldy domain, and his extreme eloquence and passionate denunciation of everything that does not exactly fit in with the doctrine that the English should make every possible haste in educating India and then post-haste leave it to its own fate are perhaps a little too general for unfaltering acceptance. After all there are such things as practical difficulties in the world which, neither in respect of foes or friends, we should take much too lightly. Intolerance is the one thing which Indian nations must learn to avoid to be able to command self-governing powers. Mr. Mehta very truly observed that "through the passing uproar, one assurance for the natives of India has come out clear and strong, that the English nation will never consent to upset the great principles of justice and equity on which the declared policy of the Crown for the Government of India is based * * *

And I am sure it will come to pass that it will be acknowledged that he has done as great service by his steadfast policy of righteousness, which has been derided as weak sentiment, as even Lord Canning did, as is now admitted, by his firm policy of justice, which was then derided as clemency." (Loud cheers.) Here is all what is good and correct. The success of the truest orator is found while boiling down his oration that no exuberance of feeling or temper is left.

Mr. Dadabhai Nowroji laid stress on the fact that not only has Lord Ripon frankly acknowledged that the country is suffering under material as well as educational poverty, but that he earnestly set about devising large and memorable measures for its mitigation. While declaring how princes and people alike came forward with handsome subscriptions to raise a memorial to His Lordship, Mr. Dadabhai said :—

We are to propose a memorial to Lord Ripon. But what will hundred such memorials be to the great monuments he has himself raised to himself? As self-government and self-administration and education advanced, for which all he has raised great new landmarks, his memory shall exist at every moment of India's life, and they will be the everlasting monuments, before which all our memorials will sink into utter insignificance. It was asked in St. Paul where Wren's monument was. This, St. Paul itself, was his monument, was the reply. What is Ripon's monument? It will be answered India itself—a self-governing and prosperous nation and loyal to the British throne. Canning was Pandy Canning, he is now the Canning the Just, of the

British historian. The native historian, with admiration and gratitude, and the English historian, with pride and pleasure, will point to Ripon, as Ripon the Righteous, the maker and benefactor of a nation of hundreds of millions. (Loud cheers.) But by far the greatest service that Ripon has done is to England and Englishmen. He has raised the name and glory of England and the Englishmen, and rivetted India's loyalty to the British rule.

The extent of good work done by Lord Ripon in India must necessarily appear small looking to the period of his office, and therefore less striking than the powerful motive His Lordship has sought to establish for the steady and smooth continuation of his high-minded policy.

The Hon'ble Mr. K. T. Telang made both a mild and eloquent speech, smooth flowing as the placid flow of a stream. While the Hon'ble Mr. Mundlik rejoiced that the hearts of all educated India beat as if with a telegraphic response to the public call of honoring Lord Ripon on the occasion of his departure, the Hon'ble Mr. Telang showed how even those who formed the permanent opposition to Her Majesty's Government in India now join the admirers of Lord Ripon. We only hope they may do this as a body and in a calm spirit unaffected by past bitterness. The concluding passage of Mr. Telang's moderate speech may be here quoted with advantage :—

Whether we look at the repeal of the Vernacular Press Act, or the resolution for making public the aims and scope of Government measures, or the practice of inviting people's opinions on contemplated projects ; or whether we look to the great scheme of local self-government, or the manner, for that is most important, in which the late Mr. Kristodas Pal—*clarum et venerabile nomen*—was appointed to the Supreme Legislative Council, we see clearly the liberal policy of Lord Ripon's Government. Gentlemen, many of you will doubtless remember the noble lines in which the successor "of him that uttered nothing base" has embodied the anticipated sentiments of after generations on the reign of Queen Victoria. "And statesmen," the Laureate sings,

"And statesmen at her council met,
Who knew the seasons when to take
Occasion by the hand and make
The bounds of freedom wider yet,
By shaping some august decree
That left her throne unshaken still
Broad-based upon the people's will
And compassed by the inviolate sea."

(Cheers.) Yes, gentlemen, Lord Ripon has made the bounds of freedom wider by shaping divers august decrees, which have not only left Queen Victoria's throne unshaken in this land, but has made it even more broad-based upon the people's will.

The speech of Mr. Jhawarilal Umiashunker Yajnik must serve to point out the absence in most of the speeches delivered a temperate discussion of the many questions handled by Lord Ripon and more or less disposed of

by His Lordship. His departure from India is just the occasion when an enthusiastic tribute of admiration should be offered him by the public. It is a mistake, however, that a dozen weighty speakers should be seduced by the legitimate cravings of eulogizing a beloved Statesman and Ruler, and altogether forget to calmly examine the merits of his measures, pointing out the various stages of their progress, or the caution, energy, and integrity needed in their pursuance by his illustrious successor. The management of a complex and anxious administration like that of India must always be sorely in need of something more than a simple appreciation of liberal measures in its behalf. The action of the wisest and the noblest serves to reveal unforeseen difficulties, the discussion and solution of which then become due. We must forget that we can ever expect smooth sailing in our expectations and ventures in the domain of patriotic politics. They are often complicated with opposite factors, which have to be taken into account and reconciled before any wholesome fruit can be gathered. We must learn to accept the time when all antagonistic parties should meet on one platform and discuss public matters without being betrayed into partizanship. Sir Jamsetji, in his opening address, stated that the speakers who would succeed him were to enter into the details as to how Lord Ripon discharged his stewardship. But, excepting Mr. Jhavarilal, every speaker seems to have avoided handling any of the large public questions on which His Lordship has left a mark. Each of the speakers might have chosen a question for himself, and dealt with it in a full, vigorous and conciliatory spirit, while one of them only might have struck the general chord on which, on the occasion under note, all the Town Hall speakers, except one, seem to have harped in such pleasing exuberance of spirits. The tone of this distinguished meeting, however otherwise encouraging and commendable, was also a seconder to the cold feelings of our worthy Anglo-India, who kept away from such demonstrations. They might well say—we were not wrong in keeping away, for you see how intensely native the meeting was,

As above stated, Mr. Jhavarilal made his speech specific by dealing with some thoroughness on one of the difficult problems of Lord Ripon's administration. He showed how his name will be associated with the reform endeavored to be effected in the condition of the peasants. These number more than fifty per cent. of the Indian population, and if their unrest was really due to the periodic revaluations of their land, the land reforms of Lord Ripon must have laid the seed of a popular content and

prosperity. So far back as 1862 Sir Charles Wood laid down that a permanent settlement was the solution of the ryots' difficulties. But we know how this idea has not found favor with local experience. Lord Ripon has perceived the miseries of the millions mainly in the periodic reclassifications of land, and has therefore ruled that once a land is properly classified and valued by the Surveyor, that he should not again set his foot on that land, that the rates of assessment should not be enhanced at every period of revision except by the newly organized Agricultural Department on the basis of general prices and general prosperity of the district. We are quite glad that this special department has been organized, which we hope will develop into that efficient and comprehensive institution which may form the climax of a satisfactory land administration. The higher step of certainty taken by Lord Ripon is the formation of a department by the means of which the agricultural and economic details of each village may be obtained. The greatest of all blunders committed by past administrations was the endeavour to bring about fixity with a highly imperfect knowledge of the agricultural capacity and resources, as also the political and administrative needs of the country. Even now an attempt towards any degree of fixity of tenures and assessments would inspire confidence in proportion to the accuracy of the total data obtained. We surmise the motive of Lord Ripon in instituting the land reform is to ensure the rates of assessments to be kept so low as may admit of quite a fair increase at the end of a large period, and the attainment of a higher degree of prosperity as may affect every large village, or a group of villages. There is one point on which we must seriously disagree with Mr. Yajnik. Surely, we can perfectly well admit that Lord Ripon leaves India more contented than ever without having a deliberate and downright fling at "the croakers and pessimists in England who lead, or rather mislead, the British public into supposing that India is on the brink of troublous times, that there are dangers immediately ahead." Even if such a precise danger existed, it would by no means mean that "Lord Ripon has ruled over India in vain for four years and-a-half that we have met to little purpose in this hall to celebrate his rule over us, if that is to be the immediate result of his administration." The administration of any great man in the world might as well stop diseases and deaths as the administration of Lord Ripon may be expected to prevent the inevitable in the absence of time and opportunity to control it beforehand. Call them what we may like, but it is our bounden duty to listen to those who maintain that the military strength of the Indian

Empire is perilously low. It matters not the least whether the Empire may be fated to dangers to-morrow, or any period hence ; it would still be the imperative duty of wise and wary statesmen to keep themselves prepared for any storm that may chance to come over the country. We gave this warning emphatically years ago, and what is the direction to which matters have been approaching ? The political parties of England have not been able to assure us for all time to come that there will be no breach of peace between England and Russia, or between England and any other power in close sympathy with Russia. And it is in this condition of uncertainty that we find Russia coming closer to India with ever-increasing brute force at its back. We cannot repeat sufficiently that the deputation shortly to wait on Earl Dufferin should seriously draw His Lordship's attention to the present dire necessity of the Empire, which we have again been urging on public attention, not only in the interests of the general Empire, but also to secure the greater advance, dignity, prosperity and unity of Native States. This extremely knotty question apart, which the diplomatic skill and princely shrewdness and magnanimity of the Earl should be able to cope with brilliantly and successfully, the public will cordially endorse the view of Mr. Yajnik that in large and small matters, which had fallen to the lot of the Marquis to deal with, he employed real foresight. "All that he did could not have been accomplished if Lord Ripon was a mere dreamer and an unpracticable man—one who in all acts of his administration was carried away by airy theories of radical philosophy." The truth is, Lord Ripon has been found free of vain dreams. All he has been guilty of is applying a highly elevated and cultured mind in stimulating native loyalty towards the Crown and the people of England. How can you procure closer and warmer loyalty to the Paramount Power, unless you moved those feelings, and unless, again, you regulated them, as Lord Ripon has so wisely and so practically done ? We should be near banishing all blessed statesmanship the moment we are agreed in putting down Lord Ripon's acts as those of a dreamer and an unpractical Radical. To our mind Lord Ripon makes the nearest approach to the character of those worthies whose characteristics have been described by the poet :—

To stand the first in worth as in command,
To add new honours to my native land,
Before my eyes my mighty aires to place,
And emulate the glories of our race.

Seth Sorabji Shapurji Bengali, C.S.I., proposed almost every leader of Bombay society to form a Committee for raising the memorial suggested by Mr. Nowrosji Furdunji, C.I.E. Mr. Sorabji well said—"It is a matter to be grieved at that on this occasion we have not the benefit of English corporation which I am sure all of us had wished. This, however, is through no fault of Lord Ripon as an English patriot. (Cheers.) It is due to His Lordship to state that in all that he has done in India he has not been wanting in love and duty towards the land of his birth. (Renewed cheers.) But his patriotism is of a solid nature and not childish. He wishes to conserve the connection of England with India, and he understands how to do it. He sees more ahead, than most people, the increasing difficulties of British rule in India. (Cheers.)"

We need not be detained long with the forcible speech of Mr. Hormusji Dadabhai, who, we believe, is one of the able pleaders at Bombay, as it dwelt specially on the character of the institution proposed to be founded to perpetuate our memory in regard to Lord Ripon. That a technical school is to be founded as a token gives peculiar pleasure to the present writer. At his instance, on the occasion of the much deplored assassination of Lord Mayo, the principal chiefs of Kattywar had raised very liberal subscriptions for nearly the same purpose as is now likely to be successfully recognized in Bombay. We may probably notice this movement hereafter, and will now merely extract the best passage from Mr. Hormusji's speech—one in which the tribute of praise rendered to the retiring Viceroy is not a whit over-painted :—

"Gentlemen, the statesman whose name we seek to perpetuate is no ordinary personage endowed with the highest qualities of head and heart; he has dedicated his time to the service of this great appanage of the British Crown. Free from every taint of selfishness or any notion of self-aggrandizement, from the purest and the loftiest motives which actuate the hearts of men, Lord Ripon, at the bidding of his Sovereign, came to our country, not indeed to acquire riches or renown or titles, or to cover himself with the prestige resulting from military achievements and conquest, but solely and simply from a powerful sense of duty—from an earnest desire to promote the good and welfare entrusted to his care. (Loud cheers.) In the accomplishment of these noble aims he looked neither to the right nor to the left, but went straightforward keeping in mind the pledges (some of them unredeemed) of our gracious Queen and of the British Parliament, and steadily having in view those imperishable principles which are founded on the law written by the finger of God on the heart of men. (Cheers.) If 'righteousness exalteth a nation,' then the righteous policy pursued by our retiring Viceroy has received the best and the highest sanction—the sanction alike of history and of a book which Christian nations regard as divine."

The real character of Lord Ripon was found out, though by very few, almost by the time he first began moving about in India. When he was affected by an almost fatal fever, only to rise in re-energized spirits, we had the privilege of setting on foot a movement for offering prayers and beseeching the mercies of the Almighty for his safety, which was then followed in various parts of the country. The prayers of the nation were heard in time, and the pledges given them by the bright-starred Marquis has been well requited in the short course of his Viceroyalty. It is quite true that he came out to India with an unselfish aim and influenced by high motives in the interests of both the mother and the subject countries. He now leaves India animated with the bright hopes with which a true and tender-hearted nurse feeds her precious and beloved charge. We pray that His Lordship may live long in health and strength to be of still higher use to India.—*7th December, 1884.*

The clearly perceptible fringes of Indian nationalities have been for the last few weeks filled in with bright holiday colors—
 The new Viceroy in India. the groundwork for the nicer tints and hues destined to have such a wide spread in future on the broad political and social canvas of India. A Liberal Dictator having erected his Shrine of Beneficence in the heart of political India departs with its universal regret—but a regret that has been converted into a hopeful joy by the arrival of a true Imperial Dictator of a rich and abiding promise encased and emblazoned in a firmament of gems that draw their lustre from the inmost, the remotest recesses of the home of Freedom and Refinement ; from the centre of far piercing Enterprise and Valor ; from the undying brilliancy of human nature sunk deep in the dreary strata of darkness and corruption ; from the redeeming traits of the region of Barbarity and Despotism ; from the hidden chambers of the land in which the brightest hopes dwell beneath the superlaid effervescence of home liberty and intoxication. Like the latest of the most skilful jewellers of the day, the departing spirit sets this half-antique modern jewelry to the renewed waters of radiance, the sight of which makes us unmindful for the moment the loss occasioned to India by Lord Ripon's departure.

Earl of Dufferin has been greeted to the shores of India in a manner so warm and joyous as a native family know how to accord to a rich bride or an influential son-in-law when first received in the nuptial home. Lord

Ripon has been farewelled from India in an equally joyous and, necessarily, in a more affectionate manner. It is stated of an old monarch that when he was asked to pass an eulogy on a famous general, he replied that he would reserve that to the end of the campaign he had undertaken. Her Majesty the Queen-Empress must probably be deeply touched with the high tributes of admiration, esteem and affection which the retired Viceroy carries with him at the end of his Viceroyalty, and she may shortly emphasize this popular feeling in India by drawing Lord Ripon closer into her gracious folds of Royalty. No outlook can be brighter just now for India than when such a popularly applauded Viceroy leaves the country to make room for another who has secured the chorus of approbation on his nomination, from every concerned country, and from nations of contrasting geniuses. He is found to be more impressionable and sympathetic at the outset than Lord Ripon was known to have been while coming out to India. By the time His Lordship settles down to earnest work he will have found no important question in reference to the interior and foreign relations of India on which all sorts of assemblies and speakers will not have had every possible say for his study and reflection. At the end of all this talk and writing, with which he is now being inundated, and while he has completely grasped the reins of the Administration, he will find, however, that he is still to make his way into the confusing, but enchanting, wilds of one of the largest Eastern Kingdoms whose good and evil he has to regulate. His Lordship has been wise in not entering upon any large survey of the questions on which his learnings the various addresses and deputations of the day tried to elicit. On a few matters such as relating the Railways, Industrial Schemes, Local Self-Government, Education, Condition of the Mahomedan World, and Defences of the Indian Empire, he gave some indications of his spirit, but not sufficient as would warrant us to hold a perfect pledge from him as to the character and scope of the policies he may pursue in future. Where His Lordship has been too guarded, he may be compelled afterwards to lean towards relaxation of the tight bounds he has now perceived ; and where he has been sanguine, he may hereafter be inclined to be calculating or reserved. We have as yet listened to nothing like that eloquent and full-expressing oration which he delivered at Belfast before leaving for India. We shall be deeply interested in his similar attempts in India, while he has fully identified himself with its cardinal measures of internal and external

development. A strong ruler as he is likely to be, he is not likely to be anything but fully appreciative of feeling the pulse of the Indian nations on every seasonable occasion when he can have brought before him the merits or demerits of every large question, or the safety or perils of each situation as it may arise. It is only by a free gauging of the intensity of passions and feelings and the depths of moral, mental and intellectual fervour on every suitable occasion, that a strong ruler can safely direct the helm of the State-ship with the aid of his own vigorous, but cautious and far-seeing, impulses.

The Earl's reply to the address of the Municipal Corporation of Bombay was his first utterance in India, and yet the most important yet delivered. When appointing His Lordship, Her Most Gracious Majesty laid—as he was pleased to say—express commands on him to do all in his power to promote the well-being of every nation in India. Accordingly, as he stated he would always be prepared to consult European and Native advisers of every province in India to guide him in his actions. That he is not likely to be a weak ruler may be gathered from the following passage from his Bombay speech :—

“ It has been your pleasure to extend similar courtesies to several of my predecessors when they stood—as I do now—on the threshold of their career in this country, unwitting of the good or evil fortune which might be in store for them. These illustrious persons have greatly differed from each other in their antecedents, their dispositions, their attainments, and their intellectual idiosyncracies. But there is one quality which all of them have possessed in common - a deep-rooted and unswerving determination to sacrifice ease, health, leisure, nay, as some of them have done, even life itself, to the welcome and spirit-stirring call of duty. (Hear, hear, and cheers.) It is this characteristic which has impressed the Government of India, from its foundation to the present day, with a loftiness of aim and intention, and an energy in execution, which I believe to be unparalleled in the history of the world. (Cheers.) Though not presuming to compare myself with the statesmen who have gone before me, in this last respect at least I trust to prove their equal, and to preserve unimpaired the noble traditions of devotion and self-effacement which have been established by their heroic examples, and by none more signally than by your present illustrious and eminent Viceroy. (Loud cheers.) Whatever criticisms may be justly passed on my future administration, it shall be in the power of no man to allege that either from fear or favour, or any personal consideration, I have turned aside from whatever course was most conducive to the happiness of the millions entrusted to my care (cheers), or to the dignity, honour, and safety of that mighty Empire with which this great dependency is indissolubly incorporated.” (Renewed cheers.)

The indication which the new Viceroy gives of the line of policy he is likely to pursue foreshadows a strength of governing which is not to be applauded as strength for strength's sake, but as strength reduced from a

multitude of conflicting difficulties. The fuller explanation given in the Belfast speech supplies any further interpretation that may be wanting in His Lordship's brief Bombay speech. The strength which he will employ in inaugurating essential reforms in various directions in India is not likely to overshoot the proper mark ; and while he would carefully ascertain the proper measure of strength to be employed, he will not be deterred by fear, or favour, or any personal considerations, from pursuing the course known to be the wisest and the safest. His Lordship has the highest sanction for the most beneficial policy that he can possibly adopt to increase the good of India and the permanent security of the British Empire. No emergency will be so great for him as to present insuperable obstacles to his pursuing the right course of duty—whether those obstacles may proceed from the Home Government, or any of the strong parties in India. At least this is our inference gathered from his speeches, and we believe it to be a correct one. Eminently possessed of a highly sympathetic nature, it may be hoped that His Lordship may never be tempted to dispose of any question of moment without giving the fullest scope to the sympathizing and deeply comprehending part of His Lordship's temperament. To a statesman commanding every requisite of a far-seeing comprehension and deep-going sympathies, it ought not to be an impossible—though it may be a very trying—task to accomplish serious ends by fully conciliating the weaker parties as much as the stronger ones. The most serious question which will early engage His Lordship's attention will be the military reorganization and defence of India—a part of which question has been, we are happy to observe, taken to the notice of the Earl when he landed in Bombay. The reform of all the military resources of India, the active development of our strong interests beyond the N.-W. Frontiers of India, in Afghanistan and Central Asia in general, are matters each having its own independent merits. The prudent reform which can be introduced in the armies of Native States will consist in upholding the pride and integrity natural to each, and tapping those resources of each which have not been touched in the interests of the general empire, or which can be gradually freed from unseemly clutches when hardly any resources have been already applied in behalf of the country at large. The Earl's most desirable mission may be to take which may not be felt by any State as having been taken, or taken without granting that substantial honour, prestige and freedom, which are at once the guarantee of good faith and

security both for the Suzerain and the feudatories. While dealing with this large question with a view to a closer and more affectionate alliance with Native Princes, and securing for the empire that accession of strength which is *hourly* due to it, a Vice-Regent of the most beloved Queen on the earth, who knows how to gracefully acknowledge the light which the Persian and Mahomedan nations lent to Europe in its darkest days, must also command the power of increasing the honour, content and prosperity of each Native State of importance, as His Lordship would supply the initiative for internal economy and reforms to those who have not yet been in any degree accustomed to them. The relations with Afghanistan have to be invigorated on a separate basis of facts and circumstances. The policy towards it, while required to be of masterly quietness, must, nevertheless, succeed in creating a material strength in that Kingdom which all must be its own and of its powerful ally in the Indian Government. The resources of that Kingdom should be so far assorted and strengthened that they may form an independent bulwark against the encroachments of any rival power. The most active and the most trusted intervention is what Afghanistan, in a much greater degree than Persia, has needed since years past. The Earl will no doubt engage himself seriously on questions of educational, industrial, material and political importance; but all such gain will be nowhere if points of permanent security of the Indian peoples and States are any longer consigned to obscurity simply on account of any difficulties in dealing with them. As air and water are the first essentials for human existence, so is an adequate and independent military strength necessary to the very existence and prosperity of this Empire.—21st December, 1884.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR of Bombay had the good grace of leading the Bombay public to pay their final ovation to the Lord Ripon's Parting Speech. Viceroy who is returning home richly laden with the praise and admiration of Oriental communities. The climax of native joy at the successful termination of the Marquis's Viceroyalty was found in the last Town Hall Meeting at Bombay. Sir James Fergusson's brief and happy speech showed that the asperity of the British community in India towards Lord Ripon's Viceroyalty has well nigh expired. At the same time our own demonstrations of loyalty and esteem have been carried to a very high pitch. At any rate it appears that the dissentient Anglo-Indians have not been found unwilling to make peace with Lord Ripon

on the eve of his retirement. They have markedly kept themselves back from joining the public movement in India, but their present attitude will lead an impartial historian to infer that there was no misdeed which they could hurl against Lord Ripon while overwhelmed with tokens of Indian approbation. The Anglo-Indians have chosen to remain the silent spectators of the unprecedented approbation showered on him by the leaders of native societies. Their studious silence seems a consistent quality, but is somewhat unmeaning. They should have either moderately joined in the public demonstrations, or in duty bound, as true Britons, might have shown by deferential speech how native demonstrations were mischievous—if mischievous they have appeared. In this case we should have expected them to aver with courage how Lord Ripon's reign was harmful—if harmful it was. They have shown no such positive feeling, and as we always have been the impartial historian of Lord Ripon's work in India, we are bound to record that the Anglo-Indians have recorded no tangible verdict against the late Viceroyalty, and have therefore allowed the public judgment upon it to go by default.

We shall now touch upon the salient points of Lord Ripon's memorable speech on leaving India. His Lordship was quite right in saying that he has made Afghanistan independent and friendly. But that was not a sufficient policy ; and for this the English Ministry is responsible. India ought not to have broken up entirely her active relations with Afghanistan. We ought to have kept some hold on Candahar, and thence encouraged the Amir to strengthen his material resources. Had this been done, we should have gained by this time in railway communication with Candahar so essential for our safety. Lord Ripon said that the finances of the country have been undisturbed, while the Famine Insurance Fund has been guaranteed at the same time that taxation has been reduced, notably in the case of the salt tax. Again, the country is ready for a greater rate of railway extensions. But His Lordship says that Sir John Strachey's financial administration was unjustly assailed. The verdict of the public—right or wrong—has not endorsed this. As we read this magnanimous vindication, we only suspect something so unaccountable in the machinery of the Government of India. Even a Viceroy must occasionally indulge in a paradox. It is a lesson to us. Lord Ripon has left us an efficient Famine Code, the value of which will be tested when a Famine occurs. Such a Code may prove invaluable. The country wants the more energetic Pub-

the Works' Policy, and this has been vouchsafed to us. But will any Viceroy have the courage to tell the influential classes of India what sin they commit in resenting the income tax, while the salt of the poor is still taxed, and there is an immoderate burden on the free dispensation of justice ? Oh the dreaded spectre of unpopularity which await the statesman who dare put his hand in the purse of the proud ! Perhaps the Ilbert bill anger will be nothing in comparison to the storm that a full income tax might raise. But by and bye we may perhaps show a quiet way how to deal with this political monster which every Viceroy coming out to India would rather let alone ! His Lordship spoke of the steps taken to relieve owners and cultivators of the soil from certain hardships which former systems entailed on them. We are quite satisfied to know that the revenue system of the Bombay Government is ahead of all India. The sympathies of Government have not been illspent in regard to the improved modes of levy and securing for the ryots the benefits of improvements made by them at their own expense, though we are as yet far away as ever from the creation of that popular revenue Court which can grapple with the difficulties constantly rising in relation to various tenures, or the relations between landlords and various occupants of the soil, or the various rights pertaining to the different classes of landlords, middlemen, &c. Lord Ripon has been instrumental in impressing on the subordinate governments the necessity for giving a fair and honest trial to agricultural banks. A trial of this sort will at any rate give birth to that honest enterprize which impoverished ryots will need. The late Viceroy was justly proud in the share he had in abolishing the Vernacular Press Gagging Act. But His Lordship has rightly exhorted the Native Press to realize the immense responsibility they wield in reference to forming and directing public opinion. We have ourselves every now and then spoken with extreme disapproval of the rabid tone of a small section of the Vernacular and Anglo-Vernacular Press. The speech of Lord Ripon, in reply to the address from the Native Press, was one which every newspaper conductor in India ought to suspend before him, in his editorial sanctum, in golden letters. The Native Press should unite in generating that virtuous and moderate force which the Marquis spoke of, and stamping down the violent, scurrilous, abusive and hatred-exciting language, which is now and then employed by a few papers with a mistaken notion that by inflaming the public mind they instruct it, or induce the Government to grant us the concessions

we may require of them. We should write firmly and truthfully and with care, but without imputing vile motives to the rulers or indiscriminately abusing their policy as spoliatory, while we can by no means conscientiously say it is so. Lord Ripon could not have done better than taking to the attention of his successor the necessity of spreading technical education in India with a view to create new sources of employment for the millions who now halfstarve for want of adequate worldly means and healthy industry. This single question is enough to engross the most serious attention of a capable statesman. In this respect we want the same progress as has been made on the Continent; even better, in some respects, than in England.

After dealing with the question of technical instruction, His Lordship referred to that of female education. It was the impetus given to that education by the recent movement at Poona, which seems to have especially made an effect on him. His Lordship said he had not done anything notable in reference to female education in India. It is "the first of social problems," but so much besetted with difficulties that he said that Government by itself can do very little. It is for the people themselves to do a good deal and to point out how Government can move in the matter. It is for the people themselves, he said, to show to Government how far they are prepared to accept progress in female education. Government can only take slow and cautious steps. He said this though he felt the deepest interest in the cause of female education in India. The prudence and breadth of Lord Ripon's views cannot be over estimated. The leaders cannot afford to be hasty, nor indiscriminate, in actually dealing with this grave problem. The Government cannot afford to open the floodgates of its eloquence and of its material resources in the cause of female education. The steps to be taken onward should be gradual, sound, and conceived with great forethought. The primary education of the bulk of the people is of much higher importance than the education of the female population in general. We cannot just in this age think of imparting any highly finished, literary, or classical education to the female mass in general. Any spread of primary education among them should, in a large measure, be initiated by the people themselves, for the resources of the Government are much more vital matters. All that the Government can now do is to supplement the actual efforts of our communities in spreading primary and other useful household

education in the females only to some small extent. Supposing some communities took a fancy to establish several high schools and colleges for females which imparted only the general education, the Government will not be bound to give grants-in-aid to all such institutions. We of course speak in general terms. The best that can be done in this age is to spread primary female education within certain limits, and to devise some comparatively costly scheme for imparting a higher education, useful and ornamental, which can be utilized *at home*, in *sarees*, and in connection with female health and training. The desire for imparting the highest culture to native ladies is as yet a very individual aspiration among the natives. And those desiring this higher benefit can well afford to pay for it. Those most interested in it will surely find the means for securing it. One of the greatest difficulties connected with female education is the formation of special and appropriate text-books for female schools and to devise a perfect standard of arts and sciences to which female mind can beneficially be subject to.

Lord Ripon briefly alluded to the scheme of self-government as introduced by him in India. It is a question which has been discussed threadbare, though it has yet not produced the full fruits which, when produced, will proclaim the sagacity of the Marquis louder than now. He only spoke the truth when he said that the elected Boards and Municipalities have become an important and universal fact; wherever they have been attempted as laid down in his Resolutions. In a few years more both the Government and the people will be agreeably surprised to observe the extent and importance of municipal work done by the people elected by the mass of their own countrymen. It is the most correct principle followed when the people are trained to do practical business themselves, in applying their own money in securing the fulfilment of their own wants. The government of a very large and a very troublesome country should expect some division of their labor to charge the subject people with. The Government can show greater confidence in the work when they spend their own money, while the people begin to learn how far they may comfortably spend their own money and where to stop. The regular administrators are thus relieved of a part of their growing responsibilities, which otherwise would prove very baneful and unwieldy. It is a public benefit if the Government seeks to relieve itself of some suspicion and discredit by pointing out to the people how they can reform their condition by their

crosses the alphabets of liberal statesmanship, which the departed Marquis had such difficulties in explaining in India. To a certain period and to a certain stage of the Indian history of the future, our countrymen will be carried away by such bursts of enthusiasm which were witnessed in Bombay last week. These fits so commendable in their character are easier to practise than the earnest and continuous endeavours to develop the government of the Queen-Empress on those broad lines of harmless progress and solid prosperity which we have taken so many years to perceive and which we yet have to fully perceive. When a child is full of joy and is lost in gushing mirth, its parent or elder, though pleased, thinks at the same time how, pleasantly, to regulate its exuberant temper and make it think of sobering and improving it. The state of the infant empire of India must lead us to assume the Earl of Dufferin to be our elder, and as such,—though we have already succeeded in engaging his sympathies in our behalf,—we should not think that he sets any inordinate value on the overflowing fervour of our countrymen in Bombay. This fervour will not move him an inch more in giving us greater concessions than the late Viceroy was able to give us. But his tendency will be to attempt sounder, more durable and more comprehensive reforms than were possible in the last régime. No statesman can fully foresee the consequences of his large striding measures. Hence in the succeeding period stock is taken of such consequences, and the course of succeeding events is shaped accordingly. As the highest authority of the land would say, there is a continuity in the changing Viceroyalties of India; but may we venture to modify this statement by hinting that there is both deep consistency in changing Viceroyalties and disintegration in the succeeding viceregal policies bequeathed to strong-minded successors. In India Viceroyalty is the only pivot on which any grand march of affairs rests. And that Viceroy must be poor indeed in ability and imagination who cannot make a history for himself. The Earl of Dufferin has expressed a nervous hope that he would work quietly and return home without creating any stir. What he probably means is he will not fail to develop the course of Indian History in every available direction he can lay his hands upon; and all this he would like to do in a manner which would not rouse rival passions and feelings among the multitudinous races of the country. At any rate the state of things left by Lord Ripon has been guarded enough; and his illustrious successor will have earned every gratitude if he does the

requisite good to India by adding to its resources of prosperity and safety by a reasonable conciliation of all the great rival parties and classes which make up this Democratic—Conservative Empire. The pride and selfishness of all classes, when they crop up too much, have to be restrained and squared for mutual benefit ; while the poorer classes deserve the highest and most earnest statesmen's labors by which they may quietly get into self-acting paths leading to more knowledge and forgetfulness of pinching poverty and straitened occupations. To do equable justice and good between the various races inhabiting India, is the most difficult problem which the Earl will have to solve. While solving that problem, and acting upon it, His Excellency will probably not betray himself into a pronounced position, either in undue favour of, or against, any particular population of India. The most skilful manipulation of practical considerations will be essential as soon as the Earl acts upon the very upright and very soothing theory touching the very core of the formidable Indian difficulty, that whether a question relates to the interests and privileges of the ruled or the rulers, they are substantially identical, and none of them need be opposed to the interests of England or India. We do not remember just here the exact words of our present Viceroy, but do not think we have misapprehended his real spirit. As we have already said, the real difficulty would lie in rendering the Native and European problems identical in practice. The magnitude of each interest will probably influence the course of action of the Viceroy in each case. That would form the real truce between India and England of mutual good and safety.—*4th Jan.* .885.

A village elder when he grew old and was near dying was asked what was it that he desired most after his death. He was very fond of children in all his lifetime and all the children of the place dearly loved him. He used to go about in the streets, daily, his pocket filled with bits of sweetmeat ; and as he went along he distributed these bits among the children who gathered round him, each being addressed in appropriate words of advice and affection. His answer to the question put to him was that he liked nothing more before his death than that the people should say on his death that the children of the village shed tears having lost him, none of them having proved the worse for the affection he had showed and the caressing words of advice he had given them.

'The Eulogistic Literature of the Tombstone.'

We cannot do better than recall to mind this little story narrated to us years ago as we read the article of the *London Times* indited on the day Lord Ripon left India. "Lord Ripon, who leaves Calcutta to-day, has been busy receiving those valedictory addresses which so forcibly recall the eulogistic literature of the tombstone." If the literature be of the tombstone, it will not at any rate die; nor is it such that any succeeding statesman, however magical the wand he may be able to exercise even to the entire satisfaction of the *Times*, can or will be tempted to ignore. Like the old villager who left an undying impression of good on the minds of his favourite children, friends—Lord Ripon, before leaving India, has left certain seeds of undying charm and vitality which the English Statesmen as well as the Indian people will not cast away as if they were a heap of unmeaning and decaying 'tombstones.' We should like to realize for ourselves the stretch of wisdom if that is what characterizes the critic in our great Monitor of the world. With this view natives of India ought to acquaint themselves with the grounds shown in the *Times* to discourage the example of Lord Ripon being imitated in the Queen's Eastern Empire.

All the eulogies heaped on Lord Ripon when leaving India, are said to be the result of Oriental compliments, besides which "our most laboured efforts of courtesy seem cold." It is admitted, however, that some "solid emotion" underlies the native demonstrations, which consists of a "considerable quantity of genuine native admiration for the retiring Viceroy." Making allowance for the spirit of Oriental flattery even a "vague belief" must be held, as the *Times* urges, that "in some way Lord Ripon was peculiarly a friend of the natives." The quality which would bring about such a result as from the subject race towards Her Majesty's first Pro-Consul in India hence seems at any rate an admirable one. This unwilling recognition of a quality, the wholesomeness of which cannot be ignored, is followed by a denunciation, the bitterness of which can only equal an experience of 'perdition' itself—at least a theoretic perdition. We quote below the passage which well nigh must take one's breath out :—

"Such popularity would be in every way desirable were it not accompanied by the profound disapprobation of men who have given the best part of their lives and their energies to service of the natives of India, and whose solid claims to be considered their friends far outweigh any that Lord Ripon can put forth. Unwise indulgence will always win the suffrages of the foolish, but we venture to think that the more sober and enlightened portion of the native population privately holds opinions not dissimilar from those of experienced Europeans in India. At all events the *Hindoo Patriot*, probably the ablest of native newspapers, has summed up the late

Viceroy as a man "full of good intentions." There is no more damning form of faint praise than to declare a man's salient characteristic to be abundance of a commodity which, unless controlled and directed by wisdom, paves for nations, as for men, the way to perdition."

That Lord Ripon should have succeeded in engaging the sympathies of parts of the Indian communities more profoundly than any of the more permanent administrators who have quietly done much good work in India, is a circumstance which must evoke the anxious sympathy of a large-minded patriot. The simple explanation of this rather unusual circumstance is to be marked in the difference of opportunities which both parties have respectively held in India. Lord Ripon found himself in a position to toil in a great ocean; the other administrators referred to by the *Times* held the reins of the oceanic streams which fed the great ocean. Hitherto we have been diving in the rivers; but a plunge into the ocean has been inevitable. The Indian ocean of politics cannot ever remain undisturbed. If disturbed they must be—and we predict they will hereafter be disturbed to an extent quite unprecedented—all that is required to be done is, with the heat of the disturbance there should not follow any uncontrollable storm to the paramount and unworthy injury of either of the two countries. True a disturbance was caused: the wisest and the most experienced of Lord Ripon's councillors were not in a position to anticipate it; but when decided signs of such disturbance appeared, the mariner of the vessel was found capable enough to prevent the storm gathering ahead. The outcome was scarcely any such thing as that "the way to perdition" was paved. On the other hand, both high and small have been led upon a broad track, hitherto unexplored, which *must* be explored sooner or later in the interests of humanity; and all of us have had an exceptional opportunity of marking where and how shoals and hidden rocks are likely to be encountered, and how those can be best avoided, while a broad humane policy is followed. It is futile to repent now that a slight spark unwitting chanced to ignite a mass of rubbish combustibles, which being swept away have all at once revealed the prospect of a beautiful region set up in their place. No sturdy, no reasonably sympathetic statesman can be tempted to grant "an unwise indulgence which always win the suffrages of the foolish." Lord Ripon was not sufficiently long in India to disprove this rather hasty assertion made of him. To know what are the exact "suffrages of the foolish," they should appear to the front. They often appear of themselves not exactly at the beck of

any one as the angry part of the Anglo-Indian outburst appeared of itself without any one being previously warned about it. The continuity of the policy not likely to rest on the suffrages of the foolish is now supplied by the Earl of Dufferin. His words on the point must be deemed noteworthy, in that his predecessor was not in a position to use them :—

“My desire is to gain the confidence and good-will of Her Majesty’s Indian subjects at large. I have not myself the slightest doubt that eventually I shall succeed in doing so, but it will be most unreasonable if I were to expect that result for some time to come. *In fact I shall scarcely value attachment or respect if I did not merit it by my acts.*” Here we have the key to the viceregal desire to gain the confidence and good-will of the subjects at large. As that key is applied, the necessary consequence of opening the safety valves of rival passions and feelings of the multitudes follows, and substantial good is conferred only by the positive acts mentioned by the present Viceroy such as, we presume, would be held just by the public at large. It therefore necessarily follows that the esteem of a particular sect of the people is not a thing to be relied upon when matters pertaining to a broad national policy are effected. When Earl Dufferin has an opportunity to display his impartiality in exercising his functions in the interests of the Queen’s subjects at large, and while so doing if he is not able to specially conciliate the feelings of any particular class of the population, the *Times*, it is to be hoped, may not say again that we have been led to the “way of perdition.” Every party admitting that national aspirations are constantly created in India to be reasonably fulfilled, it is absurd to expect that the suffrages of the mass or the different communities, wise, or foolish, or both, will not be stirred up in the cause. The management of an empire is not like the management of a factory in which the owner may safely tend up to a certain point almost everything to the conservation of his own interests. The administrators of an empire have desires and interests to satisfy which are of infinitely more importance than those exclusively belonging to themselves. It can be safely managed only by a moving and well-regulated machinery. Whether there is a moral or material machinery to deal with, both require some substance like grease to prevent friction in the working of the machinery, and its break-down. He must be a hard block formed of some utterly impermeable stuff who cannot understand the value of grease and its application ; for, to evoke even the suffrages

of the foolish is the result of applying grease to the wheels of the administrative machinery, which in a country like India must work constantly, and not stand still, or lag behind. What has affected us most while reviewing the criticisms of the *Times* on the administration of Lord Ripon, as published in the course of the last two years, is the unkindness with which the affairs of the great nations in India have been treated,—an unkindness which is more severe than that meted out to the departing Viceroy. It is no doubt well-intentioned, but has hardly been correctly applied not being based on quite rational grounds, while all the while seeming to have deplorably lost the touch of the present times with which the journal has professed to deal in an oracular fashion,—1st Feb., 1885.

No impartial observer can deny that the speech delivered by His Excellency the Viceroy at the Calcutta Trades' Dinner was a comprehensive and straightforward declaration of the policy he intends to pursue during his Viceroyalty. It was certainly no elaborate oration ; in fact it could not fairly be made so. The various sections of the political public especially were naturally anxious to know from the Viceroy personally, how was he going to govern India after Lord Ripon's régime had created some conflicting agitation in India. Had Lord Ripon left India in a morally undisturbed condition,—that is without exciting the antipathy of any class, or stimulating the aspirations of native India,—there would not have been the present close and keen desire to ascertain what the policy of the Earl of Dufferin is likely to be.

Whatever the excitement and anxieties of the different parties and nations of India consequent upon a strong ruler succeeding the retired one of a noted character, the Earl of Dufferin has fearlessly and frankly stated the aims he is to follow. Brief as the speech is, it ought to satisfy every party, if a careful and truthful manifesto of the best of rulers of men can ever satisfy mankind. There is absolutely nothing in the speech which can be made a matter of an unpleasant comment, or grievance, or dissension. Considering the immense responsibility of his position he could not have taken a more cautious, or a more firm, or a more popular attitude. He could not well decline the invitation of the foremost merchants of India to attend their time-honored annual public dinner, in which the various sections of the Government and the public take an opportunity of express-

ing their views and sentiments affecting the well-being of the numerous subjects of the Eastern Empress. If we differed from the Viceroy from any of the views expressed there, we are bound to say that that would be more on account of our incapacity to fully comprehend the difficulties of his unique position. For instance, he mentioned as we quote him below, that he was doubtful if an Executive head of the Government could, with propriety, indulge in speech-making, except on rare occasions :—

“ I knew that I should be expected to address those whose hospitality I was permitted to share, but I had some doubts whether it was altogether desirable that the Head of the Executive Government of India should indulge, otherwise than upon very exceptional and rare occasions, in oratorical displays. It is his duty to listen to others rather than to speak himself ; to examine and decide rather than to discuss or advocate ; and if I am right in considering that such ought to be the general rule of his conduct, it is still more imperative that he should follow it when he is but newly arrived in a land, which presents to his consideration so many problems of the greatest magnitude and importance, and where a casual word pronounced in ignorance or under misapprehension may occasion numberless embarrassments.”

A new Viceroy cannot but take up this position of a calculating diffidence. We have all been accustomed of late to the expression of strong views, each in an opposite direction. Rival passions and prejudices have been evoked on the side of powerful parties opposed to each other. Each of them has considered itself either to be in the right, or to have been wronged. Each has naturally wished to obtain a favorable declaration from the new supreme head in its own behalf. In this position of affairs the Earl of Dufferin seems to have only maintained an impartial bearing as affecting the opposite parties, by asserting that a Viceroy should rather examine and decide than discuss and advocate. That the problems he is now confronted with are difficult to comprehend satisfactorily, no one can doubt, especially in the case of a responsible ruler who has just assumed his office. That he should lay, perhaps, a greater stress on the necessity of observing silence, or refraining from the arena of public discussion, is, we think, more owing to the newness of his position in India, than to anything like a conviction which he may not modify in the course of his Viceroyalty. It remains to be seen, however, if his inclinations will be those of an actively reforming administrator, or of a passive and moderate one, though we are not altogether without material for conjecturing to some extent on the line of action he is likely to adopt in India. He has done the best and the safest thing in steadily avoiding a false position by an emphatic declaration in favor of any party as the cause of which he is likely to espouse,

though he has made no secret of his intentions to favor anything which appeared to him to be fair, safe, and practicable without caring what party was pleased or displeased. We ought to love him best in this, literally, a flawless position that he has adopted for himself. We all know that Lord Ripon conducted the affairs of India, as far as they went, conscientiously and admirably, and no one so steadily, though cautiously, supported him throughout as our own humble selves. But this is no sufficient reason for us to contend that the new Viceroy will be a good and true Viceroy if he adopted only what his predecessor had chalked out for himself and so nobly adhered to in the midst of disheartening difficulties and disappointments. The independent work of Lord Ripon has in itself disclosed certain new features in the politics of India, which cannot but be taken into account by his successor. Until he is thoroughly posted up in his mission, he cannot express his full views on any question which is likely to excite the public mind in inimical directions. His Lordship sees the necessity of acknowledging with equal readiness the friendly welcome offered him 'from the time he landed in Bombay to the present moment by all ranks and conditions of men, by the various communities which compose our body-politic and by his British and native fellow subjects.' The Earl further says :—

"All have made me feel that they are ready to give me their confidence ; that they are willing to believe in my sincere desire to do my duty faithfully by each of them ; that they appreciate the difficulties of the task which lies before me, and that I can count on their conjoint sympathy and united assistance in my endeavours to promote the well-being of the common weal."

So large and so difficult a country as India cannot be beneficially and peaceably governed unless, as the Viceroy maintains, all the different and important subjects of the Queen are mutually friendly, and can, therefore, accord conjoint sympathy and united assistance to him in mitigating the difficulties of the task before him. There can be no doubt that much of unrest and exasperation of feelings may be avoided if the Viceroy can carry with him in the execution of his high duties the general assent or sympathy of *all* the powerful classes of India, though on several occasions some of them may have to put up with something or other modificatory of their condition and privileges. When and how each of such classes has to give way to assist the Viceroy's "endeavours to promote the well-being of the common weal" will be no mean difficulty to obviate from time

to time. The Head at the Administration is the only authority, in the present circumstances, to decide between the conflicting interests. When we are satisfied that he has done his very best in reconciling all difficulties and striking out the only possible course left him, it would be incumbent on all to accept his decree without murmur. Nothing better can be expected under human management. As His Lordship further proceeded, he made some definite statement of the policy he was bent on carrying out. He said :—

“ Now, some of those present are probably anxious that I should define the character of the policy I am disposed to follow. I do not know that there is any reason why I should not gratify their curiosity. In doing so, I shall disclose no secret, nor initiate them, in a new revelation, for my policy will be guided by those ancient principles upon which the British Empire in India was originally founded, which have ever since been interwoven with its structure, and vindicated in turn by each of my illustrious predecessors, namely, a justice which neither prejudice nor self-interest can pervert ; an impartiality between all religions and races, which refuses to be irritated by criticism or cajoled by flattery ; and a beneficence of intention which seeks to spread abroad amongst the many millions of her Majesty's subjects in this country contentment, prosperity, wealth, education, professional advancement, a free scope to municipal institutions, and every other privilege which is compatible with effectual and authoritative government. (Cheers.) And in saying this, remember I am not speaking in my own name, nor merely as the Head of the Indian Administration. I am speaking in the name of the Queen-Empress herself, and not only of the Queen, but of the Parliament and people of England, who are fully determined that English rule in India shall be so blamelessly and vigorously conducted as to become the crowning glory of our country's history, and that any grievance and wrong of which her Majesty's subjects can complain, whether princes or people ; whether native or British-born, shall be examined into, and so far as the imperfection of all human administration will allow, abated or redressed. (Cheers.) That I may be able under God's Providence during my brief residence among you to perform the part allotted to me in a satisfactory manner is my dearest ambition. There is no sacrifice, whether of time, labour, health or strength, I am not prepared to make in pursuit of it, and though it is only by painful and slow degrees that so vast and inchoate a community as ours can expect to move towards the consummation of an ideal, I trust that, when the time arrives for me to quit these shores, I may have perceptibly contributed towards the advancement of the fair fame and stability of the British just and legitimate aspirations of its inhabitants, and to that, as promoters of the industrial arts, as creators and distributors of wealth, are powerful factors in our national development, none can doubt ; and it is on that account, I again repeat, loud cheers,) associated with you in to-night's celebration.”

“ On that day when no doubt will be left as to the policy which Her Majesty's Government will hereafter more strenuously pursue in India.

self, he could not understand it as a secret as many have understood it. He said he had no "revelation" to make in that respect. The Empire, he meant to say, cannot be conducted on any other principle except that which was employed in effecting the general conquest of India and abolishing its general anarchy and barbarism. His Lordship maintained that his rule will be that of order, justice and impartiality dealt out equally to all, whether princes or people, and to all religions and sects alike ; that measures of education, prosperity and professional and municipal advancement will be developed ; and that, while neither hostile criticism nor servile flattery will be allowed to disturb the course of conduct of His Lordship, the stability of the British Empire will be further strengthened and the crowning glory of its history will be kept in view in the increasing happiness of Her Majesty's subjects. This is a high and difficult ideal no doubt, and one in the pursuit of which the Earl of Dufferin is resolved not to refrain from "any sacrifice, whether of time, labor, health, or strength." The ideal cannot be attempted all at once in such a difficult country as India, but His Lordship is fully confident of leaving some mark in that direction, the more so as the desires which he expressed were not only his desires but of the Queen-Empress and of the Parliament and people of Great Britain.

The policy which the Viceroy desires to follow is as correct in theory as is possible to put it in human language. It is as much as to say that he will remain firm and impartial in disposing of public questions, whoever be the parties involved in them. He would fear neither Europeans nor Natives, whatever the attitude they may take up towards him. He will be both stern and sympathetic. He will not grant privileges and freedom for the mere sake of granting them. He will surely not create any especially to please one community and offend another. His main light will be pushing on to the point of the crowning part of his country's glory, which has already advanced India in the comity of the World's Nations. He will endeavor to meet the aspirations of India, but would not do so if, thereby, the British authority is weakened. He would not mind offending the Anglo-Indian community if their clamour tended to the committal of any gross iniquity to the Indian nation. His Lordship will do everything for India, while stimulating the higher order of glory associated with the supremacy of Great Britain in India. While using his endeavors thus, he will not do any positive act by which the interests or the prestige of any important nation or community may be imperilled.

It would not be fair for the Anglo-Indian Press to express a word of dissent as regards the policy declared by the Viceroy. He is governing a country in which the Anglo-Indians are not the only factor to be considered in the disposal of India's destiny. The educated sons of the soil will fast outbid them in number ; those who can hold their own on all ordinary occasions. As far as they can show their ability to serve the public interests and the Empire better than the Anglo-Indian settlers, it will not be possible for any Viceroy, however strong, to ignore native patriots, politicians, merchants, and noblemen altogether. It is true that they could not presume to deal with the highest functions of the country till it be made clear how they could do so with undoubted efficacy and justice ; but that is no reason why any Viceroy can say—" keep yourselves far away, for you will never be fit for the higher forms of government." A spirit and tendency of this sort are altogether opposed to the original mission of the British, which the noble Lord explicitly declared that he would vindicate in the same manner as the more distinguished of his predecessors had done.

There is reason, again, why the Native Press should be so far exultant as to consider that the extreme Anglo-Indians and their advocates in the Press have been vanquished by the masterly declaration of the Viceroy explaining how justly he wishes to govern India. We natives cannot expect to have the Viceroy all to ourselves. As he cannot outrage our own feelings, so he cannot outrage the feelings of the ruling race. Europeans in India form a great motive factor in the re-generation of the country ; and in endeavoring to acquire a greater influence in its administration we have to pay due respect to the prestige of the ruling race. The more we are able to compete with them successfully, the better shall we be able to associate with them with mutual benefit. After the honest, generous, careful and acute manner in which his policy has now been expounded, we may thoroughly rely on the Viceroy's firmness, sagacity, prescience and vigor in handling innovations and difficulties successfully enough, and in such a manner as to avoid all blame for any deliberate and aggressive race partiality. He will probably unite in his person all the useful and noble elements which ought to influence a free but emphatic government, and all ought to be content with that without indulging in uncontrolled agitation. As far as we can see for the present, the Premier and the Queen have succeeded in selecting the most experienced and skilled Statesman to

administer the affairs of India, who will no doubt always be ready to listen to whatever that is temperate, just, and essential which we might draw his attention to from time to time.—*22nd Feb. 1885.*

It is interesting to note the manner in which the Bombay Press has discussed the propriety of presenting a public address to Sir James Fergusson before his retirement from Bombay. A large number of our native contemporaries have strongly protested against the adoption of such a measure. The feeling seems to be general, however, in Bombay, that it would be indecent to permit the Governor to leave the scene of his five years' labors without his fellow-subjects bidding him an appropriate farewell. Undoubtedly a strong party exists in Bombay which will not feel itself restrained from adopting a public address simply for the reason that an enthusiastic address was presented to a greater and superior statesman like Lord Ripon, and that the unhappy Baronet had the audacity of criticising the feasibility of the Noble Lord's measure of self-government. It is creditable to the Native Press which has vigorously joined the onslaught against our well-meaning Governor that it has taken to this independent attitude—whether that attitude is correct or not being another question. We cannot by any means say that the opposition voters in the Press condemn the movement made in Bombay on a just and perfect appreciation of the Governor's administration, or of the present political situation in India.

The position of an autocratic ruler of India is just sufficient to entitle him to a public address provided that he is not proved to be an incapable, or an enemy of the country. A British autocratic ruler need not necessarily be presented with a public address, for he may have proved a very feeble and an indifferent ruler—one incapable of leaving any mark on the country. But one whose rule may only have turned out to be ordinarily good cannot be refused a suitable address when he leaves the country for good. Our own country in the first place has not yet produced a statesman fit to fight out his way as even a minor Governor or a divisional commissioner. If one of this character were to appear, we know how difficult it will find to administer the country in a marked and successful manner. It can be easily understood how more difficult must a foreigner find the work of governing any part of our country. It cannot be maintained that excepting a few English statesmen like the Hon'ble Mr. T. C. Hope, C.S.I., C.I.E.,

the civilians brought up in this country can, as a body, become able and successful governors. We must, therefore, expect England to continue to give us able politicians, administrators and statesmen as our governors. They are likely to handle our affairs with a larger heart and a cooler head than some of the civilians of the country. It is, therefore, the duty of native India not to be too rigid nor too extreme in showing its disapprobation to a retiring Governor. There is a slight dash of a very high pitched enthusiasm leading on to a total condemnation of the character and doings of Sir James as Governor. None of his opponents say that he has either showed himself to be a thick-headed, an inappreciative, an unimaginative, an ungenerous, or a despotic governor. No one says that he indulged in uncompromising habits ; that he conciliated Europeans in order to ruin Natives ; that he was arrogant to his colleagues and servile to his superiors ; that he flattered the Natives to their detriment and jealously forbade anything that tended to their progress ; that he did not admit his own faults and failings and spent his Indian career in indolence and pleasure ; or that he has left no grand marks of his own administration. No one can deny that Sir James Fergusson often brought the noblest enthusiasm to bear upon the points of native advancement which he handled. He has worked hard at his post. He has imparted the greatest stimulus to works of public utility, whether in the British or Native administrations. He has scarcely spared misbehaving or incompetent officials. He has filled the Presidency with the noblest institutions of learning, enlightenment, humanity, and public utility. His orations have marked him an enlightened politician and an administrator of greater sincerity than some of his predecessors, only perhaps less famous than a Temple, Elphinstone, or a Frere. He has proved to be a high official of pluck and considerable personal qualities of worth. In his time good many Resolutions of sober sense, sound reasoning, and calculating liberalism have seen the light, which have improved the administration of the Presidency in several of its branches. He has been of great use to Native Chiefs, whose welfare he has sincerely desired, who have been led by him in righteous paths. The more he became familiar with the princes and the people, the better has he behaved towards them. He has constantly expanded his generous habits and shook off stiffness or illiberality as soon as he felt it himself. He is stated to have been impulsive, but has always been governed by an honorable ambition of correcting himself as soon as

he was convinced that he was wrong. His worst enemies could not say that he was an enemy of the natives. This would be too low an estimate to form of human nature as existing in statesmen and as public characters are formed in these days. We know of cases in which he has dealt out high justice to natives in that ready and generous manner which can only be common to high-minded men. His endeavors to make himself acquainted with every part of the Presidency have been as vigorous as they have been beneficial to the country at large. We do not think any governor in his position could have done much better than he has achieved in his short official term. No governor could have shown a greater resolution and a greater independence than Sir James has done at times. The experience of his government leads us to the conclusion that supposing another term of office was allowed him, the people generally would like him much better than they do him now.

In these circumstances a calm and faithful reflection on the proposal to give the retiring Governor a public farewell does not induce us to conclude that such a proposal is worthy of any sweeping condemnation. Of course Sir James did not show himself to be such a saviour as Lord Ripon was inclined to be. Nor is he a statesman fully capable of leading the Natives to the highest eminences of political blessings, or of moral and material prosperity. But public addresses are not usually given only to statesmen of towering morality and strength. They are freely given to lesser lights as well,—to those who have smaller opportunities. We know how this business is managed in nine cases out of ten. There are words of esteem and encouragement delivered for even secondary characters in the empire which really serve great purposes. It is no use for us to be too phlegmatic in public matters of this sort. We pass over the faults of our administrators, but applaud all points of excellence in their character only to bring the latter into greater prominence, and discourage further perpetuations of the former. It is enough that Sir James' career was not an evil one in India; it was certainly not the most distinguished which the most fastidious of us may expect. But is that a reason why we should pooh-poo the very idea of bidding him a suitable farewell and raising a memorial for the perpetuation of his name amongst us as the distinguished and respected head of our society for the last five years? That he should have honestly and boldly stated the objections he conscientiously felt as existing against a very free introduction of the self-government scheme, cannot make him unworth

political emancipation, which have never been seriously entertained by us. An abstract right of exercising the higher functions of State may be safely urged both by the rulers and the ruled, though, in each instance, its application has to be well considered. But if such abstract rights may theoretically mean that it is within the province of a native to become a governor, or a lieutenant-governor, it would not practically mean that no question of admitting fit natives into offices higher than they now occupy could be discussed or acted upon. *The Times'* argument, however, lands us into this fallacious position. It is much to be regretted that the estimate of the great journal of the noble and memorable work done by one of its own distinguished countrymen in a foreign and very difficult country should be so unfair and intemperate.—15th March, 1885.

THE most important of all the popular demonstrations held in honour of Lord Ripon on his return home from India was the banquet given him, on February 25, by the National Liberal Club, in St. James's Hall, Piccadilly. Upwards of 800 noblemen and gentlemen with an equal number of ladies were present, the Hall being tastefully decorated with flowers and tall palms artistically arranged with all the contrasts of bright colours attainable. The toast of "the Queen, Empress of India," was given by the Chairman, the Earl of Kimberley, soon after the dinner. The first speech was made by Lord Hartington in responding for the Army. He spoke in terms of the highest praise of the valour displayed and the hardships borne by British Generals, recently in Egypt, and previously in Afghanistan. "Rarely, if ever," he said, "have the physical difficulties been exceeded, which our troops have been encountering in the valley of the Nile since the beginning of August last, and rarely, if ever, have British troops had to encounter in battle a braver or a more determined foe. It is difficult at this moment to say which feeling predominates in our mind—whether it be of regret for these gallant men, officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates whom we have lost, or pride in the achievements which they and their comrades have performed. The name of General Gordon belongs not to the Army alone, but to the nation, and will always be treasured among us." This is a poor consolation to the numerous people in India and England who, rightly or wrongly, hold that a faithful and trusting national hero like Gordon could have been saved, and that the campaign

in Egypt have been more firmly dealt with to the advantage of all parties concerned in it, had not the Government been vacillating on account of their preconceived theories. It was not enough to have dwelt on the noble, unselfish and heroic deeds of General Gordon and his military compatriots who have given their lives in their country's cause. We should have liked to satisfy ourselves that no reasonable precautions and vigilance adopted by the Government would have effected the relief of Khartoum. The blood and treasure of the country should not be spent merely in the pursuit of impractical doctrines of Liberalism or Radicalism when it is likely that in practice they might prove untenable. When the Egyptian affair

closed, the world will no doubt be anxious to know the relevancy of the reasons which led the present Government to follow the policy which ended in the betrayal and murder of General Gordon. It is satisfactory to find Lord Hartington avowing that though Lord Ripon did not succeed in getting the home Government to adopt his scheme of reforming the Armies of Hindustan, their efficiency was not decreased but strengthened during his regime. Here, again, we are left in the dark as to what the proposals of Lord Ripon were to the Home Government. There can be no doubt that the Government in England have been tardy in recognizing the necessity of gradually reforming the military resources of both Afghanistan and the Native States of India. The interests of India have clearly demanded that between it and the Russians there should exist an independent nation with an extensive country always interested in offering an insurmountable barrier to the Russian aggression on whatever pretext. But we may possibly have to notice this point when we come to the views expressed on it by Lord Ripon himself.

Lord Northbrook, in replying for the Navy, mentioned a singular act of heroism by Lord Beresford, who "has had the good fortune which every officer so ardently desires of being mentioned with praise in the despatches of Lord Wolseley for his plucky conduct in entering and repairing a steamer, to the best of my belief about the size of one of the penny steamers on the Thames, in front of the enemy's battery, and by the help of his gardner gun, keeping that battery in check without any severe loss to the crew of that ship." It is by such plucky and persevering acts that the British nation have gained their present predominance in the world. The best of them, when the critical hour came, have not grudged to sacrifice their lives in the cause of their country, and it is both by intellect and valour

that they have conquered half the world. Supposing a sanguinary conflict ensued in Afghanistan and Herat to-morrow, who are the princes and noblemen of India who would think of abandoning their ease and luxury, and lead a brave army against the Russians, or the hostile tribes and Sirdars who are bent, once more on producing anarchy in Afghanistan ? We may call upon our Government to induce some of our noblemen to share in the military glories, whether of peace or of war. And we may also call upon our aristocracy to come forward and boldly ask the Government to take them into their military ranks. It is a matter of deep shame to this country that it cannot repose a little faith in the best of its valiant sons to direct the tactics of the smallest English column in the time of a battle. Lord Northbrook stated from a true conviction that the policy followed by Lord Ripon in India was not only one which he cordially approved, but was also essentially one which all statesmen, to whatever creed they belonged, ought implicitly to follow. The fact that Lord Northbrook ruled India on the mixed principles of the two great parties in England lends much weight to his utterance. Whatever the ways of applying these principles by different statesmen on different occasions, none of them, unless hopelessly incompetent, can ever lose from his sight the great object of Providence in entrusting the destinies of India to the most favoured nation of the world. It is a matter of sincere congratulation that a nobleman has succeeded Lord Ripon in India who is sure to make a name in achieving both moral and material ends in binding together and strengthening the straggling nations of India, always to be illumined by the light from England, till that light is for ever blended with the light of the East.

Sir William Harcourt replied to the toast of "the Government" given by the Earl of Cowper. He took credit for the Government for the work done by Lord Ripon in India as being a truly "imperial" one, differing from the imperialism "meant in the bastard notion of modern times," and expressed the sense of gratitude and admiration felt by the Government to one "who has been their trusted colleague and who is my friend of many years, for the great services which he has rendered to this country in the imperial task which he had so long discharged." Sir William proceeded to explain the true import of imperialism such as would befit England of present times :—

I use the word Imperial task advisedly. I know it is sometimes charged against the Liberal party that they have no Imperial sympathies, that they are incapable of the Imperial

spirit and the Imperial idea. I dispute that statement altogether. If you mean by Imperialism the bastard notion of modern times, why, then, I admit it ; but if what you intend by the Imperial idea is that which was comprehended by that great governing people which most resemble, I think, in its qualities and in its spirit the English nation—I speak of the Roman Empire—then I think I can say that the Liberal party repudiates any such idea. On the contrary, I venture to affirm that it is its true representative. (Cheers.) What was the Imperial idea which inspired the Government of the Empire of Rome ? Will any one say that it was the extension of territory ? Will any one say that it was additional conquest ? Why that is to falsify history altogether. If you look into that famous chapter which opens the immortal work of Gibbon you will find that he speaks of the moderation of Augustus, that he states that the man who founded the Empire of Rome and who consolidated its strength was the man who, throughout his life, resisted, and in his last testimony bequeathed to his successor the principle that the limits of the Empire should not be enlarged. (Cheers.) There is a celebrated writer of antiquity, himself an Emperor, who places in the mouth of Augustus, when he died, some memorable words. They are short, but they are so applicable to the Government of India and to the administration of Lord Ripon that I will venture to take leave to read them. He makes Augustus to say—"I have not sought to beget one war out of another. I have thought I have done more wisely in employing all my time in the reformation of the laws and the reformation of disorders, in doing which I consider that I have not acted less well than any of those who have preceded me. And even, if I may speak with frankness, I have surpassed all those who have ever governed great empires." That is an Imperial idea ; it was the conception of Imperial Rome, which the Liberal party can well acknowledge and can be proud to carry out.

We think some fallacy is involved in a too confident comparison instituted with ancient kingdoms as in relation to any large empire of modern times. What was accomplished by despotic sovereigns of the Roman Empire, or even what was conceived by them, cannot fairly be held as an example to be followed in the modern constitution of an empire. Had there been an emperor of a different temperament in the place of Augustus, he would very likely have directed Imperialism in a direction wide apart from that attempted by the latter. If a comparison is to hold good, all conditions and circumstances should be scrupulously alike in both instances. It is difficult to believe that the features of the Empire of Great Britain are like those of the Empire of Augustus. He had hardly such foreign provocations and responsibilities as England has to deal with now in the sheer necessity of self-preservation and self-prosperity. The needs and obligations of the greatest empire in present times are widely different from those of any of the old empires which had not known such a vigorous and universal growth as of to day. What Augustus could have afforded to do in his times, the Queen-Empress could not possibly do in these days,

when there is such a close competition among a number of powerful States, whose will is based on a military prowess ever-growing. The fact is that the Conservatives have perhaps too deliberately used Imperialism, while the Liberals have not till they have been brought to the last extremity. But that the Liberals can develop this quality to as great an extent as the other party, no one can doubt. We shall probably for a long time to come fail to meet the ends of Imperialism; for, Great Britain, with all her Liberalism, is in as great a danger of losing its influence and prestige as any great Power in Europe, on its foreign relations being neglected or half-understood. Had Sir William Harcourt given us a precise definition of Imperialism, of its reality and its counterfeit, we should have better understood it than by the means of a very remote comparison. At any rate I agree with Sir William in the following eulogy he passed on Lord Ripon, in which he seems to perceive the inferior form of Imperialism which the late Viceroy so well avoided following in his work in India :—

He had some illustrious predecessors in whose steps he has trod. They were men who in their exertions for the native population incurred similar obloquy to his own. Macaulay, at the end of that brilliant essay upon Lord Clive, speaks of the man whom he was commemorating. He said :—“ His name stands high on the roll of conquerors; but it is found in a better list of those who have done and suffered much for the happiness of mankind. To the warmer history will assign a place in the same rank with Lucullus and Trajan, nor will she deny to the reformer a share of that veneration with which France cherishes the memory of Turgot, and with which the latest generation of Hindoos will contemplate the statue of Lord William Bentinck.” And if Macaulay had written a few years later, he would have added another name—I mean the name of Lord Canning, a man who in the time of danger and difficulty had such magnanimity and mercy that he was assailed with that which was regarded as a title of reproach, the title of “Clemency” Canning—a name which will remain to him forever as the most imperishable monument of his fame. Lord Ripon has understood the meaning of those great examples, and it is because he has had the courage in the same cause to encounter the same obloquy that we are here to welcome him and to thank him to-night. It is because he has understood what the Emperors of Rome did not understand—that it is not enough to dominate races by the force of your arms, or even by holding them down by the weight of your laws, but that, if you are to found an empire which is not to crumble away in a decline and fall such as that which overtook the Roman, you must discover how, in some manner or other, you can find your way to the hearts of the people you rule. (Cheers.) It is a hard lesson to human pride to learn; and though, no doubt, there is no task of statesmanship more difficult than that which attempts to reconcile the pride of a subject people, it is that task which Lord Ripon has attempted, and in which he has largely succeeded, and it is because he has accomplished so God-like a mission that we are here to welcome and to thank him.

The Earl of Derby, responding to the toast of "the Houses of Parliament," said that Lord Ripon exercised his functions so justly that he became unmindful of the personal consequences he had to endure. However prejudiced were those who opposed him, the people of England, by the honours which they have paid him, have shown that they were not affected by their alarm. The Earl considered it to be the duty of every statesman of England to rule India for the Indians, and if they would ever give a greater share to the Indians, to conduct their administration, it will not be because the British people were not fit to govern them, but because no one could better understand and appreciate native feelings and wants than the natives themselves. When the latter receive the same enlightenment as the people of England, India could not be kept by the British unless it was allowed rights and privileges commensurate with the new aspirations raised.

From Sir Charles Dilke's speech we infer that Lord Ripon has been throughout his political career an advanced Liberal—even a Radical, which he does not fear to acknowledge that he has been. In fact the principles which he unflinchingly carried out in India he had also deliberately advocated in England. It was very wise, however, on the part of Lord Ripon that he did not openly avow his radicalism while here. If he had done so he would have damaged the cause of India. His excellent merit was that while at heart he was a Radical, he showed the capacity of acting as if he was a Conservative-Liberal. Sir Charles Dilke said :—"He was a man whom they were all proud to recognize as one born to rule—as a matter of fact he was born in Downing-street itself, and if a man born there was not born to rule, he did not know who was."

However eloquent were the other speeches, none was so remarkable for fulness, for lucidity, and for temperateness as that of the Indian Secretary of State. It must be read to be appreciated. It is a masterly, sympathetic and generous vindication of Lord Ripon's acts in India. Except in one little matter, that Lord Lytton's action with regard to a small part of the vernacular press was entirely uncalled for, according to the Earl, the approbation accorded to Lord Ripon will at once command the assent of all unprejudiced men. He pointed out with conclusive arguments that what Lord Ripon attempted in India was exactly in consonance with the spirit and principles which have guided Her Majesty's Government from the earliest date, and with the character and doings of his most distinguished

predecessors, of whom history has left a happy remembrance. There was nothing novel or striking in his acts, and though he refused to base his policy on mere expediency—and so based it on the principles which he cherished—he did nothing more than continue the administration on the old lines which have always been widely approved of. He did not rule India as a partizan would have ruled—which would undoubtedly have been a misfortune. It will always redound to the best credit of India if its Viceroys, by whomsoever they may be appointed, ruled the country without being influenced by any particular tie. Let the Viceroy of the time steadily keep in view what would be the best thing for India, and that would not be too much for him to carry out in virtue of his responsible and distinguished office. As we Indians have been so much pleased with the late Viceregency, so are we also pleased with the general and warm esteem in which our acts of loyalty and appreciation caused by Lord Ripon has been held in England. It must cause us peculiar gratification to read the concluding portion of the Earl's speech :—

His noble friend endeavoured to provide for equal justice to all before the law, and he received the unwavering and hearty support of Her Majesty's Government throughout the whole of the business, believing as they did that the principles upon which he was acting were right. Lord Ripon had brought back with him to this country the universal esteem of millions upon millions of our fellow-subjects. Wherever he went in India crowds of natives came round him to show their appreciation of the benefits which he had conferred upon them. If he had no other title to their gratitude to place his rule high among that of Indian Viceroys he would secure it in that, for it was no easy thing for an alien ruler like our Viceroy to touch the hearts of men of another race, and to touch them in the unmistakable manner in which his noble friend had touched them. Lord Ripon by his policy had done more than any one else to strengthen the loyalty of the natives of India to the Crown and to strengthen the foundations of our Indian Empire, and he gave them the toast of Lord Ripon's health, with the sincere belief that when history had passed its verdict upon his administration it would be found recorded as one of the greatest and brightest of the Viceregencies of our Indian Empire.

It is noteworthy that Lord Ripon had the full sympathy of the Home Government in his struggles to get the Ilbert Bill passed, though like him the Home authorities, while being firm, took precious care not to exasperate the Anglo-Indian feelings. It may be remembered that my own attitude, while feelings on both sides were running high, and while superior light was absent among the public, tended towards the adoption of a moderate reform by certain measures of conciliation which I was first to suggest.

I now pass on to the speech of the hero of the hour—I, of course, mean our late beloved, god-like Viceroy. He said he still maintained his life-long

adherence to the great Liberal party of England. While explaining this he was induced to declare that the cheers "were a good augury of the speedy determination of the great issue whether this country is to be governed by Lord Salisbury or Mr. Gladstone." Both the Earl of Kimberley and Lord Ripon warmly upheld the evacuation of Afghanistan as an event which has secured a friendly country on our borders—no doubt a very essential thing for India. It cannot be denied for one moment that a friendly Afghanistan is essential at the present moment for the security of India, and that the best way to keep a country very friendly to a neighbouring power is not to violate its independence. Lord Ripon says that because he evacuated Candahar, Afghanistan is friendly to-day, which is very useful just now, considering the present conflict with Russia. Both the high authorities have, no doubt, tried to give us a simple view of this difficult problem. If we want the Afghans to be friendly to us, we also wish them to become powerful and make use of their power as much for their interests as for ours. We should like to be satisfied if this has been done by the evacuation of Candahar. It is presumed that the British generosity shown has been the means of giving us a friendly ally to interpose between us and the Russians. Abdur Rahaman had been shown sufficient friendliness when he was placed on the *Cabul gath*. But that measure does not seem to have made him strong enough to menace Russia, instead of Russia menacing India as it actually does now. Our abandoning Afghanistan altogether has not made it strong enough to punish Russia for its audacity in coolly appropriating portions of the Afghanistan territories. If Afghanistan has been made strong, where was the use of sending out a Commission to define its own boundaries, while Russia has continued descending on the Amir's country in spite of that Commission. We abhor the idea of carrying on a war in a neighbour's country, but when it was sanctioned by the parent country, that country ought not to have stultified itself by subsequently falling into the other extreme. I wrote a work and pointed out that nothing like annexation or anything approaching it was then to be carried out. But when a ruler assumed to be friendly to us was placed on the throne, and while we had strongly established ourselves in that country, the task of an active and disinterested warden had inevitably come upon us, which could not be avoided without doing injury to Afghanistan as well as India. You gave over the whole country to the Amir, and blessed him every year with a large amount of money. Though you knew him to be incapable of serving

the highest interests for which he was chosen you thought that all would go right by merely leaving him a perfect master of Afghanistan. There was not the slightest objection to his becoming a perfect master of his own dominions. But where was the harm to show him, when he got the *gadi* with our own help, how best he could render his position impregnable by allowing the British Government to reorganize his military and to place their own army of watch in Candahar, which he would gladly have allowed to be occupied? A great politician-statesman might have been deputed, who would have succeeded in giving some intelligible constitution to the Amir, and preventing the frittering away of his resources for the five years which have elapsed since Russia first tampered with Afghanistan. She has now actually encroached upon its territories. It seems to us much safer and more economic to guide Afghanistan disinterestedly rather than allow it to squander its resources unassisted by an experienced neighbouring power. It would be superfluous to mention how British intervention can be made thoroughly beneficial and in no wise injurious to Afghanistan. We need not grudge, however, to extend every confidence to the absolute reversal of policy effected by Lord Ripon soon after his arrival in the country. We shall now let the fast-approaching results tell us the effect of that policy. The entire effect can only be gauged on a war breaking out in Afghanistan, which every party of course would wish to avoid. It is then to be seen if the Afghans and other tribes would side with the Russians, or with ourselves, and whether they would support Abdur Rahaman as an ally of India or somebody else as a creature of the Russians. Lord Ripon's statement, in reference to his relations with Native States, I may fully endorse. The Nizam of Hyderabad owes a good deal to his generous policy, and we shall have to watch with interest for some time to come the consequences of entrusting full powers to two very young and promising noblemen—the Nizam himself and his Minister Sir Salar Jung. I hope in course of time that State may take its rank among the foremost model States in India. No serious politician ever believed that Russia had tampered with the loyalty of some of our native states. Lord Ripon inquired of this privately before leaving India, and was satisfied that the rumours were ridiculous. I trust somebody may trace the rumour to its source at least to ascertain in what manner was it possible for Russia to open any communication with any of the native states in India. Though a Liberal, Lord Ripon did not fail to

tender good advice to native chiefs when they needed it, and that was undoubtedly for their good. I can cordially bear out the assertion of Lord Ripon that "there never was a time at which the native princes of India were more loyal to our gracious Sovereign than they are to-day."

The most important part of Lord Ripon's speech referred to the pledges given by the British Government in respect of the broad and liberal policy to be always applied in governing India. His Lordship pointed out the Charter Act of 1833 and the debates which preceded it in both Houses of Parliament as the foundation work of his attitude in India. It was at that period that a free introduction of Europeans into this country was permitted with certain declarations of policy in their reference; and to this circumstance Lord Ripon did well in drawing attention. I agree with him that the changes effected in India on account of the spread of education, extension of railways, and the working of a free Press have been so great that their real meaning can hardly be realized by those whom we know to have been much prejudiced by the spirit of conservatism. The bulk of Indian officials, owing to their immediate contact with the practical work of the country and their individual inhabitants, cannot possibly breathe any very healthy liberalism in the interests of the various communities. They cannot possibly be the warm advocates of a sympathetic and generous policy, which generally emanates from statesmen possessed of large opportunities. It was natural, therefore, for Lord Ripon, while ruling India, to find out what were the object and aim of Providence in vesting its interests in a nation superior in both moral and physical strength to the natives of India. It was quite right for him to have selected the primitive principles of first purity, which had latterly been emphasised by the Queen's Government. These principles, as he said, "remain always the same. The mode of application must depend upon the circumstances of the time and the subject with which the Government has to deal." The practical and modifying spirit which will always influence the Viceroys will place a great curb on the spirit of progress characterizing the British administration. The strongest opponent of Lord Ripon as representing Anglo-India—we mean the *Times*—perceived ultimate dangers in his avowing the principles which sent out the famous Charter to India. But these principles have been clearly admitted to have been applied under conditional circumstances. It was a very little thing—it was the safest thing to have sought the investment

of half-a-dozen competent native civilians with the same jurisdictionary authority already exercised by their European brother-officials. When this extension of a slight privilege was violently opposed, the principles underlying that step necessarily came into relief. The question was not to what extent such privileges could be accorded to Indians ; the real point at issue was whether it was safe, while we were permitted to enjoy the same moral and mental freedom as Englishmen did in their own native country, to deny the natives who showed their fitness, the advancement earned by them by their own individual merits and qualifications. Lord Ripon, therefore, showed a wise forethought in practically recognizing the gradual application of the principles more than once solemnly affirmed by the British Nation. They cannot now thrust back India, and they cannot turn it into their enemies by telling the natives, who exert in qualifying themselves for the discharge of high functions, that their legitimate and temperately asserted aspirations cannot be fulfilled. Discourage them by devising as severe tests as you can in the interests of the country, but those who are found answering the tests should not certainly be discouraged. If even such men are discouraged they cannot, as Lord Ripon said, turn out the supporters of the Government. This is certainly not the method to promote good government and enhance and cheapen its functions—which is daily becoming a greater necessity for this large, complicated and poor country. If Great Britain cannot uphold its prestige and maintain its influence without India, then it is this spirit which has to be followed by the parent country not merely to obtain succour for itself, but to secure the freedom and integrity of the Indian Empire. If that high and abiding spirit were to be neglected, ruin would await both the mother and the subject countries. We shall do well by quoting here the concluding words of Lord Ripon's fair and manly speech :—

The noble Marquis proceeded to refer to some of the principal measures of his administration, including the repeal of the Vernacular Press Act, the extension of railway communication, the reduction of taxation, and particularly the tax on salt. But these duties, he remarked, were not the only duties intrusted to the British Government in India. They must desire faithfully and honestly to fulfil the great task which God had imposed upon England when He gave her the Indian Empire to rule. They must set before themselves yet higher aims, and endeavour to the utmost of their power to give to their fellow-subjects in India the rich stores of their own knowledge and civilization, fitting them in increased numbers to take part in the management of their own affairs, and admitting them gradually to those positions to which they themselves had taught them to aspire. It was only by such a policy they could maintain the good faith of

England and redeem the pledges of the Crown. By such a policy alone they could extend and deepen the loyalty to our gracious Sovereign which was so widely spread throughout India, and which it was a deep satisfaction to him to believe that during the five years of his Indian administration he did something to consolidate. (Loud cheers.)

The veteran reformer and the people's orator, Mr. John Bright, made a pretty long speech about our country in replying to the toast of "Prosperity to India." This speech takes us more to the ultimatum of British sovereignty in India than any of the preceding ones. It is always interesting to note what liberal statesmen may have to state on this point from time to time, for it cannot be accepted without subjecting it to certain broad practical tests which have to be drawn from existing facts. The argument of Mr. Bright should, therefore, be looked into, for it does great credit to his heart. He said all India and England and all Anglo-Indians and Britishers would accept that toast with unanimity, acclamation and cordiality. And yet when the means by which such prosperity can be attained are discussed, many of those who would heartily join the toast would also condemn the measures which a great officer like Lord Ripon might think it necessary to introduce in India. He contended that India can only be governed by England in what are the sacred interests of the people of India, which cannot be otherwise ruled. The reason of this he thus put in plain terms :—

"We should put ourselves in the position of the natives of India, and ask ourselves what we should say if we were there, a part of 200 millions, and were told, as several people have said, and many have said, by their action—that these 200 millions of people are to be governed by a privileged small class, a handful of men coming from some remote island, eight or ten thousand miles away, and that the interests of this handful of men should be considered and their clamour listened to, against the wisdom of the Government of Calcutta, the Parliament of England, the promises of the Crown, and the sympathies of the great masses."

Yes, it will always be safe to consult the wishes of the Crown, the Parliament and the masses at large, whenever any serious difference arose between the people of India and the Anglo-Indians. Mr. Bright has strikingly explained the present position of the people of India, though it is still a matter of doubt whether a handful of the most enlightened and powerful race can be compared at a low standard which the immense heterogeneous population of India for the present indicates. The British conquerors will, from sheer necessity, assume a commanding position in India, the gross features of which the Crown and the Parliament of England, from their freedom from local prejudices and hatred, will always have to erase from the broader assertion of their sovereignty. The development of

the numerous conflicting elements in India will for a long time to come require the watch and direction of the Lord Paramount in the Indian interests themselves. It is thus that Mr. Bright's syllogism may not stand quite well in the eyes of those reasoning from a knowledge on the spot. To show the influence of English education in India Mr. Bright narrated what was spoken to him by two natives of India sometime ago :—" I met several years ago two most educated and accomplished natives of that country ; and they were describing to me the manner in which the English language is spreading. One of them said, ' I believe in a short time—within the next few years—there will be as many people in India who know and will read Milton and Shakspeare, as there are now in England.' The other gentleman then turned round to me and said, ' I think there are as many now.' " It is needless to point out how very exaggerated was the view placed before Mr. Bright. It may not do any harm ; but it can hardly do any good. It will surely require many years yet before India can have as many English-knowing people as England has. And it will take a much longer period in attaining that popular highly-developed culture which has been acquired by England. I entirely agree with Mr. Bright when he states that the literature from the West will transform the idolatrous religion of India ; but this will yet take time. When the people have mended their social and religious systems they will be led to struggle for political reforms more than they have yet done. The general political freedom will take place not soon after the spread of Western civilization, but after the spread of social and religious reforms. I hope to have pointed out in a few words one great misconception under which some liberal-minded Englishmen so often labour. Mr. Bright naturally feels apprehensive of what would be the results on native minds of the effects of Western education and literature which have transformed the religion, the politics and the material condition of the people of England. " They would not inquire very much because they would know that it was not difficult for a foreign country like this, with trained military men and the power of engaging the military services of the natives of India, to build up a great Empire. But they would say, ' This is ancient history.' " As I have already stated, no danger need be apprehended from the mere spread of education, for a good many forces should be generated from that agency before the natives can make any formidable resolutions calculated to change the very basis of the Indian Empire.

Mr. Bright understands that a small community like the British is not permanently destined to rule such a large country as India. It is not useful to go into this question just now, for it will not be a practical task always precisely to keep in view any ultimatum of this sort, whether in favour of, or adverse to, India, while the business of its administration is carried on. A remote result is generally left to the working of Providence, while the current affairs are managed in the best light possible. Mr. Bright is quite right in saying that the administrators of India should cultivate a spirit like that of the late Governor-General. There will be then many more lib rt Bills and a greater general development of Government. "The Government, if it be so, will be far better, it will be less costly, and it will be more acceptable to the people, and less humiliating, for it will make the best of their people joint rulers with some of the best of ours. It will, therefore, be the more enduring." Here is some tangible result rightly anticipated and pointed out by Mr. Bright, which may be very cordially endorsed. And I may confidently ask the rulers, great and small, to pursue the liberal learnings indicated by Mr. Bright. In dwelling upon the poverty of India the Right Hon'ble gentleman referred to the work published on the subject of India by the Secretary of the National Liberal Club. The salient points of it were stated by him as below :—

"It will refer to two points in a single sentence. One is the extremely fearful poverty which prevails over a large portion of the population of India. The barest food, and the lowest, comfortable shelter in any workhouse in this country would be palatial treatment to millions of the population of India—(cheers)—and during the present century it is stated that there have died of famine in India a larger number of persons than all the men that have fallen in all the wars which have been waged during that course of time throughout the globe."

If such is the magnitude of the work to be done in India it is absurd not to multiply native agencies in the higher paths of our administration and to effectually amend the constitution of the country. True, India needs several capable statesmen like Mr. Gladstone as Mr. Bright hinted ; but the greater the number of such workers introduced, the sterner will be the necessity felt to increase efficient native agencies. I cannot do better than quote here the whole of the concluding passage of Mr. Bright's speech :—

"What we want in India is the sympathy of our friend here, the late Governor-General of India, permeating the hearts and feelings of the Englishmen in India. If you do so change the hearts and create a feeling of sympathy, I am quite sure it will do more to perpetuate or lead to a longer continuance of the English rule in India than the despatch of many regiments of

soldiers. (Cheers.) What we want to see—I shall not live to see it, but there are many here who will have to see a great deal—what I hope for is that in the coming time we may have the best intellects of India working with Englishmen earnestly for the good of India and the honour of England. (Cheers.) How great will be the results for good I cannot describe, or probably can't imagine, but I am sure the results for good will be great to the countless millions who for the time—be it short or long—are under the influence and subject to the English Crown. (Cheers.) The subject of India is a very great one in my estimation. The mystery we cannot fathom, by which that country, with its vast population, has been subjected to the rule of this country, is one of those things of which history gives us no example, and if we did not see it, we could not imagine it could come in the future. But it has come—not by reason of the prowess or violence, or military spirit of this generation, but of our forefathers, and we at any rate, unless we surrender it, may be to its confusion and its difficulties, are bound to do all that the best intellect of the country, the most honourable sentiment, and the most moral feeling, can do to raise as much as we can the population of that country, and to give them the belief that we wish them good rather than wish to complete our greatness upon their subjection and their sufferings. (Loud cheers.) It is because I believe that Lord Ripon, our honoured guest, has gone as far as it was possible for him in that post of eminence which he occupied to do, and has done that which it becomes every Englishman to do that I am tendering him my thanks." (Cheers.)

But the British administrators and the leading natives of India have only to be guided in all difficult positions, and in all emergencies, by the safe beacon Mr. Bright has so happily placed before our vision as it gives me such pride and pleasure to quote him here. But that beacon has to be more constantly and more firmly kept in view than it has hitherto been, and in many more directions indeed than those meagrely observed till now. We may then find in our native population so many armies for the support of the British in India, while no foe of theirs will have the impudence of menacing our peace. It may not be possible for a long time to come to press in practical service broad and generous theories in their entirety and without modifications in due regard to actual facts and circumstances; but unless our Rulers steadily maintain the light of these theories even with a certain amount of sacrifice in the interests of general good, I doubt very much the value of weak or forced loyalty that is not provided with the only useful basis of united moral and material forces to be cordially generated in the enfeebled and distracted nations of India. As the other powers of Europe and Asia become materially freer and stronger to act in the world, should the British Government proportionally take every community and every native prince into greater confidence, and, while granting them a greater scope for regeneration, prosperity and renown, should found their own enhanced strength and inviolability

in the reform and unity of their own subjects. Such a mixed and accurately weighed method can alone succeed in rendering Great Britain and its Eastern Empire permanently inviolate. It is pleasing to me to be cognizant of the fact that this conception of the national duty of India and England is more readily appreciated by the present generation, both Europeans and Natives, than it was fifteen or twenty years ago, when so many of my political propositions were felt but little removed from a dreamy region!—*29th March, 1885.*

THE *Rast Goftar*, the leading vernacular journal of the Bombay presidency, was right in urging the other day that when Lord Reay in Bombay and his Deputationists, a new Governor set his foot in Bombay, its leaders must be prepared to give him a welcome address, bringing to his notice the various wants and wishes of the Presidency. The suggestion appears to have been timely taken up. The best leading man of Bombay—the young, highly promising, and patriotic Parsi Baronet—delivered a public address himself to Lord Reay, our new Governor, in behalf of the Presidency Association. The address partook of a general character and was, perhaps, a little fuller than a majority of such addresses, as we have been used to find them. Except in one respect—and that a vital one in the present times—we consider the address to be a satisfactory document remembering that such general addresses cannot entertain any question of detail and can deal only with the general state of affairs. The condition being so, we cannot but express our sorrow that the influential deputation which waited on Lord Reay made but a passing allusion to the gravest crisis the whole of India, which this Association may be said to represent, is now passing through. When the present Viceroy was on the way out for India—when no one, perhaps, had dreamed of the present Indo-Russian complications—we had strongly urged the Bombay gentlemen to forget for a while their insular aspirations and vigorously bring to the notice of the Viceroy-elect the most serious deficiencies of the various defences of the Indian Empire especially marked in the mistrust shown towards Native Princes by letting their fine armies in the abyss of complete ruin and stagnation. All that the Bombay leaders were pleased to do was to make a passing allusion to the defences of the Bombay harbour. Matters on the frontier have since suddenly assumed a most threatening aspect. And how do the Bombay

deputation deal with them now? They deal with them at the conclusion of their address, and deal it in a manner as if a slight famine had been passing over a part of the country, which need not interrupt the considerations of the course of some happy internal development of the country! We may allow our readers to see that passage for themselves :—

“ In conclusion, my lord, we are aware, that while we are directing your lordship's attention to the several measures of internal reform above indicated, grave complications have arisen in the foreign relations of the Government of India which may, perhaps, involve the country in hostility with a great European Power on the borders of Afghanistan. But, my lord, we are so confident of the loyalty of our countrymen to the generous rule of Britain, their recognition of the great resources and strength of the British Empire, and their firm faith in the liberal principles which animate British rule, that we think the gravity of the situation need in no way interfere with the progress of the internal reforms heretofore sketched. And on the other hand, we are also sure that the Government, which was able in the dark days of 1857 to establish universities in this country, will not suffer the Anglo-Russian complications to stand in the way of those liberalizing changes which are called for by the progressive conditions of the times.

“ With these short and humble expressions of our views we bid Lady Reay and your lordship a hearty welcome.”

We should like to have a single historical instance in which an Empire may have enjoyed immunity from foreign aggressions merely on account of the lip loyalty of its subjects, or the liberality and generosity of its rule. The existence of these qualities must be very short-lived in the presence of a thoroughly covetous, unscrupulous and ill-conditioned Power, whose fiercest ambition is to destroy the British Empire in India, and who eagerly awaits every opportunity to produce the vilest anarchy amongst us. We do not doubt ourselves “ the great resources and strength of the British Empire,” but the deputationists are a trifle too over-confident in uttering this broad popular supposition. Neither they nor can the Government afford to ignore for a moment that the naval and land forces of the British Government have been allowed to slide into dangerous insufficiency considering that all other large or small powers are armed to the teeth for their own preservation. Until our own dream a quarter of a century old, that a day may come when wars shall more or less cease and all difficult problems may be solved in Iran or on some such crown of earth where all the illustrious sovereigns may meet the Empress of the East as their head, is realized, success is destined for the Power which is able to wield the greatest brutal-human force. While some attempt has been made by the Bombay Association to enter deeply into minor administrative questions,

we cannot but attribute their disinclination to look into the various military problems of the Empire to that immaturity of temperament and responsible experience which, while attaching undue proportions to secondary points of administration, is apt to ignore the most serious problem requiring powerful and comprehensive minds to grapple with precision and some severity. The communities which are partially and grievously blind to the mysteries which involve dangers against their own permanent self-preservation, are mere children who are to be treated with fancy articles and dainty toys lest they may cry and pester their elders. Just as the peace of India, and of the world perhaps, is brought on the brink of a precipice—the brink, no matter, may not be the one from which we may have a fall, we may be going round a series of such brinks—a delusive, though a perfectly well-intentioned, picture is placed before us of a people perfectly free of external and internal dangers and only imperilled because our civilization has not approached the limits of a halcyon bliss. It must try every mature temper to know that in and out of season there is nothing but a woeful list of grievances about the rights and privileges of certain classes to occupy our attention. We know the truth of the historical incident—Nero fiddled while Rome burnt. The Bombay Association is becoming, or intends to be, a responsible body on the part of the people of India. If it is only to be a faithful reflection of the masses who are helpless in saving themselves from loot, murder, or semi-barbarism, then well and good. We shall then know at least that they have limited their functions to a superficial dealing with Indian problems. But such is not the case. They would be the first in India to feel bitterly any unpreparedness on the part of India which may bring on it even a temporary calamity, or a passing anarchy. And who can survive that, amidst the burning rivalries and jealousies of the contending nations, India may not be subjected to some disastrous surprise, though everything may be done to retrieve any mishap? Evidently our public men in India are much wanting in a thorough conception of grave realities.

We shall now refer to the more agreeable portion of the address before us. We quite agree with the deputationists when they say that “few persons have come as Governors of this important Presidency with so high a reputation as your lordship bears, and fewer still have been the instances where the appointment of a Governor has been received with such general confidence and such high hopes as our own.” We were

much impressed with his lordship's abilities on reading his address at Edinburgh, which we regret we have had no leisure to review as it richly deserves to be reviewed. Lord Reay has not had much career of official red-tapeism, but in spite of that he seems to us a statesman of versatile talents and shrewdly liberal and practical sentiments. We take this opportunity of wishing His Excellency a long career of distinguished and noble usefulness in his presidency to compensate for the sacrifices he has made in coming out to India. His appointment here is only next in value to that of Lord Dufferin, among whose ablest and most loyal colleagues we may expect Lord Reay ere long to be placed.

The deputationists properly reminded the Governor of one of his important utterances at Edinburgh that "a knowledge of the permanent interests of the people is the fundamental requisite of statesmanship." They said that to have a full knowledge of those interests their countrymen should be heard along with the privileged governing classes, however able and well-intentioned they may be. This would mean that our countrymen, when they speak on public questions, should be capable of being admitted as nothing short of an authority on them. It must be admitted that the Bombay Legislative Council needs the popular representative element more than it now professes to command. But unless our old suggestion is adopted in regard to nominating a *paid Native Executive Member* in the Council whose business would be to study especially the financial concerns of the country and give us and the Council an independent and practically useful exposition of them, we do not think the honorary popular members will be of very great practical use. We have already explained how the nomination of what we might term the Independent Executive Member of the Government nominated direct by the Viceroy and the Secretary of State may be made. Such a member, we may add, would be free to deal with any administrative or public question in all meetings of the Council. We shall hereafter go more into the details of this proposal. The Municipal Boards in the various Zillahs will be a good school for preparing popular honorary members for the Government Council, and we believe that the Bombay Municipal Corporation is already in a position to spare talented and well-cultured gentlemen like Mr. P. M. Mehta for the higher Council of the Presidency.

The address asks the Governor to put into operation early the permissive provisions of the Local Self-Government Acts in favour of local autonomy,

to secure greater elective element and local independence at the Boards. We think the district authorities ought to work more in the spirit bequeathed by Lord Ripon, at the same time we should have desired the Bombay deputation to have named the places which have demanded a greater elective freedom and have been refused.

It is admitted in the address that some good has been done to the ryots by the finality of the revenue survey and assessment lately introduced by the Government. We have, no doubt, some questions are yet left unconsidered in the interests of the peasantry, which may well be dealt with in the amendment of the proposed Land Revenue Code. We do not think, however, that in the matter of the recent slight enhancement in the assessment of the soil supposed to command a water bearing stratum, Government can find itself in a just position to reverse the very fair policy it has adopted. We believe that the Government have been a little over-liberal to the ryots in this instance. We upheld sometime ago, in an exhaustive argument, the Government Resolution on the subject of subsoil water taxation, in no hesitating terms, and we notice that the Secretary of State has now finally approved of the measure. There is no necessity for the question being reopened unless the deputationists advance fresh facts and arguments in favour of their contention when the Revenue Code is revised. The deputationists headed by Sh. Jamsctjee have condemned in no hesitating terms the operation of the recent Forest and Abkari Laws. The unqualifying terms of this condemnation may best be told in the language originally employed —

“We beg next to draw the earnest attention of your Excellency to the urgency of promptly alleviating the hardship and sufferings which the poorer classes in the districts of this Presidency, especially in the Northern Division, are subjected to by the operation of the various rules and bye-laws under the Forest Act. Nothing during the last few years has so rankled in the hearts of these people as the oppressive character of the rules and the stringent manner in which they have been administered. The innocent rights and interests of villagers and private owners of forests have been sacrificed in the interest of Government that the ordinary operations of agriculture are impeded, and the Government it is said, has lately been warring against possible popular disturbance. Again, the stringency with which the Abkari Regulations are carried out has deprived thousands of the poorest classes in certain places of their chief means of subsistence during a greater portion of the year, and has caused sullen discontent. Justice and humanity alike demand that the crying grievances of the people affected by the Forest and Abkari laws should be carefully inquired into through independent channels and promptly redressed.”

There is much truth in the allegations above made against the Abkari and Forest Administrations, though, as a matter of fair play

and justice, we cannot say that the proceedings of the Government have been only remarkable for harsh one-sidedness. The actual truth of the matter is that some systematized regulation of these departments being necessary they have been accordingly reorganized—the Forest Department being entirely newly organized—and the officers entrusted with their working have looked to little more than rigidly and loyally enforcing the law so constituted. In applying the law so rigidly little consideration seems to be paid to the facts that private rights and privileges in India are not based on such perspicuous grounds as hold good in England, and that, though the questioning of rights very unsatisfactorily acquired may perfectly well apply to Anglo-judicial acumen, it may inflict mischief on many thousands whose principal aspiration and morality lie in keeping their body and soul together. India needs many new departments regulating its public affairs for its ultimate good government, but any of them deliberately injuring individuals or communities have to be greatly modified in their initial working if they are to be made a success by slow and almost imperceptible degrees. Officers of Government are likely to be influenced by commendable zeal in bringing a public department into full working order; but if its perfection should be attempted all at once, much sorrowful unpopularity must ensue as the working of the forest department has proved. It is perfectly legitimate for the Government to regulate the growth of the forests and even to render them a source of much revenue; but very bad mistakes are likely to occur in the application of this principle. Ruthless destruction of trees belonging to Government may well be checked; but the poorer people whose chief maintenance may depend on their conveying loads of fuel on head from a great distance and dispose of them for two annas, or the inferior cultivators who carry on their head the leafy refuse of forests for manurial purposes, should not be subject to payments. Some merciful consideration should be paid to the thousands who may have vested interests in the public forests, though those interests may not quite have been legally acquired. Regulations for public property may be perfectly correct in theory, but their excellence and efficacy can only be judged by the manner in which they practically affect the condition of the thousands to whom they are applied. The regulations which are required to be rescinded as soon as they are put into force cannot lay claim to any administrative excellence. We agree, therefore, with the deputationist

that Lord Reay will be doing a very desirable thing by ascertaining for himself how far the serious complaints raised against the action of the Abkari and Forest Departments are true and deserve to be modified. The difficulty in knowing exactly how deep-seated are these grievances are great indeed in the absence of a searching Press which, while revealing cases of actual hardship and injustice, has the courage and impartiality to uphold the enlightened efforts of the Government. We do not like any public organs blindly influenced by any sort of partizanship.

We owe good offices as much to the Government as to the people. We cannot deny that in listening to the woes of the people we ought not entirely to trust the statements made by concerned departments, but should turn to some independent sources so that all sides may be fully heard. Not only that we have little of a searching and impartial Press, but have no agricultural or town associations fit to study the details of such important questions as those under notice and represent them in a masterly manner. Till these institutions come into existence, Government may look upon local Boards and Municipalities as independent bodies from whom a full and independent opinion may be obtained on the working of the laws referred to. In course of time every Zillah may be able to point out its own public bodies of this character, capable of giving reliable information as to the feelings, wants and grievances of the people arising from the operation of various laws.

The deputationists have made a general mention of the necessity of extending railways, feeders, roads and waterways needed for the expansion of the increasing trade of the Presidency, as well as for mitigating the horrors of famine in tracts liable to deficient rainfall. The question of strengthening the defences of the Bombay harbour and improving the numerous ports all along the Western Presidency coast has been also cursorily referred to by the deputationists. They have also properly asked Lord Reay to extend his support to the "indigenous arts and industries which have recently witnessed the beginnings of a revival, thanks to the encouragement offered by the late Viceroy," and to the establishment of a technical school to commemorate the honored name of the Marquis of Ripon. We trust Lord Reay's Government will accord their best support to the promoters of that institution. A passing allusion is also made to the necessity of permitting a larger number of natives to share in the covenanted and uncovenanted services in pursuance of the orders of the Government of

India. One small passage is also devoted to the subject of the Native States of the Presidency, which runs as follows :—

"We shall not detain your lordship now by referring at any length to the important subject of the relations of the British Government with the Native States. We would only point with satisfaction to the recent proof which they have given of their loyalty and devotion to the British Government, and we rejoice to think that the friendship between these States and the British Government may fairly be expected to be strengthened during your lordship's administration."

As the object of the address has merely been to draw the general attention of our able and illustrious Governor to some of the salient points of his administration, we are, of course, precluded from entering into any practical details of the various important problems hit off in singular brevity. Though the Governor of a minor Presidency has now-a-days less autocratic powers than in times past, we need not explain how much it is in his power to leave an enduring name for good in his Presidency. There is an immense deal to be done quietly in the way of popularizing and invigorating the administration and bringing about an uniform development of its interior prosperity and economy. We are happy to note that Lord Reay's answer to the deputation was very promising, though necessarily brief. We record it below with pleasure and satisfaction as encouraging us with the hope that His Excellency will show a rare perseverance, ability and independence in the discharge of his functions, and elevate the status of his subjects and his Government even much more than his well-intentioned and hardworking predecessor was able to do. Here is his earnest, eloquent, well-weighed and modest reply :—

"Sir Jamsetjee and Gentlemen,—It is to me very agreeable to have the honour of receiving so influential a deputation from this Presidency on this occasion, and I have to thank you most heartily for the cordial welcome you have offered to Lady Reay and myself on this and other occasions. The address dwells on so many important subjects that I should not be entitled to your confidence if on this occasion I were to give a hasty reply, and I should not then show either the importance of the occasion, or respect to the influence of the deputation if I were to give any rash expression of mine to delude either the deputation or myself that these subjects do not require very careful handling. But I hope you will be satisfied when I tell you that some of them have already been considered by me very carefully (I promise), and that those which I have not yet considered and which are mentioned in this address will sooner or later—and sooner rather than later—be considered by me and, of course, I shall need assistance of councillors who surround me—both of my Council and additional members of my Council—and with their assistance I hope that great good will follow, and that the welfare and prosperity of Her Majesty's subjects in this Presidency will be largely increased during my tenure of office with your co-operation."—
19th and 26th April, 1885.

LORD REAY, in opening his first Legislative Council, did wise in taking the public into his confidence. He gave an address of some importance dwelling upon the general condition of the Indian Empire. He took a broad and sensible view of its present interests and position. Being a nobleman of wide culture himself, he instinctively felt "the value of his colleagues' cordial co-operation in the execution of the responsible duties which have been entrusted to him by the Queen-Empress." "The first solicitude," he said, "of English Statesmen at this moment must be to place the naval and military resources of the country on a proper footing." No doubt, as Lord Reay thinks, that wherever English civilization exists, there a firm conviction prevails that its career should not be marred by any feeling of insecurity. We are very glad that a high British administrator confesses that the very first thing needed is the Empire's capacity to destroy its enemy, whoever that may appear. But this conviction, however widespread, could have no practical effect unless Lord Reay, his Chief and the Indian nations indicate the capacity to have that conviction practically enforced. It is quite true that—

"The spontaneous and general expressions received from princes and chiefs of their readiness to help Her Majesty's Government in any measures which the safety of the Empire might require, bear conclusive evidence that at Calcutta, at Bombay, at Singapore, at Sydney, at Toronto, at Montreal, at the Cape, there is the same wish that the treasures bequeathed to us by past generations of political experience and of steady progress should not be lost through any lack of foresight or prudence of this generation. The loyalty evinced in so many quarters in India has been duly recognised by our fellow-subjects elsewhere, and it will increase the good-will which unites together all parts of Her Majesty's Empire."

But we, who have been foremost in discerning the weaknesses of the Empire and have used the fullest knowledge in pointing them out in the public, may assure Lord Reay that the utmost as yet done in securing this Empire against the direct possible dangers which could be conceived has as yet gone exceedingly little beyond the theory declared by Lord Reay in great truth and frankness. His Excellency the Bombay Governor will greatly strengthen the hands of the noble Earl at Calcutta by submitting for his early consideration a complete scheme for the naval and military defence of the most enlightened Presidency which he has the good fortune to govern. We simply hint about the scheme here, but will take another occasion to show it in a properly developed form. This is one question sufficient to occupy the most anxious attention of the Governor for several

months. With true English pride and patriotism he has vindicated the name of British valor which is often very nearly compromised, and we are only happy to render him our humble support and submit to him a suggestion to place his belief in some practice. It is pitiable to have to know from the highest dignitary in the Presidency, that the Commander-in-Chief, however great his efforts may be to maintain a high standard of efficiency in the Bombay Army, could not expect to give to the Staff Corps that continuity of military employment which he fairly claims for them. We thus despair to think of the fate awaiting the forces of the Native States, should they be equipped and drilled for active service. The distinguished services lately rendered by the 28th Bombay N. I. will, it is hoped, induce the supreme military authorities to adopt a generous standard of appreciation, if for nothing else for the interests of the empire only.

Lord Reay dwelt upon what he advocates as being the most excellent trait of the administrative organization of the British :—

"I may regret with you the abandonment or temporary interruption of a number of schemes which were fast approaching execution, but exactly as my belief in the justice of our rule is strong, so I hold it to be unquestionable that no sacrifice is too great which makes that rule as safe as possible from outward disturbance. And if, gentlemen, I do believe in the excellence of an administrative organization, which has been adopted in the greater part of the habitable globe, it is because that system is the most elastic and the least centralising which has been known in history. To belong to an empire which gives you a maximum of the best thought and at the same time a maximum of freedom in recording your divergence by word and deed is no small privilege. The absence of all vexatious interference of the administration, which is the fundamental principle of English law, is hardly known anywhere else. Whatever English administrators are sent, the humblest member of the community knows that his interests or grievances will be considered with the same care as those of any other more fortunate individual. The protection of the weak is the fundamental law of English administration. Its flexibility as opposed to the hard and fast lines of French and German bureaucratic uniformity gives it that power of coping with emergencies which less elastic agencies do not possess."

No one will demur to the views so lucidly expressed by Lord Reay. But His Lordship, new as he is to any very vigorous administration, may bear in mind that the flexibility he speaks of is merely the outcome of the most finished liberal culture of the day ; according to our humble understanding, however, this flexibility, dear readers, has yet to stand the shocks and collisions of Empires and the ravages of the Infernal Explosives and Machines which the same high-fraught civilization ceaselessly brings into existence.

We fear in the passage that we have the pleasure to quote below,

Lord Reay would seem to those best acquainted with the country somewhat stiff in his conception of the condition of society handed down to us in India :—

"A scrupulous regard for ancient customs and ideas, wherever found and by whomsoever entertained on whatever subject, is a characteristic of English administration which cannot be too carefully preserved. Any interference with venerable customs of the tiller of the soil would be in direct opposition to the traditions of English administration. The ethnographical survey lately ordered by Sir Rivers Thompson, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, shows the value experienced administrators attach to the knowledge of the idiosyncracies of the people. As in India all phases of civilization are in juxtaposition, we are in continual danger of forgetting how slow the process of evolution is, and how little good is done by interrupting the natural development of the understanding of the people."

We beg to differ from Lord Reay as far as it is truthful to say that physicians can indeed assist in and expedite the natural recovery of a patient. However old popular customs may be, the very fact that they have been injurious to society must hasten their downfall; and we shall hardly do anything wrong by aiding the people in understanding that these customs have been injurious. There is no doubt that the banefulness of any phase of civilization should be very distinct and emphatic to permit of its harmless erasure from the constitution of the society. No one can of course dissent from what Lord Reay says with reference to "the venerable customs of the tiller of the soil."

Lord Reay pays a fitting, and certainly, not in the least flattering, compliment to Earl Dufferin, in declaring that he considers it "a great privilege to have come here while so distinguished and statesmanlike a ruler as the noble Earl will influence the destinies of the millions whose well-being will undoubtedly be promoted by his beneficial government." We frankly stated on the noble Viceroy landing in India, that the greatest of all the difficulties he had to surmount was in connection with the consolidation of the defences of the Empire to make them apparently invincible against all its foes. We have now further reasons to adhere to the same opinion; and we only hope that before the noble Earl's term expires, it will have been said that Russia may for ever knock at the gates of India in vain. Lord Dufferin will have thus gained for him an imperishable monument in the annals of India.

Lord Reay said in conclusion :—

"If the Government is precluded from sanctioning any expenditure, but that which is most rigorously required, other sources of supply are not stopped, and private benefactors are happily

coming forward in increased numbers to meet the most crying wants of Indian society. The newly-constituted local bodies will, I am sure, also prevent stagnation setting in and we shall reap the fruits of Lord Mayo's beneficent inauguration of decentralization. Individual initiative in educational, in agricultural, in sanitary, in medical reforms, assisted by departmental action, will be of the greatest value to the country. My distinguished predecessors assisted by an able staff of civil servants have left me a noble heritage. To them it is due that this presidency has made such rapid strides, and my immediate predecessor has not been the least energetic; and certainly Bombay is as wide awake as ever. It will be my strenuous endeavour to maintain this presidency in the proud position which it occupies among the provinces of the British Empire. The moderation and good sense of all classes of the Bombay community will make that labour, a labour of love."

His Excellency may rest assured that no important section of the population is likely to grumble at the temporary withdrawal of extraordinary expenditures while they may be employed for an immeasurably superior purpose of our security. It would be gratifying to find the local boards responding to the call of the Governor; and we should like to see the general public doing more in the way of aiding in the development of the military strength of the Presidency.

As the Governor gets more and more into the depth of the work he has to perform in his Presidency, His Excellency will have every right to expect the millions placed in his charge to show that moderation and good sense will make that labour, "a labour of love." We have no doubt, as we infer from his speech, that he will pay a careful and generous attention to any genuine grievances which any affected community may bring to his notice. We may now be allowed to wish that Lord Reay's Government in the Bombay Presidency may turn out happy and prosperous, bearing important results in every possible direction.—21st June, 1885.

THE Viceroy has moved out of his capital to perform those long and rapid strides throughout the Indian continent which serve for the time to vivify vast human affairs and even to work out changes which may be remembered for generations to come. The Viceregal visits to centre-points of interest and activity are now becoming as frequent as the periodical changes in the Viceroyalty. The frequency has become as essential as it must tend to facilitate the high functions of the Viceroy and stimulate national and sectarian progress in some at least of the important directions marked in the country at large. There is not a State or a district which will not

Earl of Dufferin's
first Tour: The Speech
at Delhi.

heartily welcome the highest representative of the Queen, who at best can pay only one visit to a few of the important towns in India. As Viceregal visits become more regular than before, it is probable that stately ceremonials will, in future, be more and more allied with the disposal of difficult administrative, social and political questions. The Viceregal tour carries in its train some considerable outlay after dinners and demonstrations which open the ways of putting much welcome-money into the purse of the poor and the needy traders. These useful and activity-lending disbursements are rendered more valuable when the Princes obtain some of the much-coveted freedom and privileges in the interests of their kingdoms ; or the local functionaries and the Governors find valuable concessions made them for the development of their administration ; or the leaders of the people and the various communities have been granted some boons of a public character. The Viceroy who is animated with a desire to visit the various portions of his charge, though gracefully taking to the ovations spontaneously offered him,—which no amount of self-denial can induce him to dispense with,—is likely to centre his desires on grasping the intricacies and the merits or the demerits of local administrations ; on mastering the problems, a solution of which would result in bettering the various conditions of the people, or discovering those substantial advances in life which could be conceded in harmony with the genius, tendencies and aspirations of the people. Nothing is so difficult as to render an extended viceregal tour uniformly successful, for things and persons are apt to fall into the most delightful condition when the Mighty Orb revolves in all its warmth and brilliancy round the teeming little planets which legitimately assume a most brightened and smiling appearance. The many contemptible blots, which ordinarily disfigure these dependent creations and intercept their movements, are screened with a marvellous finish, as never were there products of Nature so tolerably lifeful and wholesome. It is when the rays of the great orb does something more than warm and brighten the surface of the lesser planets that the fundamental decompositions and disfigurations turn up for the burning heat which once in five years no creature would be so decrepid as to shirk. The solar heat is to be most courted when diffused throughout the composition of its dependent objects much more than when applied to particular parts only. The smaller blemishes are not easily removed by the strokes of the mighty ; and it is the wide traversing changes which

are most essential and lasting, as they are so rare in coming. The broad changes are the most difficult to attain, for they never could be attempted except by the skill and might of a real giant.

It is with such reflections rather hastily and generally expressed that we shall continue to view Earl Dufferin's present tour throughout India. The tour will be rendered specially notable as His Excellency is accompanied by the Countess, influenced by the high and noble mission she has set her heart to. Blessed will be the steps passing through noted places for there will hardly be any place where the Countess will not be the central figure for the crown of relief which she may grant to every important female population which he visits. One of the best things to hope from the Viceroy's journey is that both the Earl and the Countess may course through a full stream of knowledge and information which would enable them to have a full sight of the shores for the performance of their portion of the work expected of them in India.

We shall now do ourselves the pleasure of recording below the first felicitous speech which His Lordship delivered in the native capital of India, reserving to ourselves a suitable opportunity for noticing its salient points in conjunction with those which we may expect shortly to follow in the various practical and broad shapes which the highest authority of the land could give in the course of a nationally useful and interesting tour.—

"I beg to thank you heartily for the friendly terms of your address and for the generous welcome with which you and your fellow-citizens have greeted my arrival in your world-famed city. It has always been one of my great desires to visit the place which has been the capital of so magnificent an Empire, the scene of so many dramatic episodes in the history of India, and is still the site of a multitude of architectural monuments of surpassing beauty. Nor, believe me, in dwelling on the record of your city's past can any one in my situation fail to be reminded of the duties and responsibilities of Government towards the Delhi of to-day and the future. Though change of time and circumstances no longer admit of Delhi being the centre and headquarters of the administration, it must ever remain one of the chief ornaments of Hindoostan and the home of a numerous and influential community, whose prosperity and interests it will be the duty of all those responsible for the welfare of the country to foster and protect; and I sincerely trust each advancing year will convince its inhabitants, that, though shorn of some liveliness and colour with which it was invested during the time of its former rulers, they will have obtained a more solid, if more prosaic, compensation in firm security for life and property and the impartial administration of justice which have been secured it under the rule of our Queen-Empress. These conditions being supplied, it will be for the citizens of Delhi themselves by the intelligence of their municipal administration, and by the development of their native arts and industries, to regain, or rather, I would say, maintain the pre-eminence they enjoyed in the past. In their endeavour to do so, they will be able to count upon my warmest sympathy

and assistance. I am glad to think that it should have been my privilege to confirm to them the advantages of these municipal institutions to which they have referred with such legitimate pride, but which, it is but just to add, were created by my illustrious predecessor. Without giving any pledge upon the subject as to times and seasons, I can assure them that no one will be more personally gratified than myself at the arrival of the day when a still fuller measure of civil independence may be granted them. With regard to the other matters to which you have alluded, it is a question which has not yet been brought officially before me. There is no doubt, were I left to myself and were I to act under the impulse of the moment and with the impression of your friendly reception still present to my mind I should be disposed to acquiesce in any demands of the character of those you have preferred to me, but it is not merely a question between the gentlemen around me and the guest of the evening, but between every Indian Municipality and Government, and I would not presume to decide it without the assistance of my colleagues, and especially of my financial adviser. All that I can now say is that when the matter of your waterworks is brought officially before me, I will give to its consideration my best and most cordial attention. I have now to thank you for the kind words in which you refer to the efforts of the Government of Great Britain and India to preserve peace along our North west Frontier. There is, no doubt that at one time our tranquillity was seriously threatened, but, thanks to the wisdom of those principally concerned and especially the loyalty and moderation of the Ameer of Afghanistan whose asent we were bound in honour to obtain before coming to a settlement with Russia, war the greatest calamity with which a country can be afflicted has by the mercy of God been averted. In conclusion I beg to assure you that I shall not fail to convey to Her Majesty the expressions of your loyalty and devotion. Her Majesty is always deeply touched by such proofs of the good will of her Indian subjects, whose welfare, contentment and happiness are as dear to her as are those of any other of her people."

Lady Dufferin this morning (Oct. 30) opened St. Stephen's Hospital for women, an institution founded in connection with the local branch of the Cambridge Mission. The ceremony consisted of an address by the Rev. Mr. Carlisle recounting the history of the hospital, from which it appeared that the building owed its origin principally to the efforts, and was founded chiefly in memory, of the late Mrs. Winter, wife of the Rev. Mr. Winter of the S. P. G. Mission. Two German medical ladies are attached to the hospital, the foundation stone of which was laid in January last year by the Duchess of Connaught. A short religious service followed the address, whereupon Lady Dufferin declared the institution open, exclaiming,—“I declare this hospital open in the name of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.”—*8th November*, 1885.

As yet the Viceroy's tour dazzles us with overspreading brilliancy as his speeches at Delhi and Ajmere represent. No principle of administrative questions of an urgent import has been dealt with by the Viceroy. Nor has it been brought up by any com-

manity or government for his decision. Earl Dufferin is perhaps pledged not to initiate any such discussion himself, much less to conceive and promulgate an original measure. This will be admitted by those who remember his earlier speeches. Disappointed as we should be if he holds too fast to his early utterances, we would consider the peoples whom he visits to be at fault, should they fail in pointing out to him any large and practical grievances, or the deficiencies of a business-like manipulation of any national affair. We are, of course, entitled to expect that the Viceroy will exercise his paternal feelings for the simple reason that if he did not,—and for the matter of that the Queen-Empress would be herself without active influence in India,—the empire could hardly be developed, while the masses would suffer from aggravated poverty, or be inflamed with increasing fanaticism, or perish by hundreds of thousands. The most difficult aspect of the Viceregal tour consists in knowing the real and widespread evils of each of the provinces visited by the Earl and ascertaining the far-reaching and practical methods whereby those evils could be circumvented to public satisfaction. The local authorities should be desired to find out and mature such problems, the material for which being collected beforehand may be aptly dealt with by the touring Viceroy. We do not believe that any special effort in this direction has ever yet been made; and yet this is one of those methods to indicate to the district and Presidential functionaries those aspects of their duties which traverse beyond the grinding burden of the most commonplace routine wrapt up in red tape. In almost every district there is a virgin field for working out the economic problems touching the root of unmet resources, the unfolding of which would mitigate so much of human miseries and stimulate so much of the general contentment of the helpless millions. If we engrave a Viceroy in the heart of our hearts for his stirring feelings of ardor, of generosity, of deep-piercing culture, and of fast-winning affection, which he may pour forth while greeted by various peoples encountered in his tour, we shall no less appreciate the eloquence of his deeds that may be evolved out of the more practical and deeper earnestness characterising the modern *sawarys* of our Indo-British Maharajas.

It is interesting at the present moment to watch the Viceroy warming to business, while he is not wanting in lordly orations which every educated mind in India may anxiously digest. After his Delhi speech comes another, and a more important one, as delivered in the historical

(Mayo) College at Ajmere, on November 7. The assemblage was composed of many chiefs and influential Europeans and Natives. The whole town, including its fort on the hill and the lake below, formed one bright mirror of illuminations on the evening of the 7th. After witnessing the cheering decorations and fireworks, Lord Dufferin and his noble, benevolent and industrious wife performed an earnest business, the first in declaring the "Mayo College" open, and the second in distributing prizes among the seventy-five sons of the princes and aristocracy of Rajputana as brought up by Major Loch. The institution is one of those forming the landmarks of the changing history of India. The idea was conceived by Lord Mayo for the reform of the princely and noble dynasties of Rajputana. His calamitous assassination interfering, it was Sir Charles Aitchison who pursued the deceased nobleman's project by collecting six and a half lacs of rupees by donations from the chiefs of Rajputana. Major Mant was spared to design this building in the Hindu-Mahomedan blended, fairy-like style, as he devised for the far more elaborate palatial structure for that model ruler Sayaji Rao, the Gujerat Prince.

The Viceroy, while replying to Major Loch's address, stated that though the College was founded by Lord Mayo, its realization was due to the "wise liberality" of the Rajput Chiefs who gave effect to the intentions of the late lamented Viceroy, who, as he said, was his particularly personal friend. However limited the space at our command, we cannot afford to abbreviate the Viceroy's advice given to the noble students. The words are very few, but the choicest ones expressed in a language which must linger in their hearts till the end of their lives. As such they are, we may well record them as a portion of our history :—

"In the first place, I would remind them that, whether as scions of ancient houses, or as heads of historical families, or as destined to fill public positions of importance in Rajputana, or as future chiefs of independent States, there has already fallen upon their young lives the shadow of heavier responsibilities and stricter duties, as well as the sunshine of loftier aspirations and wider responsibilities which encompass the existence of the bulk of their countrymen. Happiness to thousands, tranquillity to vast territories, and general prosperity to the Empire at large may be advanced or be retarded in a sensible manner in proportion to the degree to which they may take advantage of the opportunities of self-improvement afforded them within these walls. For this reason it is exceptionally incumbent upon you, my young friends, to cultivate certain special qualities and to avoid certain special dangers. Inasmuch as Providence has placed you in a position of considerable social dignity, and has relieved you from the pressure of sordid cares and anxieties incidental to straitened circumstances, it should become a matter of pride and conscience to you to clothe yourselves in those manly virtues and characteristics which in all ages have

been recognised as a proper adornment of well-born men, such as self-restraint, fortitude, patience, love of truth, justice, modesty, purity, consideration for others, and a ready sympathy with the weak, the suffering, and the oppressed, and, above all, with that noble courtesy which not merely consists in grace of manner and the veneer of conventional politeness, but which is the outcome of an innate simplicity and generosity of spirit, which instinctively shrinks with scorn and disgust from anything approaching to egotistical vanity and of vulgar self-assertion. On the other hand you should be equally watchful against those temptations to which wealth, with its opportunities of self-indulgence in all ages and in all countries, has been peculiarly exposed, such as sloth, idleness, intemperance, sensuality, effeminacy of mind and body, and all those baser influences which render man a burden to himself, a disgrace to his family and a curse to his country. And in saying this, I would warn you that we are living in a shifting world—a world in which those very privileges you have been led—I do not say illegitimately—to pride yourselves upon, is being continually exposed to the criticisms of public opinion, or the ordeal of intellectual competition. If Rājputana is to maintain her historical position as one of the leading provinces in Hindustan, as the ancient home of all that was high-bred, chivalrous, and heroic, it is absolutely necessary that the sons who are the representatives of its famous houses should endeavour to show themselves as leaders of people in the arts of peace and as their exemplars in the van of civilization of that pre-eminence and renown which their forefathers won, fighting sword in hand, at the head of their clans on many a field of battle, and, believe me, in such peaceful triumphs, promoting, as they do, the well-being of multitudes of our fellow-creatures, is far more worthy of your ambition than any which were to be gained in those miserable days when scarcely a twelve months passed without the fair fields of India being watered with the blood of thousands of her children."

The most of the princes in the Bombay Presidency cannot turn to the above counsel with less advantage than those directly addressed. It is said music soothes the serpent. Well, then, if the business of a vigorous and virtuous administration be a repulsive commodity to the minds of those princes not tried in the humane paths of life, the exceedingly pregnant admonitions of Lord Dufferin must entirely convert that commodity into the most cheering and most acceptable metal. Both the darkness and the sunshine of an elevated princely life is here traced in a design no less agreeable than the lights and shades of a lovely and perfect picture. We would beg of Major Loch and the other Rajcumar Principals to insert this one of the noblest piece of oratorical passages in a text-book, and have it recited by the princely students in Prize Exhibition meetings. We are sure they will never forget it, while, in course of time, they would assimilate it with their own feelings and aspirations.

The Viceroy next turned to the subject of Indian princes and people acquiring the knowledge of English as the true medium through which they could learn the best thoughts of the greatest of the men of the past and the present, and guide their conduct and faculties to the best advantage.

The universal necessity now felt for mastering the English language has been very strikingly put by the Viceroy .—

“Passing from these general topics, I would have wished to have made a few specific recommendations with regard to matters of detail. Having, however, already detained you longer than I intended, I will confine myself to the single point which has already been so frequently referred to on similar occasions, namely, the great desirability of your becoming thorough masters of the English language. In doing so, I will not particularly insist on the obvious advantages your acquaintance with a tongue so rich and varied in its literature and through which you can make yourselves acquainted at first hand with the ideas of some of the greatest men that ever lived, as well as the latest results of modern philosophic thought and scientific research. I would rather remind you of the practical benefits which a due prosecution of your studies in this direction will confer upon you. English is the official language of the Supreme Government under which you live, and of the books which deal with public affairs, domestic administration and the general interests of your country, and it will be of continual use—indeed, I may say of absolute necessity—to you in the positions which you may be called upon to fill. Keen-witted inhabitants of many other parts of India have fully appreciated this fact, and all their energies have consequently been devoted to the acquisition of English, and, as a consequence, many of them both speak and write it with an eloquence and fluency beyond all praise. Now I trust that those I am addressing have sufficient self-respect to take sufficient pride in their province, not to wish it to fall behind other component parts of the Empire in this particular. Therefore, again I say, let it be one of the principal objects of your ambition while within these walls, to acquire the English language. Already in the council of Providence the clock has gone forth that English should be the language chiefly prevalent upon God's earth, and within another hundred years it has been calculated that the English speaking races of the world will number upwards of a thousand millions. Under such circumstances it will indeed be a grievance if any of Her Majesty's subjects in India with any pretensions to belong to the intellectual class, should remain ignorant of it.”

Of all the languages of the world the English language is the most successful. It has formed individuals and nations, the highest and noblest achievement have been acquired through its instrumentality. It has developed the most pious and the most philanthropic characters. It has reformed vast kingdoms and lifted up mankind to the highest seats of enthusiasm, chivalry, and valor, of enterprise, arts, and sciences, of the profoundest philosophies, the purest materialism, and the sublimest spiritualism. It has taken its purest and its most radiant spark from the cradle language of the *Mardian* Arvans,—the most divine and the earliest language of the Earth, and its profoundly balancing influence from the more developed and secondary languages—the Sanscrit and the Arabic. It is destined to sweep away every language in India and the East, till the antique *Avasta* is fully reclaimed and reaches the same pinnacle as the English, the Sanscrit and other Eastern languages forming their more prominent accessories.

In quoting the above valuable extract from the Ajmere speech, we may be allowed to impress upon the minds of the princes and the nobility the most paramount object which, according to His Lordship, must actuate them to study the English language. It is not to be acquired as a direct instrument to counteract the British influence in India ; this would be opposed to the intentions of Providence itself. Let us dive deeper and deeper into its currents in order to do good to all who come in our way, and to acquire the highest capability of the most genuine character for its own sake. Destined to remain ever grateful to the source whence the Anglo-Indian regeneration flows to us, any ingratitude in ignoring the original blessing cannot fail being branded as a rank sin against God, which the Aryans will, we doubt not, be the last nation on the earth to commit.

Native India must be much pleased with the genuine encomiums passed on the young Maharaja of Ulwar—"an honored pupil of Mayo College, "who has more than kept the promise of his youth by the intelligence of "his government, the personal industry which he brings to the management of his affairs, in administering his State in a way that has conduced to the prosperity and contentment of his people and his own reputation, and the honor and welfare of the Supreme Government."

The reply made by the Countess through her illustrious husband to Major Loch's address to her Ladyship, was characteristic—one which the noble pupils may bear in mind for a long time to come :—

"Major Loch,—Lady Dufferin has requested me to thank you warmly in her name for the beautiful present which you have made her, and bids me to add that she has read in a certain Greek author of a certain person who was boasting of the strength of the walls of his city. The person to whom he made the observation replied that the walls of a city were the men who dwelt within them. You have alluded in becoming terms to this beautiful hall, to its lovely decorations, which are worthy praise you bestowed upon them, but to her mind its chief ornaments are the bright, industrious, intelligent youths who stand around us. In conclusion, Lady Dufferin proposes, with your permission, as long as she is in the country, to present a gold medal to Mayo College to be competed for on terms which we will settle hereafter."—
15th November, 1885.

PART IV.

POLITICAL ASPECTS.

It is just sufficient to put down this heading (vide in the margin), and it may be said with confidence that all really good and sensible men, Europeans and Natives residing in India and knowing India, will consider that the vices of scurrility and sedition—such as have been understood by the great paper—claim no proportion in any measure commensurate with the extent and the strength of the country. The following passages have been selected from some obscure papers and telegraphed from Calcutta to the *London Times*, which has consequently come out with an article a little too serious than the circumstance actually demanded. If we should have to quote such passages at first hand, we would be fully ashamed to do it, unless we subjected them to a rigid criticism. Here are some of the passages which the telegraphic correspondent of the *Times* has made historically famous :—

“The fiendish Englishmen say laughingly that the people of Madras died of starvation because they were improvident. If those whom they have robbed of everything lament, the fiendish Englishmen call them rebels. To beg for employment is impertinence. They call men idle if they cannot work on account of weakness caused by insufficient food.”
[The name of the paper from which this is quoted is not given.—Ed.]

“Foreigners have taken possession of India and are sucking her dry. The people of India look on in a helpless manner. Their best interests are sacrificed for the benefit of the English. Over and above this, the innocent natives are insulted and killed. At every step the people send up a cry for succour, when the English whip or the English kick falls upon them. The demons are engaged, heart and soul, in violating the chastity and taking the lives of Indian females. What a heart-rending scene ! It is a matter of regret that the people of India do not gird up their loins to get rid of the oppression of white men.”

“Justice Norris did not hesitate even to perjure himself on the Bench. “Perjury did we say ? Yes ; for did not Justice Norris take oath to be a

"conscientious Judge when he accepted his appointment?" [Name of the paper not given.—Ed.]

The Native Press has always admitted that a part of it employs language so low and violent that we would sincerely desire for its suppression—if for nothing else for merely the reputation of native journals in general. The rabid part, however, forms but a very small part of their circulation. The influence of the Native Press, taken as a whole, is almost *nil* in so far as the enormous multitude is concerned. It tells on the educated classes, illiterate fanatics and the reading aristocrats for good or evil. The Native Press, in a greater part, uses enlightened language, now and then some strong language, but certainly not the language of scurrility employed by a very small portion of it indeed. The frantic declarations that a few journals may give vent to in India, have not as yet produced any result worth noting beyond making a few schoolboys saucy, or some exceptional upstarts insolent and noisy. But a few of "the native newspapers" have indulged in the scurrilous tone, and not them, as a body, as the urgent message conveys to the notice of the British public. "Our Indian dominions have a share in the happiness which proverbially belongs to nations that have no history." The telegram has, however, marred this happiness:—"Unfortunately this tranquillity is not destined, it seems, to be enduring. In the telegrams of our Calcutta Correspondent exciting topics, or, at least, topics which Anglo-Indians consider exciting, have again begun to make their appearance." The happiness of a large continent like India may be said to be disturbed if ever the atmosphere of a hall can be vitiated by the attack of some nasty smelling bees on a rainy evening, which love to hover round the lights. It is urged, and we quite agree, that the above quotations are as outrageous as those of 1878, which moved Lord Lytton to pass the Vernacular Press Act, curbing the violence of the lower orders of the native journals. But how can the effusions of some ill-ordered minds be cited as a strange result, considering that it appears "under the rule of a Governor-General who has striven to conciliate native opinion and native sentiment by every form of concession and indulgence?" These concessions are always made on specific and general grounds which have no direct bearing on the activity or the dormancy of rabid writers. A disappointed or an ill-conditioned writer, devoid of culture, will take any incident on which to hang a thrilling tale, while a most beloved Viceroy may shower every possible bliss on the natives of the

country. "The absurdity of the charges put forward in the native journals [a *few* of the *obscure* native journals be pleased to mention on a future occasion.—Ed.] is almost surpassed by their malignity of purpose and their grotesque style." Quite so. But furtheron—"The patriotic fervour of a Bengali Baboo who deplores the humiliations inflicted by narrow-hearted Englishmen," or "a brave prince like Holkar, is a curious flight of fancy, for the writer is probably as well aware as any one, though he presumes, with good reason, on the ignorance of his readers, that if Holkar and the Mahrattas were not constrained by the *Pax Britannica*, the people of Bengal would be trampled under their horse hoofs or crouching at their stirrup." The flight of fancy is only a little less curious than our contemporary's own imagination about the Mahratta kingdoms which are a good deal changed, but which being in an embryo condition of the modern times can hardly deserve the epithets applied to them. What may be applicable to one set of circumstances can hardly be applicable to another, and a radically differing, set of circumstances. The Native Press has always acknowledged, however, what confusion might ensue on the withdrawal of the British power from India. But the first is as improbable an event as the second. He must be a hopelessly crazy man who said, "it is matter for regret that the people of India do not gird up their loins to get rid of the oppression of white men." None excepting those who stave and are fanatic can ever express this. They cannot, however, interfere with the tranquillity of the country. It is not easy for a foreign press to know exactly the sources—if any—whence sedition in some papers is generated. But the *Times* is not backward in guessing the character of such sources. "In the East Bazar rumours have always been thought to indicate that some mischief is brewing, and the writing in the Vernacular Press is nothing more than a modernized edition of bazar rumours, stiffened and stereotyped and made absurd beyond all former experience by pressing into the mould of a foreign and distorted literary style. * * * Whether it is the renewal of the activity of Russia beyond the Afghan frontier, or the ambiguous attitude of some of the native princes and the magnitude of their armies, which have now set disturbing rumours afloat in the bazars and sent their echoes resounding through the Vernacular Press, it would be difficult to say." No honest politician in India, whether he be Native

or European, can so easily and directly trace the foolish writings of violent journals, to either an inspiration from the Bazzars, the Native Courts, or any imaginary organization breathing from the side of Central Asia. It is often found that half-illiterate or semi-starving writers might advocate the cause of a Native State in the most violent style, though that State might not have the least relation with them. Out of mere personal vice or vanity, or influenced by a delusive and scanty knowledge of what goes on in European societies, they may indulge in all sorts of braggardism for which not even the most suspicious bazars may be responsible—almost invariably. It is expected that some native princes might not always be satisfied with all that may be done in their connection by the British Government. The attitude of such princes towards the Paramount Power may be “ambiguous.” Before, however, we can so seriously construe such an attitude into a disloyal one, the public will certainly demand proof, and are hardly likely to accept the verdict of the *Times* as at all just or true. No amount of blasphemous language employed in the public in the way it has been, can ever warrant us to connect it with either a multitude or a native court. While Lord Lytton’s Press Act was introduced in the Supreme Council—even on such a serious contingency as that—we do not remember any instance of this sort cited in support of the bill. The India Council, though not vetoing the Act, insisted on its provisions being made less stringent than they were. If ever a multitude or a native court instigated the Press to arraign itself against the Government, that was surely the occasion when this might have been hinted. It is more just to put down the offensive ebullitions of the excitable and neglected portion of the Press—to quote the happy words of our illustrious contemporary—to a “modernized edition” of “reckless and superficial speech of irresponsible thinkers stiffened and stereotyped, and made absurd beyond all former experience by passing into the mould of a foreign and distorted literary style,” than to any supposed or real influential embodiment of sedition in India. “The millions of peasant cultivators, artisans and petty traders have nothing to gain by frightening Lord Ripon’s Government,” though “it is not so with the self-interest and the vanity of the writers noticed.” Where is the harm, then, done to the tranquillity of India?

We hope to have clearly proved how absurd it is to talk of the Native Press when it is the minor and unwise portion of it which entirely

attracts unfavorable attention. Take the mass of its writings, and its fairness and intelligence must far, far outweigh the rubbish to which so much prominence has been given. If the Anglo-Indian journals were only to be kinder to their native brethren in the press in allowing it a free access to their columns, we shall hear much less of such sensational effects as the *Times* has just been able to produce. The more influential journals of the country might with advantage quote the able and loyal writings which not unfrequently appear in the respectable portion of the Native Press.

We would rather hesitate in mixing up, as the *Thunderer* has done, the recent action of the Calcutta Municipal Commissioners with that of the over-zealous writers in a part of the Bengal Press. If we admit that there was any failure on the part of that body, it has no immediate, nor a notable, connection with the journalistic rabidness displayed in Bengal. The partial inefficiency of the Calcutta Board is owing to complicated causes, in which all the officials and non-officials are involved. Whatever the urgency of the governmental action, the plight to which the Board there has been unfortunately reduced has nothing whatever in common with the derangement displayed by fantastic public men, who have followed their own special instincts. We are sure, had the *Times* been well-informed, it would have refrained from throwing a slight on the Calcutta Board in direct reference to the alleged Indian sedition, which, by no means, is national, or even sectarian, considering our varied and numerous populations.

Most of us would be inclined to thank the *Times* for frankly telling us what even hasty impressions of the people of England are likely to be when its administration is coarsely assailed by any of its subjects. The *Times of India* gave us the true solution of the difficulty when it laughed out the silly effusions, and suggested a remedy to be adopted by the better class of native journals meeting them every time with a little good-natured ridicule. We strongly think that this remedy ought to be consistently followed in the interests of the Native Press itself, if for nothing more. Every respectable journal will find hard to tolerate a language employed in the public, which is calculated ere long to give rise to such race animosities as might defy then all such endeavours as may now be employed with some certainty. Ridicule ridicule, therefore, any disgusting stuff appearing in the prints we have noticed, and such as the *London Times* has done a service in placing before the public, however incorrect its inferences have been.—21st September, 1884.

THE Times of India gave a concise account on Tuesday last of a meeting of native gentlemen held at Bombay to organise a Committee for despatching to, and publishing in, London the essence of native public opinion on the various burning questions which agitate the public mind in India from day to day. The prevailing sentiment of the meeting was that as the telegraphic despatches sent from India to the *London Times* have often distorted and exaggerated facts calculated to prejudice the interests of educated India, it has become desirable that a telegraphic service from an opposite point of view should be established in Bombay, so that misrepresentations promulgated in England may be corrected, and the facts with reference to the true spirit and aims of the Indian people may be laid with promptitude before the English Ministry and the public. The following gentlemen have taken a lead in establishing the telegraphic service, for which it is expected that as much capital will be collected in the shape of donations, &c., as would fetch an interest amounting to Rs. 12,000 required for giving effect to the Committee's object. The leaders of the movement are :—

Professor Wordsworth, Sir W. Wedderburn, Dr. Peterson, Mr. A. O. Hume, the Hon'ble K. T. Telang, Messrs. P. M. Mehta, Dadabhai Navroji, Nowrozi Furdunji, Mahadev Govind Ranade, R. M. Sayani, F. R. Vicaji, Waman Abaji Modack, Javerilal Umiasunker, Shunker Pandurang Pandit, K. N. Kabraji, B. M. Malabari, Dinshaw Edalji Vacha, J. A. Dalal, Damodur Thakursey.

A provisional Committee will be appointed with authority to send a weekly summary of news and extracts of opinions on important political questions of the day to one of the daily newspapers in London, the choice of the paper being left to the discretion of the Committee.

The importance of this movement cannot be over-estimated as emanating from the rising as well as the veteran gentry of Bombay. The necessity of spreading the public opinion of India in the British Isles was pointed out in a practical form by the present writer to some influential gentlemen in Bombay much more than a decade ago, when the scheme was not then deemed feasible. The aim of that scheme was that events in India required that a powerful journal should be started in London wholly conducted by native writers of reputation and experience to acquaint the people of England with the best and safest views affecting the public interests of India as independent in themselves as also affecting the

privileges and integrity of the British Empire. The Editor for the journal was to be selected in India—a thoroughly patriotic and veteran native ; and the organ was to be entirely devoted to a dispassionate and vigorous discussion of the Indian questions in England, so as to effectually train public opinion of England on the spot on all matters transported to England, or originated there, in reference to India. Besides guiding the public agitation of Indian matters, one of the other important features of the journal was to be a series of sketches given from time to time of the statesmen, heroes, and reformers of English and Indian extraction, who in times past laboured towards the end of kingdoms and empire, or in variously helping on and consolidating the various communities of India. Again, the politics of Great Britain, Europe and Asia in general, were to be discussed from the point of view which the increasing vitality of the East and a complete unification of all the ancient and modern continents might suggest. In short, the proposal was to create a powerful public opinion in England in behalf of India, which would accelerate its various points of progress at the same time that it sympathized with the traditions and genius of the British Lion.

The movement under notice seems to us as being a brief preamble of the above measure. The good people of Bombay and Calcutta will find in a short time the telegraphic despatches to be entirely inadequate which will be more than overcome by the force of Anglo-Indian opinion. The short messages are sure to be ridiculed by the torrential Anglo-Indian and other opinions, which will find vent in the journals of England. As a starting step, however, we hail it with deep interest, and wish it the full success it undoubtedly deserves.

The only regret is that gentlemen in Bombay should at all have prescribed the reason for establishing the service in the way they have done. The manner in which they have proceeded to work out the scheme might produce those first prejudices against a public measure which always ought to be avoided. What's the use of proclaiming to the world that since a certain correspondent of a certain journal has habitually used misrepresentations in his telegraphic missives to a certain influential journal in London, that, therefore, the present measure is taken to foil that correspondent? We do not think this to be the most agreeable method of interesting a very powerful and universal community in matters of our weal or woe. We ought not to make such an important start by an

exhibition of such a pointed motive, nor by expressly seeking the depreciation of the leading exponent of the public of Great Britain and Ireland. We have ourselves not unfrequently dissented from some of the serious opinions of the *Times*, and unravelled its fallacies of principles and views in regard to the manner and spirit in which Great Britain has to discharge its duty towards India. What may always be temperately urged in the course of a controversy cannot be erected into a repugnant prime motive in the conduct of a very powerful organ, whose good graces ought to be conciliated by us while setting on foot an important movement like the present. The public of Bombay should not make too light of the influence exercised by the London *Times* which is immeasurably superior to what we should be able to exercise for some time yet in England. Whatever the inconstancy of the *Times*, it may be admitted that we shall not be able for a long time to come to shake the esteem in which the *Thunderer* is widely held in England,—that is, if the task falls within the range of possibility. We would, therefore, venture to advise the leaders of Bombay not to be too sanguine, nor enter into any rivalry with either the *Times*, or its Calcutta correspondent. The most feasible policy would be to select questions without any reference to the personal opinions of any correspondent, or journalist. The people in England should not be carried away by the impression that a coterie of native gentlemen in India have organized themselves to forward their own interests and endeavour to lower the favourite journal in their estimation. The motives and scope of the policy of the worthy Bombay leaders being entirely honorable and commendable, we do not desire that such an admirable business should even seemingly assume any party passion or prejudice. While we desire that the faith of the Englishers should be shaken in the really inimical efforts made in England, should we not carefully refrain from any speech or action which would at once put on a form of an opposite party combination? We regret, therefore, that the ostensible reason for adopting the measure under notice put forward should have been the one of which the patriots of Bombay have made no secret. There is nothing which suits so well the genius and the vanity of the British nation as an impersonal and skilful handling of political questions; but the Bombay gentlemen have too frankly shown their hands, and we would only wish that everything would go on successfully. Meanwhile we would strongly urge on Indian leaders to go to the very heart of the British nation, and there establish a

moderate and a vigorous, constant-speaking organ in behalf of India. There is no venture which deserves a better patriotic support than the one we have noticed above. Both the wealthy and the enlightened ought to be interested in a project which besides advocating Indian interests just on occasions when that advocacy is most needed on the spot, might also help to enlighten us with those secrets which have secured unrivalled prosperity and advance to the British Isles, and which would be of such great use to the commercial, industrial, and literary members of the Indian populations. Native gentlemen selected for conducting a journal in London, which might aptly be named *The Sun, or The Light from the East*, should be of a thoroughly tried character, of deep and various experience, and true patriotic natives of India, the whole concern being supervised by an influential and public-spirited Committee in Bombay, aided by supplementary committees in other parts of India. We ask the *Voice of India* to put the suggestion about this scheme in circulation throughout India. We are sure the time is *now* ripe, when some philanthropic gentleman can successfully identify himself with the execution of this humane measure of considerable relief and protection both to India and England.

—25th January, 1885.

THE visit of so gifted and so influential a politician like Lord Randolph Churchill to India is an event of some importance. Political activity in Bombay. for the fruit it is likely to bear in the immediate future. Our young friend, Mr. B. M. Malabari, did well in arranging for an interview between his Lordship and some of the political leaders of Bombay at the *Indian Spectator* office. Among the few invited, there were present the Hon'ble Budrudin Tyebji, the Hon'ble K. T. Telang, Mr. Dadabhai Navroji, Mr. P. M. Mehta and Mr. Nowrozji Furdoonji. The conference lasted for about two hours, during which the interviewers endeavoured to acquaint the Lord with some of the main grievances affecting the interests of the various communities and peoples of India. The questions touched upon related to the obstructions which existed in native admissions to the Covenanted and Uncovenanted Civil Services and the Legislative Councils of India, as also bearing on the publicity of the annual budgets as now obtained in India and England, the annual heavy drain on the resources of India on account of the Home Charges, and the absence of Parliamentary guarantee on India's public debt. We have

ourselves so often discussed these questions and even thrown out suggestions of practical importance that we shall not seriously discuss them to-day, but pass on to a general observation which the kind visit of his Lordship to India suggests to us.

The answer of his Lordship to the interviewers was rather disappointing. He observed that though he listened to them with pleasure the questions to which his attention was drawn were of such vast and complex character like the country and its people, that each of them, he said, would demand a study of years to acquire a full mastery over it. We scarcely think that such a long time would be necessary to understand the questions brought to his Lordship's notice. Probably his Lordship thought this the best way of avoiding the responsibility of expressing opinions and views which may not suit the present condition of the government of the country, and which may excite the disapproval or displeasure of either of the two great parties in India. It would not surprise us if he did not find himself prepared to deal authoritatively with the questions brought to his notice. He may be influenced by a genuine and laudable desire not to say anything which may, perhaps, tend to embarrass the administration of Lord Dufferin just when the Viceroy is committed to a deep study of the questions which either apparently agitate the country, or silently affect its interests. Lord Randolph was, however, unreserved on one point. "He suggested that natives of India "could not do better than send deputations from this country to England "consisting of such of their friends as thoroughly knew these questions, for "the purpose of interesting members of Parliament and others in them. "Unless they moved actively in the matter it was vain for them to expect "English politicians to evince that interest in Indian questions which they "wished him to do." Lord Randolph has at any rate made a valuable suggestion. To take measures to interest the members of Parliament in the progress of Indian questions means that the leaders at Bombay and elsewhere should themselves be identified with them more closely than ever, and initiate a very important practical movement.

The establishment of a telegraphic service and a reformed political association in Bombay must pave the way to open that intimate intercourse with the English Parliament, which must, in future, be the necessary condition of political existence in India. We are very happy to notice that since we dwelt on the lamentable necessity of starting a Central Political

Association in Bombay as the parent institution of the Poona *Sarvajanit* and other like Sabhas in the Presidency, actual steps have been taken to start a head Association in Bombay. We warmly congratulate Mr. Dadabhai Navroji, the Hon'ble Mr. Telang, the Hon'ble Mr. Budrudin, Messrs. Nowrozji and Pherozshah Mehta for the activity they have displayed in organising a grand meeting for establishing the Association. We call upon the princes and leaders in Gujerat and Kattywar to support the project substantially, as well as with their moral influence. That all may be able to join the movement, we have no doubt the first meeting contemplated in Bombay will do nothing more than dwell on the broad questions of the public benefit which India in these days so sadly wants. We need not especially trouble ourselves with what individual politicians or journalists may say about India. The basis of the Association should be temperate and effective representation of large questions of interest to the largest possible numbers of the country.

If the projected Association is expected to fulfil the function suitable to the present times, it must be especially represented by constant and powerful organs in India, but especially in London. One of our strongest contentions of years is that India should be represented by a powerful journal in England. The suggestion of Lord Randolph that deputations should be sent to England to interest members of Parliament in Indian questions, commendable as it is, should be supplemented by a more abiding measure in the founding of a powerful daily organ in the metropolis of Great Britain. It would often be impracticable to reach the British Lion by occasional petitions or deputations. The members of Parliament and the British public should be daily and hourly instructed as to the public needs of the country before any notable or abiding impressions can be made on them in a manner that would benefit both India and England, and strengthen and permanence the peace and prosperity of the Queen's Eastern Empire. Ample means should be provided to conduct the said journal in a thoroughly independent and active manner so that it may be able to claim the respect and esteem of the British statesmen and the people. Considering the dense ignorance existing in England on Indian subjects, the natural tendency of the British people to be led away by party predominance and the oracular assertions of the London press; considering also that the present influence exercised in a spasmodic way is almost lost on the English Parliament, the real instrument which can tell on such a powerful

people as the English is only a daily journal *printed and published in London entirely by competent native agency*. It is the *Sun or the Light from the East*, taking its birth in our Queen's Metropolis, which can shed true light on Indian topics, and illuminate the uninformed minds of both Houses of Parliament, the Ministry, and the people at large of England. We beg the leaders of Bombay not to beat about the bush, but go direct to the point of action, and skilfully and courageously adopt a measure which will directly tell on the minds of the British people. Let the Indian rays of light be shed *abre* clearly and constantly as the Sun acts from day to day, the measure being worked by an honest, patriotic and wisely and honorably active native agency, working on broad national principles affecting the good of no particular clique but of the whole of the Indian continent and the Eastern Empire at large. The organ to be established should reflect the views of the Great Native India, whatever the caste elements making up that power. India must then act in sympathy with all the Kingdoms in Europe and Asia and such of the European and Asiatic Kingdoms which can act beneficially on the Native Kingdoms of Asia, as the British power now does on the Indian territories at large. Surely a journal of such Eastern light cannot in course of time fail to secure the influence of the British Empire and of all the prominent Native States in India, Asia and Europe. Instead of frittering away our resources in the limited and chance-work way we do, a National Association should make its articulation felt in the manner we have respectfully pointed out. Create this telling influence in the heart of the British nation, and then exercise it vigilantly and quietly, but in a constant and respectful manner, and then see what the fruits of this righteous and cautious action will be in the course of the very first five years of the existence of the journal we would wish to see started in London.—1st February, 1885.

THE establishment of a Native Political Association in Bombay as declared in a public meeting held in Bombay two weeks ago, is an event of some importance in the current Indian politics. That the Association is headed by the Parsi Baronet, its operations being closely watched by able native patriots like the Hon'ble K. T. Telang, C.I.E., the Hon'ble Mr. Budrudin Tyebji, Seths P. M. Mehta, Dadabhai Navroji, Nowrooji Furdunji, is at once a guarantee that our political affairs rest in competent hands. It is an interesting task to notice the first proceedings which were

A Political Meeting at Bombay.

presided over by the young and worthy Baronet, Sir Jamsetji Jeejeebhoy. As he said, the necessity for this organization has been doubly felt owing to Lord Ripon's regime having given fresh force to native public opinion. This view as well as the other one of the Parsi knight stating that the present Viceroy desires to follow the same line of policy as has been chalked out by his predecessor, would have been objected to by anti-native critics, but for the qualifying assertion of Sir Jamsetji that "the true interests of this country, as every capable judge admits, are identical with the true interests of Great Britain." It is a misfortune that there are many influential people in India and England who do not admit the correctness of this theory and thus retard the progress of the country.

The Hon'ble Mr. Budrudin Tyebji, very eloquently showed why Bombay should have its own political association, and a national one, as affecting the interests of the Indian Empire at large.—

"It is, I think, with nations as with individuals that with the growth of political life new aspirations arise, and these aspirations require an organization to give them due expression, and the organization in its turn watches, regulates, develops and directs national aspirations. Now, gentlemen, it cannot be denied that a city like Bombay, the capital, I may say, of West India, with its vast population, with its keen and intense political life, a city which has been described by eminent statesmen as the chief and best centre of political thought in India, ought to possess a well organized, strong, and true national association for the purpose of watching the interests of this country. It is perfectly true that there is in our midst a branch of the East India Association, which has no doubt for many years done good service to the people of this country. But that branch was established rather in aid of the parent association in England than as an independent association in this country. It no doubt served temporarily to fill the gap that was created by the death, if I may use the expression, of the late Bombay Association. But, gentlemen, I think the time is come when temporary measures of this kind should be set aside, and a political association that may be called a truly national association should be founded upon a permanent basis. Gentlemen, Bombay cannot afford to be satisfied with the branch of any association, however powerful, eminent, or useful that association may be. Bombay, I say—as the chief centre of political thought in India, ought to possess an association worthy of its greatness, worthy of its active political life and political history (cheers)—an association which shall not merely follow the sentiments and movements of our friends in England, but rather in a measure lead them. Gentlemen, I feel therefore that we are performing a great duty this evening in laying the foundation of such an association."

It is one of the signs of the times when we have a Mahomedan gentleman furtheron admitting that the Western enlightenment tends to unite the discordant nations of India into one, and that their aspirations being made common, their effect on the country is to gain for it greater freedom and privileges at the same time that the strength and security of the

Empire are increased, and the bonds of friendship and of harmony "which at present happily exist between Her Majesty's Eastern and Western Empires drawn closer together." The most violent opponent of native interests will hardly demur to the proposition put forth by the hon'ble gentleman, which the Association has promised to bear in mind from its very cradle. He wisely said: "I trust that in times of excitement and agitation it may exercise a moderating influence upon the popular feeling. Above all, gentlemen, I think it must not confound real independence with that petulant and carping spirit which can see no good in any Government measure and detect nothing for the benefit of the people of this country." Perhaps this is the first time we find an important principle of patriotic action enunciated in a public meeting as led by the distinguished band of patriots whom we have already named. The difficulty which will now be felt is to apply this principle in practice. We have no doubt they will overcome the difficulty. But there is a still greater difficulty to overcome dwelt upon by ourselves very recently. That difficulty relates especially to the study of financial and military problems as to which our politicians have yet to evince a knowledge and insight at least as great as those of the actual administrators.

Short as the Hon'ble Mr. K. T. Telang's speech was—whom the public would always desire to hear at length as being an effective, sensible and experienced orator—he must have gratified the meeting by disclosing the material resources already gained for conducting the Association. This short speech we quote entire, calling upon the people and the princes of the Presidency who are interested in our political advance to contribute their resources to the vigorous working of the Association:—

"The object of the meeting has been so often discussed during the past few years, that it will be a work of supererogation to say anything in support of it. There is only one remark which I should like to make at this meeting with reference to it, namely, that the response which has been received to the call made by myself and my friends for help from the public of Bombay is a response which has completely satisfied us all. We are in a position to announce that nearly three hundred gentlemen have already consented to register themselves as subscribers to this association. (Cheers.) But what we regard to be more important is this, that nearly forty-five gentlemen have promised donations of Rs. 300 each, which will form the nucleus of a permanent fund for the association. (Cheers.) Now I will not be understood to say that this is at all a large sum, but it will be necessary to supplement it hereafter, and I have no doubt that the public of Bombay will help us in that matter in the same way as it has already helped us by giving us so many annual subscribers. I may say that the response hitherto given to our invitation is such as is calculated to cheer us on in this work, and one which I think may be treated

as a respectable response at this stage of the association. But so far as things have progressed, I think we may all congratulate ourselves on the satisfactory results achieved. When we have any work on hand well begun, it is said to be half-done, and I think we have more than well begun this undertaking. (Cheers)

Mr. P. M. Mehta quoted a most appropriate extract from one of the old speeches of the Earl of Dufferin addressed to the citizens of Quebec, in which the noble Lord exhorted them to sacrifice some of their means and leisure in the pursuit of the self-government of their country. The extract is so important, so eloquent, and so admirably suited the object of the meeting which Mr. Mehta addressed that we must thank him for putting it in a prominent light as below —

"I cannot help wishing to express the extreme satisfaction which I experience in observing with what alacrity and self-abnegation the chief citizens of Quebec, gentlemen whose private occupations and engagements must be extremely absorbing, are content to sacrifice their domestic leisure and the interests of their private business in order to give their time and attention to the public service. Gentlemen, I take it that there is no more healthy sign of national life than this, or rather that there would be no more fatal indication of an unpatriotic selfish, and despicable spirit, than were what are called the business-men of the country, that is to say, those persons who, by their education, character, habits and intelligence, are best fitted to serve her, being tempted by an over-absorption in their private business to abstain from all contact with public affairs, and from a due participation in the onerous and honorable strife of municipal or parliamentary politics. Were such a defection on the part of the most intelligent, energetic, and high-principled men of the country to prevail, the consequence would be that the direction of its affairs would fall into the hands of corrupt adventurers, and trading politicians, and that the moral tone of the nation as a nation would deteriorate throughout every stratum of society, and what I ask, is the worth of the largest fortune in the world, of the most luxurious mansion, of all the refinements and amenities of civilization, if we cannot be proud of the country in which we enjoy them, if we cannot claim part in the progress and history of our country, if our hearts do not throb in unison with the vital pulse of the national existence, if we merely cling to it as parasites cling to a growth of rotten vegetation. Of course, I do not mean to imply that we should all insist on being Prime Ministers, Secretary of State, or Mayors, or Members of Parliament, or Town Councillors. Such aspirations to all would be neither useful nor desirable. A large proportion of the energies of the community must be always employed in building up its mercantile, manufacturing, and agricultural status, and in its learned professions, but I venture to think that no one, especially in a young country, no matter what his occupation, should consider himself justified in dissociating himself altogether from all contact with political affairs. The busiest of us can examine, analyse, and judge, we can all canvass, vote, protest, and contend for our opinion, we can all feel that we are active members of a young commonwealth, whose future prospects and prosperity depend upon the degree of patriotism, self-sacrifice, and devotion with which we apply our energies in our several stations to her material, moral and political development."

These words shrewdly quoted will serve to remind our present Viceroy

of what the natives of India may expect on his hands, as well as instruct the latter as to the responsibilities which they would incur in assuming the aspirations which the Earl of Dufferin has so forcibly pointed out as being a requisite feature of a noble and powerful citizenship. It is, however, one thing to be animated by noble thoughts placed before us, and another to pursue legitimate ends in consonance with them. The difficulty lies in rendering abstract ideas, however well-developed and generous, consonant with the business instincts which can fully fall in with the times and circumstances of the place where such abstract ideas are sought to be utilized. Even in patriots whose feelings and sentiments are to be so much commended, we should prefer to see a practical force generated much more than a simple desire for securing larger rights and privileges for natives in general. What seems essential in the present state of things in India is that we should all unite to practically sympathize with the higher forms of British administration, and, while thus laying practical services at its disposal, share in the glory of perfecting the consolidation of the Indian Empire. We beseech the distinguished Bombay leaders to comprehend the gravity of the military situation in India. Their efforts should be directed to bring about an effective conference of the suzerain power with its feudatories on the question of reforming their forces on mutually creditable and useful principles, and once for all to accomplish the permanent object of so securing India to itself that it can always present an impregnable barrier to its present and future foes without being placed at the mercies of the dangerously shifting politics of Great Britain. We respectfully insist on public men in India inducing the Government to secure once for all the permanent security of India as mostly dependent on its own military resources, which we have always pointed out as being abundant, if only earnestly considered and frankly and honorably utilized. The military problem is not the only one imperatively needing a satisfactory solution, though at the present moment it surpasses every other in respect of imperial urgency. Unless the worthy leaders at Bombay show themselves deeply alive to the dire necessity of immediately augmenting the defences of India, it is hardly likely that the public and the Government of England will be moved to take up the question in a thoroughly earnest spirit. As the state of things now appear, is it not possible that our safety on any unforeseen contingency might drift into an helplessness, certainly not so bad as has appeared in the affairs of Egypt for the last few

years, but nevertheless such as may cause great anxiety. Where is the man in India who can pronounce a confident opinion as regards its safety as influenced by the numerous unknown complications which have ensued from the favorable and unfavorable aspirations, traditions, and prejudices of the various powerful nations of the West and the East? What sagacious politician in India will refuse to believe that such difficulties as those in Egypt, on our own frontiers, and those connected with some of the European and Asiatic States may one day endanger the peace of India!—
15th February, 1885.

We feel greatly interested in the concise account given by Lord Randolph Churchill of his recent tour in India, and have, therefore, great pleasure in producing it below. We are specially gratified to publish it for the edification of our readers, as it is singularly truthful, unsensational and modest. What amount of harm is done to India when some of those who visit it give an exaggerated and unsympathetic account of Indian affairs! Young India ought not to be too fond of such feeling accounts, because the real wants and necessities of India are concealed under the ludicrous and sensational pictures sought to be portrayed by those who, though exceedingly well-meaning, are incapable of controlling their temper and judgment when they hear that affairs in India do not improve and progress as fast as they do in America or England. What a simple and quiet account did our good and noble Lord give to his interviewers about what he saw in India, which ought to have had a wonderful effect on those personages who probably desired to report some startling stories as emanating from him, for did they not know what high-pitched things were lately narrated in the London periodicals? Lord Randolph frankly stated that, considering the present political crisis in India, he would refrain from laying much stress on the conditions in vogue there. He wondered, and very rightly too, that a large number of politicians of England did not visit India and study public questions on the very grand scale which our country so well afforded. We expect immense good to India if his Lordship's suggestion were adopted by his brother noblemen and the members of Parliament, who consider that the clysium of the Earth is comprised only in the tight British Isles. The Reporters must have been amazed to know from the noble Lord that he did not find any pinching starvation or poverty among.

the peasantry in India, and that the recent railway extensions in the Bombay Presidency must render any widespread famine in the Deccan impossible. We would rather now allow the account we have spoken of to narrate the results of Lord Randolph's memorable and extensive journey in India, which we may be permitted to hope his Lordship will fully record in a suitable volume, which, further, we may be allowed to hope, he may present to India in return for what interest it may have roused in his mind while touring through its principal districts :—

Lord Randolph Churchill arrived in London on the 7th instant. A representative of the Press Association had an interview with his Lordship on the 8th instant and obtained from him an account of his extended tour in India. His Lordship said that in view of the Russian advance in Afghanistan, which naturally excited so much anxiety in the public mind, he felt reluctant to enter fully at present into his impressions of the political opinions and condition of our Indian fellow-subjects. The same question as to Afghanistan was now uppermost in the minds of all Indians who took any degree of interest in politics, and for the time had quite superseded in their attention all local controversies or discussions about local self government and other matters of that kind. Their attitude towards the frontier question could scarcely be described as one of anxiety, but rather as one of intelligent curiosity as to the eventful result of the communications now passing between Great Britain and Russia on the subject. In reply to further questions, his lordship proceeded : "I have been absent from England 125 days, and find that I have travelled no less than 22,800 miles, showing how much can be accomplished in the present day within a very short period. Throughout my whole tour I was received with the utmost hospitality and kindness on every hand. I derived from various sources very much information that I could not otherwise have obtained about our Indian Empire, and what I have learned naturally stimulated my interest in its welfare ; but after a comparatively short and hurried tour I do not feel quite warranted in at once giving any positive opinion as to its present condition, progress, or future prospects. I think, however, that people in this country have very little real idea of the extraordinary attractiveness of Indian travel, and the great importance of the interests involved. It is now a matter of intense surprise to me that a far larger number of our fellow-countrymen, especially those of them who are active politicians, do not visit our great Empire in

the East, all political problems in India being solved on such an enormous scale, that a study of them on the spot cannot but open the minds and enlarge the ideas of visitors. Lord Salisbury has said that, if we would understand the Russian question, we should study it on large maps, and everything in India is on so vast a scale that political questions may be studied there as upon a large map. The people of India feel it a disadvantage that there is such a tremendous gap between them and the British public, everything which concerns them has to filter to us through so many officials and by means of the formalities of a Government bureau, that their natural views and feelings are never put quite fully or fairly before the people of Great Britain, and they are, therefore, very glad to welcome any politician to whom they can talk freely upon subjects which chiefly affect them." Asked for an account of his route, Lord Randolph said: "I went from Bombay to Poona, and travelled thence to the very interesting old state of Beejapore, in the Southern Mahratta Country, thence to Bombay. I next journeyed to Indore, and stayed there with Sir Lepel Griffin, with whom I had an opportunity of visiting the important military cantonments of Mhow. At Indore I saw the Maharajah Holkar and his court. From that point I accompanied Sir Lepel to Gwalior, where I met the Maharajah Scindia, when I had an opportunity of seeing his Highness's army. There were 7,000 men on parade, and speaking as a civilian, without professing much military knowledge, I should say that their drill and manœuvring was equal to almost any British force. But they are only armed with the old "Brown Bess." It may equally be said of almost all the native troops in the various States that for modern military purposes they are practically unarmed. The account which Sir Lepel Griffin gives, in this morning's *Times*, of the armies in the Native States of India is most faithful and accurate. From Gwalior I went to Lucknow, and thence enjoyed a fortnight's expedition into the Feraï, on the borders of Oudh and Nepaul, where we had some good shooting and killed a fine tiger, as well as some other wild game. I had also an opportunity of seeing the country and visiting many of the villages, taking care here as well as at other points, to observe for myself and to ascertain the condition of the peasantry." In reply to a question as to where he had noticed much misery amongst the common people, his lordship said: "No, I did not see any startling evidence of starvation or deep poverty, although in the British portion of the Deccan there was evidently a good deal of agricul-

rural distress owing to the absence of rain and the failure of the crops for several years. But the Government seem to be treating the people there with great consideration in the way of remitting burdens and otherwise helping them to overcome times of trouble. The efforts of the Bombay Government during the last few years, under Sir James Fergusson, to extend the railway system over the Deccan have, I believe, entirely obviated the danger of any great famine in that district for the future. There may be scarcity from time to time, but no probability of another famine upon any serious scale." Resuming the narrative of his journey, his lordship said: "From the Terai I returned to Lucknow, and there by the kindness of General Dillon I saw some of the native regiments, including the 15th Sikhs, a magnificent regiment now in the Soudan. From Lucknow I travelled to Calcutta, where I stayed a week, and had the advantage of making the acquaintance of most of the leading officials as well as of many of the principal native gentlemen, many of whom I found to take a great interest in British politics. Here, as in the other large towns, I found the intelligent natives to be equal to any Europeans in information, extent of reading, and public spirit. From Calcutta I went to Allahabad, where I was the guest of Sir Alfred Lyall, and met General Sir Frederick Roberts. I next visited the Native States of Rewah, and there enjoyed some more sport. The prince there is a minor, and his State is being administered by the British during his minority. From Rewah I went to the sacred city of Benares, where I had the honour of being the guest of the Maharajah. My next point was Delhi, from which I went to Agra, thence to Jeypore, and next to Baroda. The Gaekwar of Baroda is as fine a specimen of a native ruler as one could desire to meet. He is quite a young man, I think only 22 or 23 years of age; but is intelligent, firm, discreet, and shows an intense desire to promote the welfare of the general body of his subjects. There is nothing in the way of representative government; indeed, the Gaekwar himself manages the whole affairs of his State, assisted by a council of native ministers chosen by himself. Although the ruler is himself a Hindu, his Prime Minister is a Mahomedan. Both of them speak English perfectly well, and, indeed, the knowledge of English among the leading natives is very general and remarkable. From Baroda I went to Hyderabad, and remained there a week, spending a couple of days in camp with the Nizam on a sporting expedition. A large tract of jungle was beat towards us, in the usual way,

by a number of beaters on foot, but the tiger was not at home. Although we had little sport, the life in camp was exceedingly pleasant and luxurious. When in Hyderabad, I saw all the sights of the city, and made the acquaintance of the ministers. In many respects the State of Hyderabad seems to possess a more advanced and enlightened government than any of the other Native States. Its present Prime Minister, the Nawab Salar Jung, has surrounded himself with a body of very excellent colleagues, principally Mahomedans from the north. The Nawab is actually carrying out the great reforms initiated by his father, and in these he is well supported by the Nizam. If he is properly supported by the British authorities, I think the State of Hyderabad will be fully as well governed as any part of India. From Hyderabad I returned to Bombay, which I left on the 20th of March on the homeward journey." When asked which of the Indian cities struck him as most characteristic, Lord Randolph replied that he thought Hyderabad was the most thoroughly Indian in all its features and surroundings, adding that many of the large towns in the north-west were getting more and more Europeanised.

His Lordship, who was somewhat tanned by the Indian sun, states that he is in excellent health, and thoroughly enjoyed his tour from beginning to end. By means of private correspondence and newspapers he has been able to keep himself fully informed as to the progress of political affairs in England during his absence.—*10th May, 1885.*

THE civilized world must be wondering at the recent change effected in the Government of England. It is unique of its kind as formed by Lord Salisbury, and as permitted by the Premier and his Cabinet under suspension, according to the wishes of our August sovereign. It is a wonder to find how easily the Opposition side has gained the day, and with what readiness the Government, which was only a moment ago considered all-powerful, have been smashed by their opponents. It is not that that Grand Old Man being very aged and over-tired himself has sought his own expulsion from office : the whole Ministry of the Liberals professing to be the favourites of the majority of the people of England have walked out, and for the time being the Whigs and the Radicals are defunct as active members of the Government of England. You may say that just now the Tories have absorbed them and have appeared to be possessed of the soul

The Change in
Government and Lord
Randolph Churchill.

of Englanders ! Such a change is startling, especially as it is not at the hustings that the fate of the Radicals has been decided, while the Tories have not yet been proclaimed masters by the electorates of Great Britain. The Gladstonians, therefore, cannot be said to have been as pointedly defeated as the Disraelites were after the great Midlothian campaigns. The dissolution of the Parliament has not yet taken place, and the national votes as to what Government will be accepted by the nation will only be taken a few months hence. Thus the majority of the House of Commons which came in with Mr. Gladstone after the defeat of the late Lord Beaconsfield, are yet intact. We, therefore, consider that the Liberal Government have been placed under suspension with the cognizance of the nation and the sovereign. The Conservatives have to rule with the tacit approval of the Liberals, who, finding the Government too hot for them, have, as it were, sought a sort of compromise with the party in Opposition. They have thus got out of hot water and have succeeded in plunging the Conservatives into the most trying position, while the nation have shown signs of mistrust and disaffection towards the party led by Mr. Gladstone. They have managed to bring the state of affairs in some doubtful and anxious position, which may or may not eventually end in everything that is right and proper, but which the genius of the people of England has begun to strongly disapprove of. The premier must no doubt be thinking that affairs are now what they should be, and that they are only in the way of being properly adjusted, but that his supporters have grown weary of constantly propping him up ! He might, therefore, very well attempt to punish the receders by getting his party to throw up the reins of Government just at a time when the nation is most anxious to know the results of the foreign policy of the statesman whom they once so unreservedly adored. This is of course our own view, which we take of the situation. Probably Mr Gladstone may have apprehended evil results as issuing from the best he had attempted, and it would be quite right for him not to persist in the course of policy he has strenuously followed. He would wish in the interests of the nation to permit a change of treatment and watch the course of affairs for the next election. If everything went right and the Conservatives were returned, he might either seek repose, or reclothe his Liberals for again bringing the nation to his own ideal. If the Conservatives did not effect a successful administration by the time the reformed elections were complete, he would be ready to step into office

again for a short time, if only to demonstrate that Grand Old England's heart beat for no miserable creatures, but only for the magnificent Liberals ! Thus he might aspire after securing a long term for them after being tested by trials and difficulties. Let the Liberals only live till he lives—and then the deluge.

It is astonishing that the Conservatives have taken office without being called to do so by the nation. May we say that this event, however unusual, will serve to give us some guarantee as to the interests of our own empire—not to mention others which certainly perpetually influence ours. We may say just now—we do not care for the Liberals, the Radicals, or the Conservatives. If grave doubts have arisen how our frontier affairs would end ; how our own vigorous Viceroy's consummate policy might be dealt with in the absence of any change in the Government, then the accession of the new personnel is a decided gain to us. This much is true that the Russian Government will no more continue the interested protraction of affairs which they have attempted with a Liberal Government. They will not be permitted to break promises and engagements, and find out some loop-hole by which to pounce upon other people's territories to the detriment of this country. However lofty the sense of justice as owned by Mr. Gladstone, we fear he failed in estimating its due proportion in relation to Indo-Afghan affairs, the consequence being that the Czar's Government have been naturally emboldened to extend their influence so far that a dread of their might may be established in India—which, of course, is a most unwelcome thing which neither Earl Dufferin nor those having a solid experience of an Oriental country have for a moment desired. As regards Egypt, the popular opinion seems to be adverse to the conduct observed by the Liberal Government. Any such uncertainty or complication in Indian affairs would have probably created a much greater sensation.

Whatever some English journals may say as to the inexperience and impetuosity of Lord Randolph Churchill, he has instinctively adopted the right course in viewing, as he has done, the line of conduct observed by the Russian Government. We are amused at the efforts of some of the London journalists in predicting that evil might come from his discharge of the high office of the Indian Secretary at the present serious juncture, while they base their apprehensions on one of his Opposition speeches, in which he has made a very spirited attack on the Russian Government and their supposed abettors. We do not believe that Lord Churchill, as

Secretary of State, is the same statesman who had inveighed against the late Government. He is a very bold, effective and intrepid speaker ; as a party man he would be a formidable instrument to deal with. When he has the field of controversy to himself, he can be an uncompromising and a very bitter debater. He is a merciless exposé of faction-faults. But we refuse to believe that when once he has found the responsibilities of office fastened on him, he would be the same free lancer as he has been as an independent member in the House of Commons. In the practical concerns of administration, his Lordship may be found as profound and as wary and cautious as any practical statesman of the opposite bench. We have seen with what deliberate tact and caution he conducted himself in India, and how sensibly, wisely, and intuitively he replied to the vital questions put to him on his return from India. The replies he gave elicited the admiration of all elderly India, who know the sort of stuff which carries muster with the ignorant part of the public of India and England, as emanating from some of those specious sentimentalists whose noble efforts India cannot ignore, however raw or misguided they may be. When we had not for a moment supposed any possibility of Lord Randolph accepting our Viceriship, it struck us from his demeanor in India and the scope and character of his travels in our country, that he was rather misrepresented in England. We fail to find weight in the utterance of the *Pall Mall Gazette*, that his Lordship lacks any of the essential qualities which are needed for the administration of the Indian Empire. It is deplorable to find how loosely such assertions are made in England. If Lord Randolph is so useless for the high office he now occupies, how many noblemen who have held office before him could be said to have even been worse than him ? There have been many indeed, a little better than mediocres and time-servers, of less experience of the Houses of Parliament, and completely ignorant of the state of the countries whose affairs they have administered. In Lord Randolph we have a man who has been in the House of Commons for over a decade. He is possessed of healthy, vigorous, straight-forward and ready instincts, and is an orator of a high stamp and a forward school ; one who loves India, and who has with commendable exertions seen this vast country for himself. Whatever his party predilections, his instincts for official life are just what we need ; what our own capable Viceroy may be badly in want of. While in India, the noble lord scrupulously and consistently, from beginning to end, refrained

from uttering a single word or taking a single step which would compromise or even embarrass the authority of the land. And yet he was then one of the most forward and the most influential members of the Opposition, who might have, if he was so disposed, cast India into a ferment of agitation.—*12th July, 1885.*

No one will disapprove of our referring, in general terms, to the various railway incidents which give rise to unpleasantness between Europeans and Natives, first in very limited circles, and then throughout the world by the means of newspaper agitation. From individual grievances the circumstance fast grows into a political and racial question. There are, of course, warring partizans to be found in the Press, and as soon as a spark is ignited, the two inimical sides are formed for a hot contest. It is to be much doubted if permanent peace and good-will result from these wars of passions and prejudices, for any time some untoward incident occurring, the same furious agitation disturbs the public, deepening perhaps more the certain amount of estrangement now existing between the rulers and the ruled.

We hope and trust that we may soon see the time when the European and Native communities will travel together peacefully. While we say this, we are cognizant of the facts that a humane desire exists in large numbers of both Natives and Europeans to yield to mutual convenience and comfort, and that in but very few cases the latent racial prejudices existing accidentally grow into a quarrel which may be compared to something similar to a donkey forced into a tiger's skin ! There is no doubt that the timely interference of Government, whatever its actual effects be in individual instances, helps towards the formation of an healthy public opinion in both communities.

We might as well make our meaning clear by adducing some illustrations. We say that European prejudices against travelling in the same carriage with Natives should decrease, for many mistakes are made by our European brethren by not freely associating with the natives. The toleration of the latter, as a class, towards their much humbler brethren is imitable, in that a Merchant will permit his Mehta to sit with him, or that a Sowcar will think nothing demeaning in travelling in a third class carriage with a host of very inferior persons. European and native

officers with full conscience, good sense, and generosity, will now and anon look into a third class carriage, if only for the purpose of obtaining information about the social and material lives passed by the lower, but highly useful classes of the commonwealth, or about the effects produced in the populace by various administrative measures.

What is a European to do, however, if he finds the only first class compartment occupied by no usually decent native, but one who may appear repulsive, both in his clothing and in his manners ? It would be best to consult the law of the land on the subject. Such a person comes within its measurable distance, and the Railway Company is the authority to apply civil compulsion with the legal guarantee to back them up. But a large-minded European, who has probably much weightier things to engage his mind during the leisure which travel affords, will probably walk into any compartment and avoid delay and provocation. He can take an action of this sort as well as prudent natives would do in the opposite case of the only compartment occupied by European rowdies, revelling in cigars and brandy, and emitting smells not certainly less strong than that of an ill-mannered Hindu, Parsi, or Mahomedan. When a patient—whether a male or female—is in urgent need of rest, and the fact is duly made known, we cannot conceive of one person among a hundred Europeans or Natives, who would grudge to yield. Supposing a Governor or a Prince travels *incognito* in his own territories, and finds in the only first class carriage a husband and his wife. will he force them to separate, or directly repair to another carriage ? He is likely to do the latter.

In all cases of disputes between railway passengers, the railway authorities of a station ought henceforth to be able to settle the disputes themselves. The laws of right and propriety have both to go hand in hand on the railway platform, or in the train. We are of opinion that no unseemly racial disputes ought to occur which would necessitate action from the highest quarters of the Government. The railway companies would do well to instruct their officials to deal with such disputes in a firm, cordial and impartial manner, deciding questions of rights and courtesy in a way which would satisfy all parties. Whether the parties are European or Native grandees on the one side, and uninflucntial Natives or Europeans on the other, the railway authorities in charge are the proper men to settle such disputes in the light of law and reason. If the law or any clear reasonable course is allowed to be violated by the responsible railway

official, he is amenable to suitable punishment. If any party, whether a European or a Native, has suffered inconvenience or in reputation, he has his remedy in law against the offending party and the responsible man abetting him. When Government have done all they could in warning their own servants, that if they be wanting in consideration towards the weak, that consideration should be unfailingly shown them, we submit Government does all that is expected of it. The relations which arise in public travelling have thus been made clear. In all such cases hereafter, the law must be allowed to take its course, and the law must be vindicated and explained by the responsible servants when they have to deal with disputes between passengers. If they do not fail in their duty, there is no reason why such comparatively little matters should in future engross the very valuable time of the Government. If legal remedies are well understood, and the law is properly enforced by the railway companies, there will be no need for severe *departmental* action being taken by the Government. The worst necessity that may be felt in future would be for a further legal provision in the Railway Act, rendering a refusal to submit to the specified legal orders of a duly appointed railway authority punishable in a Court of Law. We shall then effectually remove most of the railway rati al contentions from the bitter region of newspaper sentimentalism and extra-judicial remedies. We beg that the contemporaries of the day on both sides may ponder over the view here taken of the present agitation.—30th August, 1885.

We have read the appeal sent from India to the Electors of Great Britain with great pleasure and interest. It will
 India's Appeal to the British Electors. always remain as an important document remarkable for its moderate, conciliatory and comprehensive spirit. If there be any possibility of the British Electorates being influenced by solitary leaflets and speeches to pay serious attention to vital questions concerning the Queen's Eastern Empire, this appeal may have that effect, though we may differ from some of the less important views contained therein. The document is one sufficient to arrest our attention and require more than a passing reflection.

The first passage ably delineates the conditions in which the British found themselves possessed of India and the germs of the bright future for India which accompanied that possession. "Though we are one-sixth of

"the human race and are bound to you by kith and kin and by all that is sacred and true, we have no voice in the affairs of our own country." And accordingly the Electors are asked to support only those candidates for the next Parliament who can assure them that they will have justice done to India. Before the British took India "our future was most uncertain," which is nearly true. But to say that we had then "national traditions of civil freedom" is hardly as much correct. We loved to be possessed of those traditions which the internal dissensions did not permit, but which the imperial light generated from the combined forces of the West and the East are now in a fair way of granting to India.

We like it to be said as it runs in the second passage, that "our well being is so indissolubly united with your own:" one of those accurate sentiments which we have sought to insert into the mind of native India for a quarter of a century. The most elevated points of both England and India must meet on the same level. We are instructed to have it so by the cardinal principles of the Crown ever acting on recurring intervals to set right the narrow monopolies which interfered with the purely benign foundations of British intervention and supremacy—whether those monopolies referred to the public trade, the services, or vitiated the highest trusts or the state and political life and integrity, enjoyed by the native chiefs. None of these reformed strides were, however, accomplished without the Crown and the Parliament having themselves taken the initiative as inspired by the acts and intentions of statesmen not different from those who now form the crowning points of the British sceptre—whether serving in India or England; whether of one party or another. Through these saint-like personages we are now enabled to make our way towards the noble soul of Great Britain centred in the hands of their honorable electors. We thank the Bombay Presidency Association primarily, and the rest of the principal Associations in India, for making this courageous and historical move.

The third passage portrays the dawn which now slowly breaks upon us to illustrate the prime danger against which India and England have to make an efficient provision as a united nation; otherwise their fate would be doomed. It is in no uncertain tone in which the necessity at least for this provision is indicated, and we quote this passage entire with the satisfaction which we must feel in observing that the paramount duty on

which we have again and again insisted is at last realized by native India.—

“The present is a most opportune moment for thus taking stock of the results which have been achieved in the past. More vividly than on any previous occasion, the value of the connection which subsists between the two countries has been forced upon your attention by recent events. India forms the pivot round which moves the entire imperial or foreign policy of England. Your interests in the fortunes of Central Asia, in Turkey, in Egypt, in the Soudan, in South Africa, in distant China, all centre round your care for the possession of this country. For the first time your insulation which had often been regarded as justifying indifference to the movements of the great European powers, has ceased to exist, and some of those powers have extended the limits of their possessions with a close vicinity to your Indian frontiers. How to safeguard your interests is the question of the hour, which you are called upon to decide in a way worthy of your place among nations. Indian topics will form the chief planks of your political platform, on which in a thousand places those who lead and form public opinion will address you when they seek your votes. Your constituencies have been by recent legislation increased in numbers and strength, and now, more than ever before, the great mass of the working classes in town and country will realize both their powers and responsibilities. These special considerations encourage us to hope that the work, so nobly undertaken in the past, will be continued by you in the present with a full sense of the sacred trust laid upon you. No new principles have to be laid down. Your work will chiefly be to enforce the principles that have been repeatedly declared by our Gracious Sovereign and Parliament as binding upon your servants here in their administration of his great empire.

The only misfortune is that the fact that foreign powers of very doubtful motives and humanity having sought to outstrip India in dread- ed strength has been recognized by Bombay and general India as late as the electors of Great Britain have done for themselves.

We heartily welcome such expressions as these—‘Mind the attacks from abroad’ ‘Mind the absence of reserves in men and means wanted to meet outside attacks.’ We find these in the fourth passage along with the other wants and grievances of India. The suggestion for a complete permanent settlement of land revenues is not quite happy nor about the industrial development being in foreign hands. The extravagance of the cost of Home charges and the public services, the present utter demartialization of all peoples and states, the unchecked devastating famines, the grossly defective government councils are the right points to put into the ears of the millions of electors. But it is not quite appropriate to say that “the taxes are trenching upon the margin of subsistence.” It would be quite right to say that many of the ablest classes of the Indian populations, European and Native, trench upon the margin of subsistence of the Government and the poor people. Again, we need not infer that we are

trenching upon the margin of subsistence of the poorer classes by an imaginary equalization of the rates of taxation payable by the poor and the rich. It has taken very long for India to adopt scientific, economic and beneficial methods of taxation, and we fear we shall still take more time in carrying the country with us in boldly maintaining the maximum of taxation and all the equitable taxes which must be borne, and not forsaken as now, for the sake of our best and most vital concerns. When shall we have our Associations to consider these problems in their full and fair light—a measure by the means of which we should be able to get the public debt reduced, and the strength of the empire in men and money increased? If it is in the power of the British electors to compel the Parliament to introduce a new era of reforms in India, it is no less the duty of our public men to assist the Government actively in devising the measures, in which their co-operation is indispensable, but is at present so much deficient. What is wanting in India itself cannot be much repaired by moving England.

The fifth passage refers to what is considered as an imperative obligation of those who may be returned for the next Parliament, *i.e.*, they must insist on a Commission of Inquiry being appointed to ascertain the abuses prevalent in India, and what would be the best remedies in pursuance of the proposition recently brought forward by Lord Randolph Churchill, the Secretary of State for India. Very much will depend on the basis supplied to such a Commission to work upon and the character of the Commission adopted. We have our own propositions to bring forward on this important question, which we shall gladly do when the time comes.

In para. sixth we find it strongly maintained that “the temptation or policy to resist aggressions by meeting the enemy far away from our frontiers being dazzling with the magnificence of its ambition should be resisted,” and that the already impoverished resources of the country should not be burdened with the extra expenditure of two or three millions annually. We welcome again expressions such as these—‘make India self-sustaining’—‘don’t let it become the sport of the policy of the foreign nations’—‘create national reserves out of the armies of Native States’—‘take Indian Princes into complete confidence.’ But for these ideas being taken up so late, we should not have been put in the present dilemma. whether to send a “robust protest” against the proposed additional expenditure, or be quietly subject to the essential extra expenditure which we may find India charged with to our grief and dismay.

The appeal-makers are in error in confounding two important questions together, which they have done terrified by the new expenditure intended to be imposed on the country. Whether India's defences should include Afghanistan or not, should be decided on its own merits : let the cost of it, however heavy, remain a matter to be separately dealt with. Both the Premier and the Secretary of State have arrived at the only sound conclusion which is possible to arrive at in the matter. We have over and over again demonstrated the fact, that if we allow Afghanistan to fall into the hands of the Enemy now posted at our Gate, we might as well leave the whole of the North-west of India to him, and that to lose Afghanistan is to sacrifice half the defences of India. It is a grave blunder to treat Afghanistan as England would treat France. If Afghanistan is not to be defended along with India, the Indian Associations would be perfectly right in protesting against the additional expenditure proposed, for in that case there would hardly be any necessity for increasing the military strength of India so much as now proposed. It is a remarkable coincidence that both the great and opposed parties in England have practically arrived at the same conclusion which we have insisted upon for years together, that Russia cannot menace Herat without doing injury to India. Has not the most Radical of the Ministers—Mr. Gladstone—exerted with all his might to arrest the progress of Russia at Penjdeh and Zulficar ? What did his preparations mean if both Afghanistan and India were not threatened by the Russian advance a little short of Herat ? It is surely no “dazzling magnificence” which has affected the statesmen who have held that Afghanistan should be kept intact ; for they have been influenced by practical considerations of the most serious import. If we have anything to do with the Afghans, they must either be our friends or foes. If they are retained as our friends, they would like us much better than the vulgar and the covetous Russians. If they are once allowed to get under the iron heels of Russia, these wolves will be stimulated to join with the bear to plunder and ravage India when a serious and general war broke out. Our public men must understand that we have not yet obtained the normal efficacy of our military strength and expenditure. Though we have been unable to get the immoralities of this expenditure checked and to insist upon our mother-country bearing a fair share in our external and imperial defences as far as these may be necessitated by the aggressions of foreign nations against the Imperial

Suzerain, there are no reasons why the wise, the prudent, and the far-seeing measure so cordially adopted by Earl Dufferin and Lords Salisbury and Randolph, and acquiesced in by Mr. Gladstone and Earl Granville, should not be enforced without a moment's delay. The additional expenditure would not be so disastrous as the ill-visioned timidity which may hereafter dictate the abandonment of the task of reorganizing our friendly Afghanistan and creating an additional force to back up its own strength for resisting the impudent foreign aggression which is now planted at the foot of the Paropamisus Range. The season, when all this should be done, ought not to be spoiled by the inadequate representation we are here noticing, though we applaud the motives dictating it.

Rather insist upon the imperative duty of utilizing the immense forces of the Native States and setting face against the dreaded additional burden talked about. Again, agitate equally strongly about the duty of England to share in the expenses of the imperial defences and suspending the inequitable expenditures incurred here and in England. But because you may not be able to comply with the demand for further expenditure, do not imperil the peace and safety of the empire ; and it would be a national crime of the highest magnitude to find the country failing to become self-acting in its own defence and in that of its neighbour on a general war becoming so complicated that the throats of the mother and the children were found strangled in all directions at one and the same time. If we have been wrong in our fears, show by facts and figures how the British Empire could stand its foes without complying with the modern necessity of keeping up the full military strength, as every Power in the world, except England, has already done.

We, of course, cannot help extremely sympathizing with the enjoinder to the electors—" It also rests with you, as the ultimate source of all "power, to enforce through those whom you will select to represent you " in the coming Parliament, peace, retrenchment, and a wide extension of " native agency generally in the administration as the most just and safest " policy to pursue for the rulers of this country." It is a pity that to such an excellent programme the not less important words of—" Do not fail also to render your Indian Empire strong and inviolate, whatever the disturbances which may agitate Europe or Asia, or whatever be the machinations employed to undo India—" were not added.—*11th October, 1885.*

We have re-published the letters of Sir Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy, Bart.,
 C. S. I., and Mr. Dosabhai Framji, C. S. I., intimat-
 ing to the Bombay Presidency Association their
 resignations of the offices held by them. The Secretaries
 to that Association have, under instructions from the Council, addressed
 a spirited reply to Sir Jamsetjee. The question raised on both sides is of
 no mean significance. We are glad that it has been raised, for the ad-
 vanced natives of India must try and ascertain for themselves what would
 be the most effective method of influencing the British constituencies in
 favor of India, and what mistakes we may be liable to commit in attaining
 that end. It is this issue which Messrs. Mehta, Telang and Dinshaw
 Wacha have raised, and Sir Jamsetjee and Mr. Dosabhai have also indicated
 for the judgment of the public. It is to be regretted that circumstances
 do not seem to have favored a dispassionate and impersonal handling of the
 question. For the position which should be secured to carry on a
 controversy of high political importance, such as the present one is, should
 be altogether free of all minor matters, and so secure and so invulnerable
 that our cause in England may evoke unchallenged sympathies. In basing
 our position, we have to bear in mind a series of elementary facts. In the
 bringing up of India in the Electoral campaigns of England, the ready
 assumption of the mass would be that it was at any rate a very awkward
 intrusion. Educated Indians have not yet established themselves in the
 heart of England as it were, as they have not yet succeeded in going there
 in large numbers, or making themselves heard by the means of a powerful
 journal on the spot for which we have repeatedly made mention in our
 papers. Any constituency to be expected to favor the Indian cause will
 first look to the interests of its own country and those of Great Britain.
 It is most difficult for us to know what those multifarious and conflicting
 interests are, and how any of them could be handled in a manner that
 would win over the voters on our side. The native candidates know
 immeasurably better than ourselves what would easily move the springs of
 those constituencies, while most of our own or the foreign candidates
 would be at sea how to perform the miracle. We may endeavour to adopt a
 perfectly straightforward policy in the cause of Indian interests, but if that
 course of action militates against that of any of the native candidates whose
 programme are likely to be accepted by the constituencies applied to, the
 foreign programme might require a sensible modification. We have to

deal with a difficulty of great magnitude for some time to come, in that not more than one or two natives of India are expected to be accepted. Whereas India require a very large number of its representatives sitting in Parliament, they could only serve India so far that they succeed in endearing themselves to their constituencies. It is England which rules India ; the latter has therefore no voice in moulding the affairs of the former. It must be further understood that none of the native members themselves could have their individual cause predominate over the general instincts of the Parliament. If it be so in the case of European members, much more so will it be as regards our own members. The poor Indian flag can only appear last of all, and even then it has to follow that of the British Jack in whichever direction it may triumph. We cannot just now calculate upon our own independent triumph ; we have to follow the lead of the triumphant party in England. We have somehow or other to be within the folds of that party till we can assert for ourselves. Those who may be deemed our best friends to-day may turn out indifferent ones to-morrow ; if they were incapable of doing this themselves, circumstances may force them to be so. Possibly, also, whom we may consider our foes at one time, we may not grudge to accept as our friends at another. As far as possible for the present, our strength can only be asserted in due proportion to the elements of success which may be existing in our favor. We shall have to meet with failures no doubt, and if such failures ensue even after every precaution is taken and every political sagacity employed, events on our side will rather progress than be retarded.

With these fundamental observations before them, the readers will be better able to comprehend the merits of the question raised in the correspondence under notice. Sir Jamsetjee states that the reason of his resigning the presidentship is that the original laudable and moderate programme, which had his warm sympathy and support, has been departed from by the Association latterly instructing its delegates to hold up certain European gentlemen as fit men to represent India, and certain others as possessing no confidence of our people. The Association replies that this its action is only "an ample development" of the principle adopted by the old Bombay Association in 1870 when the electors of Hackney were addressed for the late Mr. Fawcett. It may be noticed with regret that no full and previous understanding was arrived at between those responsible for the doings of the Association in regard to the desirability

or otherwise of mentioning the candidates for the black list and those for the bright list.

If a particular party is recommended, it would follow that Indian interests were used in the interests of one party in England to the exclusion of another. So says Sir Jamsetjee, but the Association employs the strongest language in disavowing any such intentions. And they further point out that they have used the parties only to advance Indian interests. Now it is most difficult to decide if the Liberals do nothing but pure good to India, and the Conservatives nothing but evil. It is most difficult we say to put the issue between these two more or less debateable points. The Liberals have been very easy and generous in their sentiments, and when a pliable opportunity occurred, they would no doubt concede a popular and far-seeing measure to India. But they would at the same time omit other far-seeing things. If by doing anything it may temporarily prove unpopular to the natives of India, the Liberals would hardly take a step of that sort ; while the Conservatives would. None of the two parties could, however, venture to carry out any policy which would meet with the strong disapproval of the mass of the inhabitants of Great Britain, and which would be a distinct loss to them. The present tendency of the parties in England is to approach towards each other's aims as much as this could be done with individual safety secured. Hence it is that we do not despair of being badly treated either by the Conservatives or the Liberals. Again, it cannot be denied that certain policies are sometimes inaugurated by either of the parties which, though dictated by the best of intentions, give rise, however, to great differences of opinion. Such a position of affairs has barely anything to do with the inherent characteristics of any of the parties. Reflecting upon the characteristics of individuals belonging to either party, we must not lose sight of the fact that a Liberal is sometimes as apt to be a Conservative as a Conservative is apt to be a Liberal. Taking the whole of the Parliamentary forces together, none of them could do very considerable which is special in the Indian interests, and if these interests are to be really advanced they should be potentially represented by India itself. We have thus seen the difficulties of drawing an expressly sharp line between parties and individuals in England which could provide for us a perfectly smooth sailing there. If we had numerous and able native canvassers in England, we should very much like that they exerted in

t. create the Electors themselves to call upon their representatives to the two intelligent views about India as would merit the commendation of a work of its sons. When a correct general feeling of this sort is likely to be much the question of adopting personal names for either of employed if the measure for the Association will hardly come within the its good or evil, are effectively the tone of public men of all shades is originate. When the meaning of the measures and ^{whereas} the delegates will be well any candidates are made plain and forcible, those who may ^{in India, whether they tend to} side of reason and higher obligations are likely to be better dealt ^{than} those who may be found wanting in that appreciation. The Electors are more swayed by persons before them and the manifestoes they lay before them, whether they meant attention or indifference to India. It strikes us, therefore, that our vigor may be employed with skill in an indirect manner to circumvent the influences which may be exercised by those unable to place Indian affairs at the top of their demonstrations. It would be necessary for a long time to come to put forward any pushing ability which we may possess, while it is also needful that we ally that character with considerable diplomatic and political tact. We cannot afford to have our strength too much tested just at present, while we should be advancing a deal more perhaps by employing winning tactics.

In regard to the dispute which has arisen in the Association, we shall watch with interest the result of the delegates acting upon the instructions sent them. If they are men possessed of great judgment, discretion and cool temper, we are sure that they will follow the most successful course which neither Sir Jamsetjee and Mr. Dosabhai nor the other members of the Association will fail to heartily recognize. The public in general would have been more gratified than now if the differences had been smoothed over before they came to their notice. The Association cannot afford but be strong from all sides rejoicing in a perfect general unanimity of principles and views, and in this spirit only can we venture to offer our observations.—25th October 1885.

A very competent authority writes to us from England as below :—

Elections in England *versus*
Indian Affairs.

"We are just now in a state of great excitement about the approaching Election. The Bombay Association has, I think, very unwisely sent some Indian delegates to represent India on the Liberal side, as against the Conservatives, and with instructions to oppose the election of certain gentlemen who have held high office in India. In this matter India should have nothing to do with *party* questions. Her claims and wants may fairly be put forward, but these will receive as much thought from one side as the other, and I know well that many Conservatives are amongst her best friends. As to the Radicals, they are a most selfish, and untrustworthy class, and from them India will never get any real consideration. They have no sympathy or good feelings, and care only for themselves and their own aims and objects. May God protect India and its people from them !!"

It may be remembered that we some time ago dwelt upon the question which the Bombay Association had raised by making an express mention of the British statesmen who should not, in its opinion, be trusted in regard to Indian affairs, and of those who should be. Our able and esteemed correspondent disapproves of the action taken, and whoever may be the party who is returned to power in the present Electoral campaign, we doubt not that the view expressed by our correspondent will receive every weight which it deserves. It must be remembered that he does not disapprove of our primary step in despatching the delegates from India, for he dislikes it only so far that they were sent with the express purpose of running down the Conservatives and applauding the Liberals at the expense of the former, and in regard to their conduct towards India. When we had our say, we rather preferred to discuss impartially the merits of the measure boldly adopted, but we now find that some strong feeling has been excited against it in England. We do not quite prefer the mode of singling out individuals on the sharp line of condemning them as inimical to the interests of India, for we would thus incur the danger of lessening the ranks of those who may be really desirous of doing us good. Unless we have a covenant from a powerful party,—who may, again, have gained a permanent tenure in the government of this Empire—which may secure for all times to come an unmixed liberal government for India, it hardly appears expedient to allow India to fall a prey to any party purpose. And so far we cordially agree with our wise and experienced Censor that we should be wary before letting India be drawn into the vortex of a party warfare. Thus far it will be seen—and we thank our diligent and influential correspondent for affording us a test for our recent reflections—that the tact and skill comprehended by us

as being an unavoidable factor in any measure which India may adopt in bringing forward its cause before the Electors of Great Britain were well suggested under the circumstances. Great Britain itself never becomes the sport of any one party, and India to a certain extent has to follow that policy. We must heartily accept sound friends—to whichever party they may belong—and endeavour to keep them. Though Lord Randolph Churchill forms a powerful portion of the Conservative fabric, it is quite likely that he may do us as great a good as a Canning or an Elphinstone did. Though Lord Ripon is now out of office, he is not the less considerate towards us, as when he was in it. Our correspondent makes use of very firm expressions in reference to the more forward political creation of England—the Radicals. India's share in the councils of one of the greatest empires seems to acquire a significance which cannot be too earnestly considered. We would draw special attention to the concluding portion of the extract, and should have desired a more full treatment of the danger apprehended for India. We are sorry to postpone a fuller consideration of the important questions on which our correspondent has favoured us with his very valuable and suggestive views.—*6th December 1885.*

PART V.

THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION.

"My policy will be guided by those ancient principles upon which the British Empire in India was originally founded, which have ever since been interwoven with its structure and vindicated in turn by each of my illustrious predecessors, namely, a justice which neither prejudice nor self-interest can pervert, an impartiality between all religions and races, which refuses to be irritated by criticism or cajoled by flattery, and a beneficence of intention which seeks to spread abroad amongst the many millions of her Majesty's subject in this country contentment, prosperity, wealth, education, professional advancement, a free scope to municipal institutions, and every other privilege which is compatible with effectual and authoritative Government. (Cheers) In saying this I am not speaking in my own name, nor merely as the head of the Indian administration, I am speaking in the name of the Queen-Empress herself, and not only of the Queen, but of the Parliament and the people of England, who are fully determined that English rule in India shall be so blamelessly and vigorously conducted as to become the crowning glory of our country's history, and that any grievance or wrong which her Majesty's subjects can complain of, whether princes or people, whether native or British-born, shall be examined into, and, so far as the imperfection of all human administration will allow, abated or redressed."—*Speech of the Earl of Dufferin at the Calcutta Trades Association Dinner.*

Administrative and Political Reforms in India. HERE is the watchword and the reply for the British Indian statesman in India. Here is the outcome of the safest wisdom which the ablest autocratic and most benevolent ruler can show in India. It must calm the fears and anxieties of British officials ; it must somewhat calm native politicians as well.

Meanwhile there is no general programme for India. We have the most enthusiastic writings from the pen of Sir Auckland Colvin down to Mr. Malabari in reference to what India wants. The leading men of Bombay have talked eloquently on the necessity of the British Government attending to native representations—such as their newly established Association intend sending them from time to time. Sir T. Madhavrao has at last scented the Russian danger to India, and advocated the very monarchical institution for India, which I fully pointed out many years ago. It is nearly a decade since I first described the constitution necessary for India's safety and prosperity. It was my theory, but a theory as it has been the disconnected links of it have here and there been perceived

by practical people. I repeat there is no feasible programme as yet projected for India.

One solitary Ruler has laid down the policy which for the present can be best pursued in India. On the other hand, we have had any amount of inspiring talk from one end of the country to another. But no public man, no public association, has yet laid the groundwork for future India, on which it may be safe for all to act for half a century at least. Lots of noble ideas and aspirations float on the surface, any amount of sentimental and philosophical dissertations have been put forth. These are Indiaful. What a miserable disproportion of anything tangible is done. The prime cause of this poverty is,—no one has any substantial far seeing programme to act upon. Some give out froth, others repress it. Some are dazzled by the glitter, others shut their eyes to, or refuse to be dazzled by, it. There is such a play of winged insects in sunshine, in rain, in the break of weather, and around the lamp. All that the viceregal lords of the creation can do is partly to be amused at them, partly to be anxious about their safety and right disposal. In the midst of glamour, of exuberant fertility, of excessive cries in chaos and darkness, the programme cannot be found, and much less, if found, it can be acted upon.

The programme can only be framed with the utmost care. It can only be based on the thin but sure outline I have placed at the head of this, as the early light in the Eastern horizon presaging the rise of that Indian Sun which the gifted Indian Secretary, Mr. Mackenzie told us about the other day. The greatest of all difficulties is how to let in the flood of light gradually, and how best to use it.

High sounding, glowing generalizations, and platitudes are of comparatively little worth. Brilliant philosophies will not do much active work. Stray petitions on stray occasions are not of much practical use. The difficulty is to know how to take the castle, following only the peaceful measures, and when taken how to settle down in it—new and old men all on friendly terms, none being driven out, and every one within finding his own occupation.

The best promise for advance and success is whenever the capacity for doing a friendly and profitable business amongst public affairs is shown by us. Take up first of all the revenue and expenditure sides of the country. Let us know if there is one native public man, one native public association who have thoroughly mastered the public finances of the country—its practical ways and means.

Let there be a financial non-official Parliament. No Parliament, in the true sense of the term, will just now be allowed to India. Instead of a ponderous association let there be a financial Parliament founded on self-imposed obligations. Take up the previous budgets, study them thoroughly, compare its facts and figures with the actual internal circumstances from which they may have been drawn, and let each member of that Parliament criticise it and throw out tangible suggestions to improve the revenues and regulate the expenditures. The proceedings of the people's representatives should be published far and wide and sent to the Government.

This is one method which may eventually induce the Government to select from this non-official assembly members of proved merit to join the Executive Council, which may then never think of passing the country's budget without discussing and improving it in a public manner. This will form one of the remedies by which legitimate and wasteful expenditures may be exposed, and the regular and irregular sources of revenue brought into full light. This is one specific manner in which a full knowledge of the conditions, wants and aspirations of the country may be gained—an element in which our public men are so deficient, and hence is properly disregarded by Government. Instead of employing indefinite platitudes and indulging in tall and aimless and enthusiastic and denunciatory talk, go straight to the point, prove yourselves to be business-like men, and show the poor, hardworked, and often annoyed Government of the country that you can indicate a better way of spending your money; that you can find more practical ways of enhancing the prosperity of definite sects of your communities; that you can unobjectionably get more money than the actual administrators can; that you know how the military defences of the Empire are weak; that you know what are the practical ways to strengthen them; that you really understand how the Queen can hold the country at the same time that She formed an impregnable bulwark against all external foes; that you are alive to the fact that there is no chance of the corporate civilization of the country being any day endangered while you constantly babble about the few sons of the soil not getting their due share of the loaves and the fishes. It is no overwhelming patriotic fervour, no gushing enthusiasm, no self-delusive vanities, no words of soothing succour from the Olympian heights, nor pompous texts from great writers, that will prove of much practical worth. O! deluded patriots, cast away

this showiness mistaken for substance, and once for all assume the real, the genuine soul of business.

Every large question should be thoroughly and openly discussed in the people's assembly or the non-official Parliament, before a representation is made to the Government on the subject. As one of the first measures—discuss the eligibility of some high-posted judicial native officer of long standing in the service, or some native officer of great administrative experience to be recommended as an executive member in the Viceregal or a subordinate Government's Council. If this be not practicable just now, induce the Government to promise that certain classes of native officials will be eligible to executive seats in the Council on so many years' approved service.

The public association or the people's Parliament should also press on the Government the necessity of admitting honorary members into the Executive Councils, who should have a right of vote on important matters brought forward for discussion—the nature of which to be previously defined in a specially enacted law. It would be well if these honorary members for the Supreme Executive Council were selected from a list submitted by the Viceroy's Government to the Government at home, which would be duly guided by public discussions held in India.

While an experiment of this sort is put in progress it may be ascertained if very enlightened and extensively elected Boards in large centres are capable of submitting a list of honorary members for the Executive Councils—such as may be decided upon by the Government in the absence of such influential Boards.

It would be impossible for the indigenous elements to associate themselves with the practical work of Government in its highest branches unless they have first proved their capacity for it by working on clear lines by the means of public associations at the centres of Government. First, in such outlying fields they have to demonstrate their aptitude to grapple with every administrative question needing scrutiny, amendment, or development, and to point out the various new beneficial courses which it may be possible to strike out. It is safe for both the country and the Government that the moral and mental faculties of the would-be leaders should be first exercised by practice and discipline before they can be effectively applied to Government.

As every centre of Government in India require an active political

association, so one of this class will be needed in London before we can effectively force improvements in the constitution of the India Office. Not only an Association is required there, but also a powerful constant exponent of native opinion to create an India-party in England. This scheme has been already explained in previous issues. Sure steps ought to be taken to find out capable and independent critics representing native India to procure for them an admission into the India Office with a view to give effect to the discussion and publicity of prominent Indian measures at the Home Board. How soon can India succeed in returning a few practical members to watch and assist the action of the Secretary of State and his Council may depend on the political influence and ability displayed in India. Probably for some time to come a probation in the Executive and Legislative Councils may better fit native members to represent India at its chief office in London. It is thus that a more effectual way than any now existing can be paved for some notable admission into the British Parliament itself. A laborious and definite working of several political associations in India must in itself result in the training of members for the Parliament and the Home Office. What is first needed in every direction is to command the fullest information on every administrative, political and social problem dealt with by the Government, and by discussion and representation convince responsible authorities as to the undoubted methods by which a more popular and, therefore, a more beneficial state of things might ensue. The difficulties in the way of perfecting an impartial and vigorous administration are always great indeed. These are practical factors in the way of all reformers, and it is by sympathizing in these difficulties that we may ultimately succeed in bringing about that radical change in the constitution of the State which, in practice, is likely to turn out superior to the present system. Appeals to mere sense of justice and to the higher obligations due to India from England will not prove as potent as the laying out of actual capacity in all available directions which alone could practically induce amelioration in public affairs. Here a sound basis for telling action may be gained, which a fervour of sentimentalism, however widespread, cannot in itself secure.—*8th February, 1885.*

About half-a-dozen vacancies will shortly occur in that antiquated body which works in London as the 'India Council' controlling the autocratic Viceregal Rule in India. That so many vacancies have partly occurred, and are partly to occur, under the presidency of that young and dashing Reformer, Lord Randolph Churchill, is at any rate an event which presumably should place considerable new influence in his Lordship's hands, if that influence can be used while he is at the India Office to renovate its constitution in the interests of representative India. We are not inclined, as moral and intellectual India is now situated, to condemn wholesale either the personnel, or the conduct and procedures of that august office as affecting the ordinary interests of India. It would be presumptuous to deny the ability and integrity of the supreme men of wisdom who control the actions of the Indian autocrats. That each and all have not been doing their best, striving to keep the wheels of the administrative machinery at a moderate, calculated and unfrictionable pace, would be sheer stupidity to deny. That they have from time to time generated a restraining force behind rapid and unheeding strides performed in India cannot also be denied. That they have, on the other hand, on many occasions, responded to the broad and generous instincts displayed by Indian consuls, cannot also be overlooked. It is fashionable to call our great sages an antiquated body, and yet they have had to exercise responsible functions as between the Crown and the Parliament and our Indian dependency. We do not know what India and England would have done had not this institution—the supreme arbiter of destinies—come into existence to receive and respond to the multifarious, complex, self-troublesome echoes from India. While Great Britain sent dashing and enterprising ruling agents in India she placed them under the supple thumb of her many sons who had themselves returned from India, tempered by trials and mollified by precious experience. They have at any time occupied the position of a lofty sentinel placed on a distant eminence, which could take at any critical period a sweeping broad bird's eye view of the poor struggling creatures below. Their aged golden vision, freed of all passion and dross, must have often pierced into the apparently unbounded region of apprehensions, suspicions, and knotty problems, tying up at times the many unmanageable and chaotic elements ruffling the Indian surface that they have generally commanded in tolerant omni-

The India Council
and its vacancies

potence. True that the body is always possessed of a good amount of callous wisdom, which, however, has also been disinfected by the fresh and vigorous crowning spirit that has invariably supervised this weighty institution. The Indian sages have to a certain extent served the purpose of Indian representatives, without whose knowledge and experience any Indian Secretary in England would have been a ship without its chain-cable. If that were so, a Parliament directly dealing with Indian affairs would be a most meaningless and unwieldy instrument for any practical use. When, therefore, we come to say, 'Sweep off the India Council as an useless encumbrance,' we are brought face to face with doubts and difficulties of no ordinary sort. The conclusion we arrive at is: it is impracticable for the present to abolish it; we cannot easily abolish it; nor should we do so till at least we actually found something better to take its place. There is any amount of room, no doubt, to amend it, to amplify it, to re-energize it, and to make it more practically representative for improving the resources of India and placing it on a path tending to make it national and strong and more truly federated to the Queen's Empire, so as to effectually and independently punish the wanton aggressions of its great semi-Asiatic foe who makes unwarranted and stealthy advances with the base object of plunging it in anarchy. If these large objects are to be attained—and these are the really grave patriotic objects which ought to constantly move every patriot in India—all we have to do is not to give up wholly the Grand Old Institution which has hitherto served our aims—however deficiently. The old foundations are true and stable, and on them let us refit our renovated superstructure. No politician, however ardent and radical, can earnestly say: "Do away with the India Council, limb and body." We do not doubt that the conclusion which Lord Randolph may have arrived at even so early as now cannot be differing much from the one we have here expressed in general terms.

It is on lines like the above that our considerations in reference to the India Council question are likely to take, and these lines must come into prominence, while the tendency of public opinion in London seems a little too stringent than the actual conditions and circumstances call for. On this point we shall quote a well-informed writer from London in one of our daily contemporaries:—

"The fact that Lord Randolph Churchill not long ago,

vision of greater freedom

and legislative assemblies of India in due proportions, while it should have its own executive members and officers from the ranks of practical native philanthropists from India. We shall thus gather in England some respectable and reliable material through which to give an effective representation to the wants and grievances of the country at large. Not only a more telling representation could be secured in India itself in its various governments, but a better and final scope may be given to Independent India to obtain open-door discussions and decisions in England itself, where the British Parliament is too ponderous and lofty to move for every detail of the Indian administration. According to the original measures suggested by the present writer from time to time, the actual edifice will be worked up from no illusory but practical foundations, right up to its crown. We can have no effective voice in the Grand Old Parliament unless we strenuously worked up from small and modest beginnings, some of which we have tried to fasten on the public mind by issuing special works. The provincial and chief administrative assemblies of a practical popular character have yet to be organized. ~~Unknown to~~ in stating that Lord Randolph has great opportunities in his hands to remodel of his great office on the lines we have here humbly ventured to constitution. If His Lordship wishes it he will not only be able to secure unique indigenous material from India, but can also lay hold of a more vigorous and modern set of Anglo Indians now in England, as above shown, to impart a fresh and wholesome strength, of a public pattern, to that ultimate body of our governors who can make or unmake this vast country — *9th August, 1885.*

THE new Secretary of State for India must have caused an agreeable surprise to those not fully acquainted with him, by his late masterly exposition of the financial condition of India, and as this most difficult and most complicated task can yield to an oratorical attempt of a couple of hours. The speech which he delivered on the 6th of the last month after the House of Commons went into Committee, went out of the beaten path, and will long be remembered for its liberal and vigorous tone, and for the statesmanlike grasp with which many questions were handled. Considering the unusual ability possessed by Lord Randolph Churchill, we do not for a moment doubt that the public in general will soon learn to appreciate the cautious and sagacious spirit which his Lordship is able to show on an

emergent occasion. This being so true of him, we should have wished him to have steered clear of personal observations made against the late Viceroy of India. We do not for a moment desire that even the idol of the articulate people in India should be screened from the consequences of neglecting a policy of the first importance to India. But if we desired to consign the administration of a good ruler to obscurity, we have to be put upon our guard in observing that no more personal ill-fame is fastened upon him than the circumstances of overpowering party influences and their culmination would legitimately allow. The necessity for stimulating native loyalty has been felt imperative for many years in India; and if Lord Ripon, in the short tenure of his office, succeeded in achieving this object, the public in India will naturally desire that no personal odium may be attached to his name. Perhaps Lord Randolph, overwhelmed with his present responsibilities, could hardly take sufficient care in employing that discrimination which would have separated Lord Ripon in person, from Lord Ripon as the agent of the Liberal party which had just returned to power. Though an objection exists so far in respect of the condemnation employed by Lord Randolph against Lord Ripon, it would be a sad day for India when politicians here, or in England, are deterred from a most searching exposition of the extremely faulty system of government which certainly damages this great dependency. The speech under notice has the high merit which should be attached to a fearless exposition of the grave disabilities of certain administrative measures in India. But let us look into the speech itself somewhat more closely.

A surplus of £319,000 was estimated in the budget of 1884-85, but the revised estimate showing a revenue of £69,992,000, and an expenditure of £70,702,000, converted this surplus into a deficit of £710,000. The falling off was due to less railway receipts and the depression of trade, which has affected all other countries besides ours. It appears that the wheat and rice exports have fallen off—a fact which ought to stimulate our landlords and the general public to procure the abolition of the export duty on rice under befitting conditions. The increase in the receipts stood thus :—

	£					
Opium	256,000
Excise	217,000
Irrigation	116,000
Other sources	200,000

The increase in the expenditures of the year was as under —

	£
Excess cost of production and manufacture of opium	593,000
Political charges especially on account of the Boundary Commission	167,000
Interest on debt including £154,000 for discount on the £3,000,000 3 per cent London loan of last year	242,000

But reductions were also made in the expenditures as the following items will show —

	£
Army	126,000
Reduction of loss by exchange	285,000
Working expenses of the railways	139,000

We now come to Sir Auckland Colvin's Budget for the current year as dealt with by the Secretary of State. The revenue is estimated at £72,090,000, and the expenditure at £71,582,000, leaving an estimated surplus of £508,000. Sir Auckland has estimated the revenue higher than last year by £2,098,000, the details of increase being worked out as below —

	£
Land Revenue	788,000
Railway Receipts	929,000
Opium Receipts	176,000
Customs	145,000
Salt Stamps Excise and other receipts	307,000

The irrigation expenses being taken less by £167,000, Sir Auckland estimated the expenditure higher on the whole by £880,000 than in 1884-85, the items of excess being —

	£
Working expenses and interest on railways	538,000
Railway Construction (excluding the amount borrowed)	179,000
Law and Justice	146,000
Election	81,000
Land Revenue Collection	98,000
Military Works	116,000
Commission for Debt Reduction	360,000
Cost of Exchanging (the rupee value being taken at 1s 7d as against 1s 7½d in the past year)	321,000
Other Heads	148,000

To counteract this increase, our able Finance Minister has placed the interest on ordinary debt less by £451,000, the opium charges by £458,000,

